ANGLICA WRATISLAVIENSIA XXI

WROCŁAW 1991
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WROCŁAW 1991
WYDAWNICTWO UNIWERSYTETU WROCŁAWSKIEGO

Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis No 1254
ISSN 0301-7966 ISSN 0239-6661
ISBN 83-229-0560-2

DUWr. Z. 1151

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ACTA UNIVERSITATIS WRATISLAVIENSIS
No 1254

Anglica Wratislaviensia XXI Wrocław 1991

LANGUAGE

ANDRZEJ GŁAZEK

ZERO-DERIVED DENOMINAL NOUNS? AN APPROACH TO WORD MEANING REPRESENTATION

0. The primary goal of this paper is to propose a solution to a specific lexical semantic problem. In order to accomplish that, however, we will have to work out a novel approach to word meaning representation in general, which, it will be suggested, can be applied consistently to a variety of other phenomena.

Throughout the paper we will stick to a modular mentalistic framework (cf. Chomsky 1980), more for reasons of analytical convenience, terminological consistency, and clarity than because of any crucial consequences that might follow from the choice itself.

1. Even a cursory look at the examples below suffices to notice that the words in italics have in these combinations senses which diverge from their usual meanings.

(1) coffee *beans*
(2) a pneumatic *hammer*
(3) glass *wool*
(4) a flying *saucer*
(5) a horse *shoe*
(6) a space *ship*

These combinations could of course be dealt with in the same way as *to catch fire*, *to run a temperature* and other semi-idiomatic expressions. What complicates the issue is the fact that under some conditions the words in italics can preserve those special meanings outside the combinations, as the following examples illustrate:

(7) I don't like strong coffee. Grind just four or five beans.
(8) The horse has lost a shoe.
(9) The astronauts lost control over their ship.

Besides, there are infinitely many combinations of nouns with modifiers like *fake, imitation, ersatz* etc., which also involve a special sense of the modified noun:

(10) a fake *gun*
(11) imitation *brass*

(12) ersatz *coffee*
(13) prospective *teachers*
(14) a former *president*

If the ordinary meanings of the nouns were assumed here, the meaning of the whole phrases would be noncompositional (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 120-121).

These cases could be accounted for by claiming that it is an inherent characteristic of such "fake" words that they change the meanings of the nouns they modify. Example (15) may be taken as an indication that it is not always so.

(15) a fake image of reality

Although imitation brass is strictly speaking not brass, a fake image of reality is after all some image of reality.

Again, it is possible to construct examples involving the same special senses outside such combinations.

(16) It's no use taking this gun. It's a fake.
(17) This is Jimmy Carter. You know, the president.

Besides, some otherwise neutral modifiers can behave like "fake" words in combination with some nouns. Compare (18) and (20) with (19) and (21), respectively.

(18) A zebra is a striped horse.
(19) A zebra is a striped quadruped.
(20) This is a toothless comb.
(21) This is a toothless snake.

In this paper we propose to give a uniform treatment of all these facts in the context of a general approach to lexical meaning representation.

2. It is more or less generally agreed that meaning provides a link between linguistic form and extralinguistic reality (cf. Ogden & Richards 1972: 11, Ullman 1962: 57). Meaning plays a crucial role in enabling linguistic expressions to refer to (perceived) reality. Thus it is the basis of all possible uses of such expressions. Consequently, an adequate linguistic theory incorporating some representation of word meaning must ultimately account for the full Range of Possible Uses (henceforth RPU) of any given word.

The RPU can be conveniently viewed as an infinite set of entities that a given word can be used to refer to. The question now arises how to define such infinite sets in a finite way, as the mind is after all a finite device. The classical answer to the problem, known since antiquity, consists in finding properties common to all entities in the set which could differentiate them from everything that is outside. In technical terms, these are the jointly sufficient and singly necessary conditions for membership in a set. It has long been believed that this solution can be naturally applied to word meaning, and this classical theory of word meaning has been implicitly or explicitly assumed.

This assumption has, however, been under attack for the last thirty odd years. Wittgenstein (1953: 31-32) found out that the RPU of the word *game* cannot be characterized in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. That result has been corroborated by the psychological researches of Rosch (1977, 1978) and her associates (e.g., Rosch & Mervis 1975), which demonstrated that people structure categories as

consisting of the prototype (central / ideal instance) and other members with varying degrees of prototypicality (closeness to the prototype).

The application of Rosch's theory to word meaning and/or conceptual categories is, however, not unproblematic either (cf. Armstrong, Gleitman & Gleitman 1983, Osherson & Smith 1981).

In their strongest versions the two theories of mentally relevant classes of entities differ in a number of ways (cf. Smith & Medin 1981):

1. classes defined by necessary and sufficient conditions v. classes defined by the prototype,
2. equal v. unequal status of members,
3. clear-cut v. fuzzy boundaries,
4. reliance on inherent v. interactional and experiential properties.

3. If either of these theories is taken as the only and universally applicable one, it is easy to find numerous seemingly unsurmountable problems. For instance, "Where exactly is the boundary between blue and green or between big and small?" is a question that is sure to embitter an orthodox classical theorist, while a zealous prototype theorist may be frustrated by an inquiry into the possible differences between the prototypical odd number and the prototypical prime number.

The problems can be avoided if the extreme stances are relaxed. This can be done either by giving up the universalness of any one of the theories or by modifying the theories themselves. Attempts to reconcile the two approaches have been made (e.g., Cuyckens 1984, Lipka 1986, Pulman 1983) and this paper is another attempt in this direction.

4. An examination of the RPU's of the words exemplified in (1)-(20) reveals that they comprise two largely distinct areas, corresponding to what was intuitively and impressionistically called ordinary and shifted special senses of the words. To see that those were not mere intuitions, consider the following phrases:

(22) guns and fake guns
(23) teachers and prospective teachers
(24) wool and glass wool

Even if a little unusual, these phrases sound considerably less strange than the following:

(25) guns and machine guns
(26) teachers and part-time teachers
(27) wool and lamb's wool

This contrast parallels that between the normal, acceptable (28) and the odd (29):

(28) people and dogs
(29) people and children.

The oddness of (29) stems from the fact that *and* carries the conversational implicature that neither of the conjoined categories includes the other, thus implicating that children are not people. Now we may conclude that the difference between

(22)-(24) and (25)-(27) confirms an earlier surmise that while machine guns are guns, fake guns are not. The conjunction test proposed here could be applied to all of the examples we have considered with the same result.

This boundary effect is corroborated by the observation that while (30) entails (31), (32) entails its negation (33) (Lakoff 1982: 35):

(30) This is a black gun.
(31) This is a gun.
(32) This is a fake gun.
(33) This is not a gun.

Also, the linguistic hedges *strictly speaking* and *in the strict sense* make explicit reference to the boundary (Lakoff 1972).

Thus there is a boundary cutting across the RPU, dividing it into the "real" things and all other things that can be referred to by the same word. Consequently, we have the Bounded Range of Use (henceforth BRU) and the Outer Range of Use (henceforth ORU). Entities within the BRU share some properties and can be freely referred to by the given word, entities in the ORU are related to the BRU in various ways but have little in common with one another and can be referred to by the given word only under some contextual conditions. For instance, the concept of real, natural wool has a clear-cut boundary that can be defined in terms of perceptual and interactional properties, whereas cotton wool, glass wool, mineral wool, imitation wool etc. share just the property of being similar to that real stuff. Similarly, real guns can be defined by their common features of various kinds while toy guns, fake guns, and replica guns as well as wooden guns used by boys at play can bear the same name only by virtue of resembling the real thig to varying degrees. The same is true of teachers on the one hand and prospective teachers, former teachers, ex-teachers, would-be teachers, and phony teachers on the other hand, and of innumerable similar cases.

5. The clearly bounded, "real" senses of words, which are used to refer to entities sharing some properties, can naturally be represented in terms of the classical theory, possibly augmented by interactional criteria. It is our contention that such a representation together with a suitable pragmatic theory is sufficient to account for all aspects of word meaning. In particular, we propose to argue that a representation of this form determines the ORU.

Let us recall that the senses of a word in its ORU are context-dependent and that they are all motivated by the central sense in the BRU. In these respects they are very much like the senses of denominal zero-derived verbs studied by Clark & Clark (1979). Consequently, we might try to account for the ORU in a way similar to their approach. To do that we will construct a convention governing the use of words beyond their BRU, replicating the Clarks' convention for denominal verbs (1979: 782).

(34) Extended Word Use Convention

In using a word outside its BRU the speaker means to denote: *a*) the kind of entity, *b*) that he has good reason to believe, *c*) that on this occasion the listener can readily compute, *d*) uniquely, *e*) on the basis of their mutual knowledge, *f*) in such a way that the entity denoted is construed as in topically relevant respects similar to the entities in the BRU and/or related to them by some actual or imaginary process.

The Clarks justified each part of their convention in great detail. Here we can note that parts *a-e* are a particular formulation of Grice's (1975) Co-operative Principle. This principle is a general condition on successful communication and thus need not be included in this particular account of the ORU of words. Part *f* is the essential component of the convention, specifying the possible range of senses a word can take on in the ORU. The clause "similar to the entities in the BRU" accounts for cases like:

(35) a fake *gun* (similar appearance)
(36) ersatz *coffee* (similar functional/interactional properties)

The clause "related to the entities in the BRU by some actual or imaginary process" applies to the following:

(37) a burnt-down *house* (real process)
(38) a would-be *scientist* (imaginary process)
(39) a toothless *comb* (actual or imaginary)

In some cases both of the clauses are applicable:

(40) a winged *horse* (similar appearance and imaginary process)

Similarity and relatedness are a matter of degree, which makes the ORU a fuzzy set in the sense of Zadeh (1965). This is correct because there is no specific value of similarity that is necessary for an entity to be referred to by a given word in some circumstances. Thus for example, *table* can refer to anything from a door placed horizontally on two stools to a large stump (on a picnic), to a handbag (if one plays cards on a train), to a person's back (if someone else writes a note on it).

6. The part of our convention (34) that remains when corollaries to the independently necessary Co-operative Principle are left out specifies some aspects of word meaning and yet we claim it is not a representation of lexical meaning. What is its exact nature then? Our account of the ORU is based on the Clarks' analysis of zero-derived denominal verbs. If we take the parallel one step further, we can regard the shifted senses in the ORU as zero-derived denominal nouns. Consequently, what has remained of our convention can be considered a word formation rule (although the Clarks preferred not to treat theirs as one).

This seemingly unusual kind of Word Formation Rule (henceforth WFR) can be shown to fit in the system of traditionally recognized WFR's and in fact to complete that so far defective system in an interesting way.

Reduplication and compounding aside, WFR's can be divided into affixation and zero-derivation (which is commonly albeit not universally considered a WFR; cf., e.g., Aronoff 1976). They can also be divided into category-changing WFR's and noncategory-changing ones. A cross-classification based on these two divisions should yield four types of WFR's:

(41) *a*) category-changing affixation, *b*) category-changing zero-derivation, *c*) noncategory-changing affixation, *d*) noncategory-changing zero-derivation.

Types *a-c* are well established and can be exemplified by the following productive derivations:

(42) a) go_V — $goer_N$, b) jet_N — jet_V, c) $transformable_A$ — $untransformable_A$.

Zero-derived denominal nouns would exemplify type *d*, until now unattested, thus closing the system.

WFR's usually consist of two components: a formal operation and a semantic operation performed on the base (cf. Aronoff 1976: 63). In the case of zero-derivation, the formal operation is null (apart from a possible category change) and the only transformation is semantic. Part of our convention (34) is just this semantic component of a WFR. The complete rule could be formulated as follows:

(43) Denominal Zero Nominalization

$[X]_N$ 'x' + $\emptyset \rightarrow [X]_N$ 'something similar or related by some actual or imaginary process to x', i.e., phonological form X of the morphonological category Noun, meaning 'x', becomes, without changing its form, a noun meanig 'something...'.

As with other productive WFR's, some derivatives may become conventionalized and lexicalized, which results in polysemy. Indeed the senses of *beans*, *shoe*, and *ship* in (1), (5), and (6), respectively, seem to have become independent lexical items.

7. To sum up, the extended senses of nouns exemplified in (1)-(20) are all instances of lexicalized or productively zero-derived denominal nouns. Since the base and the derivative are homophonous and syntactically indistinguishable, the choice of one or the other meaning is contextually determined, the base sense having natural priority.

8. The proposed approach is intermediate between the classical and the prototype theories in the following way. The BRU is characterized in classical terms except for the possibility of using interactional properties. The relation between the BRU and the RPU, however, is exactly the relation between the prototype and the category. The RPU is determined by the BRU, which is tantamount to defining the RPU in prototype terms.

This approach can easily be generalized to the entire lexicon, even to colour terms and relational adjectives, where the BRU is the focal or extreme point.

Although prototypes are not directly represented, they are derivable from the representations. Rosch & Mervis (1975) established that prototypicality corresponds to the degree of family resemblance the given representative bears to the others. The prototype is the representative that is the most similar to all the others. The degree of family resemblance is easily computable on the basis of the real world knowledge associated with the BRU. This result is in line with recent results in cognitive science, where prototype effects are now considered "superficial phenomena that may have many sources" (Lakoff 1987: 56; cf. also Rosch 1978: 41 and Pulman 1983).

We can illustrate the division of labour between the components of our theory if we consider the meaning of *beans* in the following set of examples: *beans, green beans, plastic beans* and *coffee beans*. The first two represent directly the lexical meaning of

the item in question with *green beans* construed as less prototypical on the basis of one's world knowledge. The third example illustrates a productive derivative of the basic sense obtained by convention (34) or rule (43), while the last phrase, *coffee beans*, contains a lexicalized extension of the original sense.

In contrast to our account, the classical theory has nothing to say about phrases like *plastic beans* or the difference between *beans* and *green beans*. The prototype approach, on the other hand, capitalizes on this kind of difference but, by treating all but the first example as nonprototypical members of a single lexical category *beans*, obliterates distinctions between them and leaves the boundary phenomena illustrated above (section 4) unexplained.

Thus our approach seems not merely a possible reconciliation of the two underlying theories but a viable and efficient alternative to either of them.

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No 1254

Anglica Wratislaviensia XXI Wrocław 1991

ANDRZEJ GŁAZEK

SOME ASPECTS OF THE FORM-MEANING RELATIONSHIP IN IDIOMS

1.1. Idioms are notoriously troublesome linguistic phenomena. They have managed to resist linguists' repeated attempts at analysis and rationalization of their apparently bizarre semantico-syntactic behaviour. Although the past two decades have seen a series of significant steps towards the solution of some of the problems (e. g., Weinreich 1969, Fraser 1970, Makkai 1972, Newmeyer 1972, Ernst 1980), there is still no general consensus as to even the most basic ones.

1.2. Some of the notorious stumblig blocks are the following, not yet satisfactorily answered questions:

1.2.1. What is the nature of idiomaticity? or How should idioms be defined? While it is agreed that idioms are larger-than-word chunks of linguistic structure whose use departs from what could be predicted from the usual meanings of individual constituent words, little more can be said without subscribing to some particular view of the idiom's internal structure. Weinreich (1969) defines the idiom as follows: "A phraseological unit that involves at least two polysemous constituents, and in which there is a reciprocal contextual selection of subsenses." This definition presupposes a view (sometimes termed the non-unit approach) on which portions of the meaning of an idiom are in some way allocated to individual words.

Makkai (1972: 128), in contrast, distinguishes between lexemic and sememic idioms and defines the latter as: "A polylexemic construction whose aggregate literal meaning derived from its constituent lexemes functions additionally as the realization of an unpredictable sememic network". Obviously, the claim underlying this definition is that parts of idioms do not carry parts of their idiomatic meaning (the unit approach).

1.2.2. What is the degree of syntactic transformability of idioms? and Where idioms differ in this respect, what is the reason for that? Little has been offered in the way of explanation here, except for the fact that Fraser (1970: 39-40) provided a hierarchy of syntactic processes and located various idioms along the scale. Newmeyer (1972: 299) made some suggestions that syntactic peculiarities of idioms follow from the semantic relationships between the literal and nonliteral senses of the expressions but no details were given.

1.2.3. Why do some idioms allow lexical variation and modification whereas others do not? It has repeatedly been observed that the idiomatic sense of *kick the bucket* 'die' is lost in *kick the pail*, and this invariance is often cited as a property of idioms at large, which of necessity leads to treating frequent cases of actual variability (e.g., *bear/carry one's cross* 'tolerate a heavy weight of sorrow, inconvenience' etc., *grasp / seize the nettle* "attack a difficult situation or problem", *miss the boat/bus* "fail to take advantage of a chance when it is offered') as merely accidental.

Each of the above questions has to be addressed and answered if one is to resolve the problem of greatest practical import:

1.2.4. How are idioms represented in the mental lexicon? The two competing views were signalled above. The non-unit treatment consists in viewing idioms as semantically compositional expressions containing special, not otherwise occurring, senses of their constituents. The unit approach treats whole idioms as lexical units on a par with single words, normally semantically unanalysable.

1.3. While we do not propose to offer an answer to the question posed in 1.2.1, we shall address ourselves to the other problems mentioned above in an attempt to find a principled, uniform solution. In so doing, our central claim will be that ***the relationship between the literal and the idiomatic senses of an expression determines the behaviour of the idiom.*** Basically, this is a development of Newmeyer's (1972) above-mentioned hints, drawing on some recent advances in cognitive linguistics.

1.4. The claims are substantiated by evidence drawn from a sample of 250 idioms, all of the syntactic shape V+NP, investigated with respect to three factors:

a) passivizability, which should be indicative of the regularities governing transformability. (Passivization and some other processes are now often treated as lexical rather than syntactic. This, however, does not make the task of explaining the differences between idiomatic and nonidiomatic expressions vis-à-vis passivization easier. As nothing hinges here on the kind of theory of the passive, we shall continue to refer to passivization as a syntactic process.)

b) internal modifiabiliy, i.e., the possibility of adding a modifying expression to one of the elements of an idiom

c) variability of lexical composition.

1.5. The principal source of idioms in the sample are two dictionaries: Cowie et al.'s *Oxford Dictionary of Current Idiomatic English* vol. 2 (ODCIE) (1983) and *Longman Dictionary of English Idioms* (LDEI) (1979), both of which contain large numbers of (real and made-up) examples of usage as well as explicit information about passivizability and lexical variability. Additionally, we have consulted Wood's *English Verbal Idioms* (EVI) (1965), which gives occasional comments on passivizability, and Kunin's *English-Russian Phraseological Dictionary* (ERPD) (1984), providing a wealth of actual examples. All illustrative sentences in this paper come from these sources unless otherwise stated.

2. As has been suggested, the central characteristic of idioms is the nature of the relationship obtaining between the idiomatic meaning of an expression, its literal sense, and the meanings of its parts.

2.1. First of all, it must be said that there may be no such relationship. This is, for instance, the case with the idiom *trip the light fantastic* 'dance'. Its parts do not contribute individually to the meaning of the idiom, neither do they add up to any sensible literal interpretation of the expression.

2.2. Most of the other idioms do have a literal interpretation, e.g., *kick the bucket* 'hit the pail with the foot', *pull sb's leg* 'draw sb's lower limb'. It must be borne in mind, however, that the relationship between meanings which we are concerned with here is synchronic, not etymological. Such a relationship obtains only if it can be recovered on the basis of the current meaning of an idiom, meanings of the words that constitute it and one's knowledge of the world. If such a relationship exists, i.e., if a familiar idiomatic expression can be made sense of in terms of its lexical constituents, we shall say that the idiomatic sense is motivated, otherwise it will be referred to as unmotivated. It must be stressed that motivation is radically different from compositionality. An expression is compositional if its sense can be derived from its form and the meanings of its parts without any prior knowledge of the whole. An expression is merely motivated if its meaning can be a posteriori construed as not arbitrary, given the senses of its parts.

2.3. Thus, the following are examples of (synchronically, for most people) unmotivated idioms: *carry the can* 'accept the blame', *chew the fat* 'talk idly', *kick the bucket, paint the town red* 'have a very enjoyable time, in a noisy and lively way'.

2.4. In some otherwise unmotivated idioms, one of the constituents can be construed as metonymically standing for an argument in the idiomatic interpretation. Names of body parts or other belongings can be understood as metonymically representing the possessors. This is a possibility in such idioms as: *pull sb's leg* 'make fun of sb', *twist sb's tail* 'tease sb', *get sb's goat* 'make sb feel irritated', where sb's X stands for sb.

2.5. A limited number of idioms seem to be motivated by the literal senses of the individual constituents rather than by their combined literal meaning. *Steal sb's thunder* 'spoil sb's attempt to be impressive by doing what he had intended to do before him' is a case in point. *Take pains* 'make special efforts' and *sharpen sb's wits* "make sb more alert' appear similar.

2.6. The great majority of V+NP idioms, however, are motivated in a different way. The idiomatic senses are linked to the literal meaning metaphorically (based on analogy) or metonymically (based on some sort of contiguity). In this respect this relationship is very much like that between extended and literal senses of individual lexical items.

2.6.1. The exact nature of the relationship involved seems to be in line with Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) claims about conceptual metaphor and metonymy. In spite of the large number of idioms motivated in this way (at least 195 out of 250 investigated), there seem to be a limited number of primitive conceptual metaphoric and metonymic models. Metonymy, which underlies most of the 195 idioms, is invariably based on one of the following relations: instance—class (part—whole), cause—effect, means—ends. All idioms motivated in this way involve understanding abstract situations in terms of physical, experientially simpler situations, just like all extensions

of lexical meaning proceed from the physical to the abstract. As Lakoff (1986: 446-453) convincingly argues, the idiomatic meaning is based on images which are more specific than a plain literal interpretation of the expression. For instance, the idiom *sweep the board* 'win all the prizes' invokes the image of taking the pool from the table after a successful gambling game rather than applying a broom to any long, thin piece of timber. Thus, an abstract situation is understood in terms of a very particular concrete situation.

2.6.2. The following are typical examples of metaphorically and metonymically motivated idioms: *spill the beans* 'give away information', *keep one's nose clean* 'keep out of trouble' (metaphors); *sweep the board, scoop the pool* 'win all the prizes' (metonymy: concrete instance for abstract class); *bite the dust* 'die', *climb the walls* 'be distraught' (metonymy: effect for cause); *have a bee in one's bonnet* 'be obsessed with sth', *see red* 'become extremely angry' (metonymy: cause for effect); *clip sb's wings* 'restrict sb's activities' (means for ends); *measure one's length* 'fall flat on the ground' (imputed aim for means).

2.6.3. In fact, most idioms of this sort are motivated in a complex metaphoric/metonymic way. To take just one example, let us see how the idiomatic sense of the idiom *spread one's wings*, defined in ODCIE as 'to (have the confidence to) extend one's activities and interests', is related to the literal sense-based image. First of all, the relationship is based on the metaphorical analogy between human behaviour and birds' behaviour (which is also to be found in, e.g., *clip sb's wings, ruffle one's feathers* 'show aggression' and *foul one's nest* 'bring disgrace to one's home, family, profession or country'). Now, the image of a bird spreading its wings is a tangible instance standing metonymically for an abstract class of other kinds of expansion or extension. Besides, the image metonymically replaces that of a bird flying (means for ends), which is in turn, in the case of a young bird, an instance of doing something new, and hence a metonymic substitute for the more abstract concept.

3.1. Having shown what the relationship between the literal meaning of an idiomatic expression and its idiomatic sense looks like, we shall argue below that the exact nature of this relationship is the only characteristic of idioms that affects their formal behaviour, which is peculiar to those expressions. All other constraints result from factors that are shared by idiomatic and nonidiomatic expressions alike.

3.2. It is our contention that the special status of the relationship in question is mainly due to the fact that it authorizes or prevents assignment of a portion of an idiom's meaning to one of its constituents. This is crucial in that many apparently purely syntactic operations seem to be accompanied by a pragmatic requirement that some of the elements involved possess specific semantic content, e.g., topicalization seems to be impossible if the topicalized word is semantically empty.

3.3. There are two ways in which the literal meaning of an expression can help to assign specific sense to one of its parts on the idiomatic interpretation.

3.3.1. First, as has already been indicated, there may be some metonymic relationship between a part of the literal expression and an element of the idiomatic interpretation. Thus, e.g., *your leg* in *He pulled your leg* stands for 'you', *bottle* in *He hit*

the bottle stands for 'alcohol', and *heart* in *She lost heart* for 'enthusiasm'. Again the metonymic models are quite general.

3.3.2. The other possibility can be explained in terms of Fauconnier's (1985) notion of *mental spaces* and the *Identity CIDT Principle on Mental Spaces*:

> ID Principle on Spaces
> Given two spaces M, M' linked by a connector F and a noun phrase NP, introducing or pointing to an element x in M,
> a) if x has a counterpart x' (x = F(x')) in M', NP may identify x' (Fauconnier 1985: 22).

Among others, Fauconnier (1985: 31) discusses so-called *domain spaces*, where the ID Principle operates across domains of activity. Idiomatic and literal interpretations of idiomatic expressions could be considered microspaces of that kind, the connector F being the complex metonymic and metaphorical models that link the two interpretations. An element of the literal interpretation will have a counterpart in the idiomatic interpretation if the two spaces are structured in a parallel fashion. Such parallelism is typically produced by metaphorical motivation and metonymic motivation based on instance—class relations. In both cases the result is a sort of tangible model in terms of which more abstract situations can be comprehended. If, e.g., we consider the idiom *spill the beans*, we can see that metaphorical motivation enables *beans* to stand for 'information', although in themselves, abstracting from this image and interpretation, beans are not similar to information. To take an example of the other kind, in *argue the toss* 'oppose a decision that has already been taken' the toss can be identified with any decision that has already been taken. In other types of motivated idioms, the two interpretations are not likely to be parallel in the required manner and hence no portion of the idiomatic interpretation can be assigned to any of the constituents, e.g., in the idiom *bite the dust* motivated by the cause-effect metonymy, *the dust* cannot obtain any semantic content on the idiomatic reading.

4. Now that all the central mechanisms have been described, we are in a position to tackle the particular questions posed at the beginning of this paper and to see how the mechanisms fare as explanatory tools.

4.1. The first problem for us to attend to is the question of syntactic transformability, exemplified here by passivizability. Our main claim is that with respect to passivization idioms should behave in exactly the same way as nonidiomatic expressions unless there is some inhibiting factor stemming from the relationship between the literal and the idiomatic interpretation.

4.1.1. Passivization is a syntactic process affecting sentences of the form S(ubject NP) + V(erb) + O(bject NP), consisting, among other things, in putting O in the position of S and either leaving S out altogether or placing it at the end of the clause. Such a reordering has some functional correlates:

a) O is topicalized,

b) the referent of O is interpreted as in some, as yet not fully understood sense, independent of the referent of S. S and O must usually be noncoreferential and S cannot be the possessor or experiencer of O, or otherwise be in full control of it.

Due to these pragmatic properties not all passive counterparts of nonidiomatic active sentences are acceptable. Consider the following examples:

(1) *You know John, don't you? Five windows were broken (by him)
(2) *John was killed (by himself)
(3) *His hand was taken out of his pocket (by Tom) (if *his* = Tom's).

4.1.2. As far as idioms are concerned, the behaviour of an expression with respect to passivization can be predicted in the following way: if the idiom is motivated in such a way that the object can be assigned a part of the idiomatic meaning, it can be passivized unless the object is inherently connected with the subject.

4.1.3. This explanation is borne out by the data in the following way:

a) virtually all idioms with clearly topicalizable (meaning-bearing) objects independent of the subjects (in the sense outlined above) passivize. Examples include:

(4) The problem was that with their cover blown they had nowhere to go (ERPD) (*blow sb's cover* 'give away the secret of sb's whereabouts')
(5) We have to hop along with clipped wings (ERPD) (*clip sb's wings*).

b) virtually no unmotivated idioms, of necessity containing nonmeaning-bearing objects, passivize. E.g.:

(6) *The bucket was kicked (by John) (*kick the bucket*)
(7) *The fat was chewed (by Dick) for hours (*chew the fat*)

c) topicalizable objects dependent on the subjects do not passivize:

(8) *His own nest was fouled (by him) (*foul one's nest*)
(9) *His step should be watched (by him) (*watch one's step* 'be careful about one's behaviour').

d) idioms that fall in between the three clear cases display a mixed picture whose exact nature is very hard to grasp as the data are mostly inconsistent between sources. To illustrate the point, out of 155 entries in the sample shared by ODCIE and LDEI, 51 differ as to passivizability. Passive examples were also found in ERPD of idioms marked as unpassivizable in both the dictionaries:

(10) You're only an apostate with your coat turned (*turn one's coat* "change one's support to the opposite side, view').

EVI too differs sometimes from the other sources in its passivizability markings (e.g., *lick one's wounds* 'comfort oneself after being defeated or punished' is marked as passivizable (even though "not often"). To top it all LDEI gives a real passive example of the idiom *build castles in the air* 'cultivate dreams, hopes, desires that are unlikely to become reality', classified by Fraser (1970: 42) as completely frozen:

(11) Your scheme is merely a castle in the air built on purpose to justify this folly.

All the inconsistencies can be explained if we adopt the view presented above that the blocking of passivization in idioms is not their individual grammatical property but the result of general pragmatic/functional factors. A speaker realizes that an idiom is passivizable when s/he is confronted with an appropriate discourse setting for a passivized idiom, or with an actual instance of passive usage.

4.1.4. To close our discussion of passivizability in idioms, it should be stressed that more is involved here than the requirement that both the literal sense of an idiomatic expression and a literal expression of its idiomatic content be passivizable. Newmeyer (1972: 299) claims that the reason why the idioms *kick the bucket, shoot the bull* "talk idly' and *make the scene* 'appear' do not passivize, whereas *pull sb's leg, spill the beans* and *bury the hatchet* 'agree to be friends after a quarrel' do, is that the meanings of the former are one-place predicates while those of the latter are two-place predicates. Our explanation additionally accounts for the fact that idioms like *bay the moon* 'want sth one cannot have', *raise the roof* 'make a lot of noise', *hit the ceiling* 'lose one's temper' etc. do not passivize although both the literal and the idiomatic meanings are two-place predicates.

4.2. As far as modifiability of idioms is concerned, two subcases must be distinguished depending on whether the modification is superficially compatible with the literal interpretation only (e.g., *He could cut a sharp corner* (ERPD) — *cut corners* 'do sth in the easiest, quickest way, disregarding rules, safety') or with the idiomatic interpretation only (e.g., *He fouls his own academic nest* (ODCIE). The two types differ with respect to conditions on their occurrence.

4.2.1. Modification of the "sharp corner" kind affects the idiomatic interpretation in the following way. Given the image motivating the idiomatic interpretation and the metonymic/metaphorical connector, a modification of the motivating image should be carried over to the motivated idiom by the same connector. So, for instance, knowing that the idiom *bell the cat* means 'do sth dangerous to protect others', and that it is based on the image of a mouse hanging a bell on a cat's neck so that other mice could know when the cat was near, we interpret the sentence

(12) Which of us dare bell this wild cat? (ERPD)

as implying doing something extremely dangerous (if a mouse's belling the cat is (an instance of) doing something dangerous, then its belling the wild cat is (an instance of) doing something extremely dangerous). Clearly, not all, and in fact quite few modifications of this kind can be carried over to idiomatic interpretations. Whether it is possible seems to be a matter of the particular image and the particular modification involved. One general restriction is, however, that the idiomatic interpretation must be related to (motivated by) the literal sense. Hence such idioms as *kick the bucket, trip the light fantastic* etc. cannot be modified in this way.

4.2.2. The other sort of modification (of the "academic nest" type) consists in direct modification of a part of the idiomatic interpretation assigned to the superficially modified constituent of the expression. Thus, modification should be possible only in cases where the ID Principle mentioned above is applicable. This is indeed borne out by the data. The following examples are representative of this type:

(13) Thus the arms production is breaking Britain's economic back (ERPD) (*break sb's back* 'harm sb by keeping him busy with too much work')
(14) She has not the vocal guns for the part of Clytemnestra (ERPD) (*have the guns* 'have the necessary qualifications')
(15) The 20th anniversary of the Prague Spring has been used [...] to reap a propaganda harvest (BBC World Service, Aug. 1988) (*reap a harvest* 'obtain profit').

This type of modification was studied by Ernst (1980) and the phenomenon has led some researchers to claim that idioms are in fact compositional and their constituents are listed separately in the lexicon with the special meanings appearing in idioms (cf., e.g., Gazdar et al. 1985), e.g., one of the meanings of *beans* is alleged to be 'information'

(*spill the beans*) and one of the meanings of *hair*, 'unimportant detail' (*split hairs* 'argue over unimportant details'). This analysis is problematic in view of the fact that in some cases both the literal and the idiomatic interpretations are activated. One such case is the following example:

(16) The hairs *of specialization* are split *finer* than that (ODCIE).

In this single occurrence of the idiom *split hairs*, both types of modification are present at the same time. We shall return to this question below.

4.3. Lexical variability of idioms can again be explained on the basis of their motivation. Lexical variation is possible if it does not cause any change in the motivating image or if the change can be carried over to the idiomatic interpretation by the established metonymic/metaphorical connectors. In cases such as *grasp/seize the nettle, pull the strings/wires* 'use private influence', *tread/step on sb's corns/toes* 'hurt sb's feelings' the image does not change (cf. lexical variation in Lewicki's (1976: 98-99) sense), whereas in such pairs as *lose/save face* 'be/avoid being humble', *lose/take heart* 'become discouraged/encouraged', *let sleeping dogs lie/waken sleeping dogs* '(not) look for trouble on purpose' the change (oppositeness of meaning) can easily be transmitted on to the idiomatic interpretation (cf. Lewicki's (1976: 56-64) derivational relationships between idioms). The occurrence of lexical variation is much more restricted than that of modification discussed above. The principal reason seems to be that unlike modification lexical variation destroys the identity of an idiom and thus makes it less efficient in communication. Again, quite clearly, there is a radical difference between motivated and unmotivated idioms. The latter, not being linked to their literal meanings via images, cannot normally display any lexical variation.

5. As can be seen, motivation is the central concept figuring in the explanation of the various phenomena discussed above. The reason why it is so becomes clear if we adopt the following view of idioms.

5.1. Idioms are unpredictable, but not arbitrary, combinations of larger-than-word forms and meanings. Idioms qua forms are fully regular. Their constituent words behave morphologically in the same way as outside idioms (cf. Newmeyer 1972: 296). Phrases undergo all applicable syntactic operations, subject to some general functional/pragmatic restrictions. It is motivation that provides a basis for the implementation of these restrictions. The principal role of motivation in doing so is to enable constituents of idioms to acquire portions of the respective idiomatic meanings.

5.2. As we argued above, motivation is fully derivable from three kinds of information: the idiomatic meaning, the literal meanings of constituents and knowledge of the world. Additionally, the mediating image is selected in such a way that the link between the idiomatic meaning and the image should be decomposable into a small number of primitive metonymic/metaphorical models. This conceptual machinery is not peculiar to idioms. It manifests itself in the polysemy of lexical items (in fact idioms could be regarded as extended meanings of polysemous phrases) and in reasoning (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1986).

5.3. Now we are in a position to address the problem of the representation of idioms in the lexicon. In view of the preceding discussion, it seems reasonable to assume

that the only unpredictable information concerning idioms is their meaning. All other properties can be derived from the separate entries for their constituents and from the interplay between the idiomatic senses and the senses of individual words in ways described above. Of course, we would not risk claiming that idioms were exception--free. We do, however, believe that they are at least no more exception-ridden than nonidiomatic expressions.

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ACTA UNIVERSITATIS WRATISLAVIENSIS
No 1254

Anglica Wratislaviensia XXI Wrocław 1991

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ALLITERATIVE PATTERNS IN *THE PEARL*[1]

1. Introduction

The metrical structure of *The Pearl* has attracted prosodists and metrists on account of its unique ornateness, which distinguishes it from the three remaining poems included in MS. Cotton Nero A. X., and makes it an interesting specimen of late Middle English poetry. The approximate date of its composition has not been agreed upon; some scholars suggest the latter part of the 14th century, others do not exclude the possibility that the poem may have been composed a little earlier. We can, however, safely assume that *The Pearl* was written in the North-Western dialect of Middle English, and the poem's form enables us to classify it as alliterative. The question arises, however, to what extent our definition of alliteration suffices for discussion of *The Pearl* in these terms, or whether we must remodel the concept of alliterative patterning with reference to the distinct structure of the poem.

Bearing in mind the rules of Old English alliteration and comparing them with the alliterative patterning in *The Pearl* we may be right in asserting with many metrists that alliteration in this poem is purely ornamental. Opinions may vary about this matter; Northup (1897: 338), for instance, claims that *The Pearl* is not written in alliterative measure, but is prevailingly alliterative, McGalliard (1969: 290) thinks that the term "optional but preferred" is the most appropriate.

In Old English alliteration performed a structural role and had some characteristic features (like, e.g., no stanzaic arrangement, frequent enjambment, non-relevant vocalism of the onset syllable, clusters *sp, st, sk* alliterating with identical groups only, rhyme – found very rarely, predominating alliterative combinations: aa/ax and ax/ax). By the Middle English period alliteration had lost much of its former rigidity, which was caused by factors of purely linguistic, literary, and totally extra-textual nature (as, e.g., foreign influence). It cannot be denied that Old English poetry changed its character because of developments in English itself. The language had become more analytical, which manifested itself in the increased number of functional words (due to the loss of

[1] For all the valuable suggestions which have helped me to write this paper, I am immeasurably indebted to Professor E. G. Stanley, of Pembroke College, Oxford.

inflectional endings), changes in the stress patterns, thus making the medium less appropriate to maintain any longer the density, strict organization and regularity found normally in classical Old English poetry. Those new trends in the language were immediately reflected in the syntax; by the end of the Middle English period the word order had become more restricted. The degree of regularization depended, however, to some extent on the poet's personal preferences. For instance, the word-order in the *Pearl*-poet sometimes goes beyond what could be considered as standard for prose of the period.

As for the development of alliterative poetry in Middle English, numerous investigations have been undertaken, usually stressing literary or external factors.

2. "Expanded Alliteration"

Alliteration in *The Pearl* changes noticeably throughout the poem. It has always been pointed out by editors and commentators that the middle stanzas (roughly the lines 241 - 972), devoted to the discourse on theological matters, are less alliterative than the initial or final ones; the natural explanation being that the alliterative medium was less adequate to yield the subtleties of religious disputes. Gordon (1953: 97) sees the influence of the subject-matter on the number of Scandinavian loan-words as a factor heavily affecting the form. We might, however, argue as to what extent scandinavianization affected the alliteration in the poem. Traditional alliterative poetry depends heavily on Germanic vocabulary (whether it is Scandinavian is not relevant) whereas the whole stock of theological words, so abundant in *The Pearl*, was borrowed from Latin either directly or through Old French or Anglo-Norman. These words were usually polysyllabic, some with varying stress patterns, which may have been one of the reasons for their "inappropriateness" in the genuine alliterative passages. It is evident upon the first reading that first four sections of the poem are characterized by heavy alliteration. For instance, in the first five stanzas there is only one line without alliteration (l. 41) and usually three stressed alliterating syllables in the line predominate, though there are also a few lines where all the four stressed syllables alliterate (e.g., ll. 47, 55, 56, 40 – this last line contains even five stresses on lexical words and all the five seem to alliterate). A similar tendency continues more or less throughout the next three sections, though towards the end of the fourth section we cannot but say that the density of alliteration decreases; there are more lines with only two alliterating words and, e.g., in section four there are altogether twelve lines without alliteration (ll. 181, 185, 186, 205, 206, 215, 218[2], 219, 220, 225, 232, 239) as compared with one in section 1 or three in section 2. The middle stanzas contain a very heavy percentage of lines without any alliteration at all; out of 732 lines, 247 (33.7%) do not have any alliterating words. They are usually classified as descriptive passages and hence treated on the same footing

[2] l. 218 – unless we assign a secondary stress to *ouerture*, which will then become an example of prosodic sandhi, consisting in the hierarchization of the word stress. Every hemistich normally contains two metric stresses (ictus), but ictus can occasionally be represented by the secondary stress when there is no second word with the primary stress in the hemistich which could represent the arsis.

as the initial four sections to which they are equal in the number of lines (adopting Gordon's classification). A more detailed examination reveals, however, that alliteration in the last four sections (as compared with the first ones) is much more scarce and unsystematic; out of 240 lines, 85 do not contain any alliteration, which makes about 35%, whereas in the case of the initial stanzas, out of 240, 20 lines are devoid of alliteration (8.33%). And again, the same question arises: was it a deliberate intention of the poet and if so, are there any other kinds of prosodic linking, of whatever kind, which might possibly make up for the gradually decreasing density of alliteration?

In the attempt to answer this question we must bear in mind some features of *The Pearl* formal organization, namely its peculiar stanzaic arrangement. Each stanza (in twenty sections) is linked with the preceding and following one by concatenation relying on the recurrence of the same word or partial recurrence. The effect created gives the impression of the flawless unity of the whole poem and, at the same time, singles out stanzas as separate units. It is also the repetition (understood in a very broad sense) within the stanza that calls for special attention. Alliteration, as well as rhyme, is regarded as a unit of rhythmic patterning. This in turn imposes a kind of parallelism reflected in the phonological plane. It relates to rhythmic measure extending from the outset of one stressed syllable to the outset of the next, thus functioning as a link within a line. In the strict understanding of alliterative connections we limit our field of investigation to a single line. However, already in Anglo-Saxon prosody (in certain poems) there existed a peculiar practice of binding together consecutive lines, so that the last stressed syllable of one line sets the alliteration for the second line. Examples of this appear in *Exodus* ll. 41 - 44:

deadra hræwum – dugoð for gewat
Wop wæs wide, worulddreama lyt,
wæron bleahtrosmi um banda belocene,
alyfed laðsið leode gretam ...

The next example comes from *The Wanderer* ll. 26-29:

hwær ic feorr oþþe neah findam *m*eahte
þone þe in *m*eoduhealle *m*ine wisse
oþþe mec freondleasne frefran wolde,
wenian mid wynnum. Wat se þe cunnað ...

(examples from Oakden 1930: 148)

This interesting feature of Old English verse (successfully employed up to Middle English times) allows us to go with our examination beyond one-line boundaries and discern any possible links within the units occupying the highest position in the prosodic hierarchy, viz. stanzas. A broader look at alliterative patterning is indispensable in case of such an elaborate poem as *The Pearl*, in order to appreciate fully its artistry. In the whole poem there are five cases of this ingenious device:

ll. 153 - 154 And ever me thoght I schulde not wonde
For wo ther weles so wynne wore.

ll. 638 - 639 Fyrste was wroght to blysse par*f*yt,
Oure *f*orme fader hit con for*f*ete ...

ll. 1005 - 1006 The emerade the furthe so grene of scale;
The *s*ardonyse the fyfthe ston;

ll. 1166-1167 Over mervelous meres, so mad arayde
Of saas thagh I were rasch and ronk,
ll. 1169-1170 For, ryght as I sparred unto the bonk,
That braththe out of my dreant me brayde.

Yet under closer investigation the poem reveals more of such "expanded alliteration" (using this term we mean a recurrence, echoing of the same phoneme, or phonemic cluster, extending through more than one line). The resulting effect is audible chiming. It becomes apparent now that in discussing expanded alliteration we go beyond the commonly accepted notion of alliteration and concentrate more on the flexibility of the poet's licence. To produce a chiming effect the poet appears to have exploited freely the musical resources of his poetic language. This tendency to adorn the poem with various kinds of phonological (and sometimes – verbal, as will be shown later) repetition could, for example, be detected in lines bound together by repetition of the same consonantal phoneme. It can be organized in such a way that the alliterative sound of one line is echoed in the next one, often regardless of the alliterative sequence in the next line. It may sometimes be the last stressed lexical item, or the first one, or else the word echoing the alliteration of the previous line may occupy a medial position in the line (the second or third stressed word). The distribution of lines with the so-called "alliterative enjambment" (a term used interchangeably with expanded alliteration with regard to the position in the line and in the whole poem) shows that the initial stanzas are characterized by a relatively low occurrence of alliterative enjambment which may be accounted for by the fact that the poet is careful and mindful of "proper" alliteration (each line having a different alliterating sound). The medial stanzas, generally regarded as the most irregular ones, enjoy instead quite a number of supplementary interlinear links. The final stanzas, though usually treated on a par with the initial ones, show a slightly higher occurrence of alliterative enjambment, which may again be suggestive of the poet's tendency to maintain the chiming effects, if not by "pure" alliteration, then by some other kind of sound parallelism.

3. Verbal Repetition

It has been mentioned that the chiming effects in *The Pearl* are also enriched by another kind of physical, acoustic parallelism, viz. verbal repetition. A repetition of a word (leaving aside the powerful effect it may have in the semantic sphere) constitutes in itself a kind of phonological foregrounding or echo. It may sometimes be accompanied by a tendency to adorn a piece of poetry with devices such as alliteration or other deliberate arrangements contributing to the harmonious and artistically elaborate presentation of ideas. The lexical repetition should always be identified with phonological patterns, which results from the fact that verbal iterations entail the repetitions of sounds. In the case of *The Pearl*, we may be dealing with an exact repetition of the same word in the stanza, for example *kynde* appearing three times in section 5, stanza 3. Those manifold repetitions (e.g., *God* repeated three times in section 9, stanza 1) appear to be the result of rhetorical sophistication and also a clear and conscious intention of the poet, whose mastery over the form and undeniable

craftsmanship would have been sufficient enough to have otherwise avoided superfluity of expression. Section 6, stanza 1 provides us with another example of verbal and consequently sound parallelism in that the word *leue* occurs four times within the same prosodic unit. More numerous are the stanzas with twofold repetition, e.g., *alle* (section 7, stanza 3), *couenaunt* (sec. 10, st. 2), *gentyl* (sec. 11, st. 1), *grace* (sec. 11, st. 2), *wroȝt* (sec. 14, st. 4), *þowsande* (sec. 15, st. 3), *gret* (sec. 16, st. 2), *pes* (sec. 16, st. 4), *twelve* (sec. 17, st. 2 and sec. 18, st. 4). The examples I have adduced (however slim evidence they might present) seem yet to support our earlier observations and favour the conclusion that the decreasing alliteration of the middle stanzas is compensated for by other components of the general "symphony" of phonological schemes, one of which is lexical repetition, as it may act as a pivot of a continuous repetition of the same alliterative sound throughout the stanza.

The *Pearl*-poet has achieved a fusion of alliterative enjambment and verbal repetition by using one of the features of the overall metrical design, viz. concatenation. An inherent characteristic of this device is the location of the repetition. The commonest place for it is at the beginning of some relevant unit; be it a grammatical unit, or – as in the case of *The Pearl* – a prosodic unit, the stanza. The invariable parts of the unit, i.e., the verbal repetitions themselves (within one section only because in the next one the invariable part assumes another lexical form) perform multiple functions in the metrical organization of the poem in question. Firstly, they attract our attention as potential bearers of meaning. Secondly, constituting a recurrent refrain, they focus the poem, shape its form to such an extent that eventually their accumulation evokes the impression that *The Pearl* may indeed be a "word-hinged" poem. Thirdly, because, as has been remarked, verbal repetition is inseparably connected with acoustic repetition, of which alliteration constitutes an integral part, it may be perceived as part of alliterative enjambment or interplay of sounds, extending beyond one line. Given this, we may view the link-words in the preceding stanzas as setting the alliterative pattern for the first line of the next stanza and in this way not only does this device maintain the verbal iteration but also allows for the alliteration between stanzas to run smoothly and uninterruptedly throughout the poem. This peculiar interaction of repetition and alliteration has also been pointed out by Oakden (1930: 228), who noticed that "they [the poets] make extensive use of 'repetition' and 'grouping' and added as much alliteration as possible".

Dealing with such a sophisticated poem as *The Pearl* we cannot, however, exclude the possibility of purely rhetoric handling of repetition, not infrequent in medieval times.

4. Interlinear Alliterative Linking

Another interesting phenomenon concerning the alliterative patterns in *The Pearl* can be seen in the repetition or predominance of the same alliterative sound throughout the stanza. It may, of course, be questioned to what extent it is a result of the poet's conscious attempts to contribute to the overall euphony of the whole poem, or whether it is just haphazard. Nevertheless, the fact remains that in the case of 93 stanzas (out of 101), excluding sec. 8, st. 1; sec. 9, st. 1; sec. 10, st. 1; sec. 10, st. 2; sec. 13, st. 5; sec. 14,

st. 4; sec. 15, st. 1, and sec. 20, st. 2, we can discern an unobtrusive interweaving of one alliterative sound in the stanza. There are two examples in the poem where the alliterative sound is repeated four times in the stanza, viz. section 3, stanza 4 (*m* – though in the case of the first line it is only one hemistich) and section 18, stanza 1 (*p*). Stanza 2 of section 12 presents a curious case in that (apart from the first line) there are two main alliterative sounds, viz. *s* and *h* ($3 \times s$ and $3 \times h$) and even if the remaining lines do not have "proper" alliteration, there is still a subtle echoing of one of these two sounds skilfully interwoven between the lines containing the *s* or *h* alliteration. The musical effect becomes conspicuous on recitation, when there is an audible link between, e.g., ll. 678 and 679:

"Lorde, quo schal klymbe þy *h*yȝ *h*ylle,
Oþer rest withinne þy *h*oly place?"

or ll. 681 and 682

"*H*ondelynges *h*arme þat dyt not ille,
Þat is of *h*ert boþe clene and lyȝt,

or ll. 683 and 684

Þer schal hys *st*ep *st*able *st*ylle".
Þe innosent is ay *s*af by ryȝt.

Similarly, one cannot escape the feeling that playing with the sounds *w* and *b* in the following lines was not incidental:

ll. 649-651

'Innoghe þer wax out of þat welle,
*B*lod and water of *b*rode wounde:
The *b*lod uus *b*oght fro *b*ale of helle ...

There are 27 stanzas (out of 98) where the same sound sets three times the same alliterative sequences. In three cases (ll. 87, 88, 89; 196, 197, 198, and 1034, 1035, 1036) it happens to be a grouping of lines connected by one alliterative sound but normally it is one of the following:

(1) repetition of only one alliterative sound in the whole stanza, e.g., sec. 4, st. 1 ($3 \times s$); sec. 6, st. 1 ($3 \times l$); sec. 7, st. 4 ($3 \times l$); sec. 12, st. 3 ($3 \times s$); sec. 10, st. 5 ($3 \times p$),

(2) threefold repetition of two alliterative sounds in one stanza, e.g., sec. 2, st. 3 ($3 \times f + 3 \times g$); sec. 12, st. 2 ($3 \times h + 3 \times s$),

(3) threefold repetition of one sound combined with twofold repetition of another, e.g., sec. 1, st. 1 ($3 \times p + 2 \times s$); sec. 1, st. 2 ($3 \times s + 2 \times w$); sec. 2, st. 2 ($3 \times b + 2 \times g$); sec. 3, st. 5 ($3 \times f + 2 \times b$); sec. 5, st. 1 ($3 \times p + 2 \times l$); sec. 6, st. 2 ($3 \times d + 2 \times k$); sec. 7, st. 2 ($3 \times m + 2 \times b$); sec. 13, st. 3 ($3 \times p + 2 \times k$); sec. 15, st. 2 ($3 \times b + 2 \times k$); sec. 19, st. 2 ($3 \times p + 2 \times g$),

(4) combination of two sounds repeated at least twice, e.g., sec. 1, st. 5 ($2 \times p + 2 \times f + 2 \times k$); sec. 3, st. 1 ($2 \times f + 2 \times b + 2 \times w$); sec. 3, st. 3 ($2 \times m + 2 \times f + 2 \times st$); sec. 20, st. 3 ($2 \times d + 2 \times s + 2 \times r$).

As has been mentioned, the question of the poet's deliberate application of this peculiar kind of interlinear linking may still be a matter of debate, nevertheless, such a possibility cannot be excluded. Alliterative patterns, or rather the poet's specific predilections for some of them, can be taken as one of the proofs corroborating or

denying the authorship of the poem, as has been shown by Kjellmer (1975: 65-71)[3]. If then the varying proportions of the use of the phonetic resources (or, in fact, optional linguistic elements) can be treated as a hint revealing the poet's personal preferences for alliterating sounds, we probably would not be wrong to assume that the *Pearl*-poet's astounding mastery over the form could have been manifested in the exploitation of musical (echoing) effects created by skilful repetition of alliterative phonemes or consonantal phonemic clusters.

Talking about interlinear alliterative linking one might be tempted to go beyond stanzas and look for any possible predominance of a particular sound throughout the poem (i.e., the frequency of occurrence). The results show that the letter which appears most frequently in the poem is *w* (80 cases), then, respectively: *s* (as distinct from consonant clusters beginning with this sibilant, 78 cases), *m* (72), *p* (66) and *b* (64). It is somewhat surprising that the semivowel *w* occupies the first place, as we would have rather expected a sound which appears in the link-words, which would justify such high occurrence. Further, it does not even correspond to the number of *s*-, *p*- or *w*-words in *The Pearl*'s vocabulary. Counting all the lexical words we can easily notice that those which begin with *s* (about 160) significantly surpass in number the words whose first sound is *w* (about 95), *m* (about 100), *b* (about 125) or *p* (about 94).

5. Consonant Clusters and Sibilants

The treatment of some consonant clusters in *The Pearl* provides us with numerous interesting cases for analysis. One of them is the nature of Middle English *wr*. Giving examples of introverted alliteration Northup (1897: 338) suggests that l. 56 (My wreched wylle in wo ay wraghte) contains two different alliterating sounds, viz. *wr* and *w*. The position of *wr* may give us reasons for speculations and doubts resulting from the combination of two graphemes, and hence makes us wonder to what extent it affected the actual pronunciation. Jordan (1974: 155) says that *w* was lost in the initial position probably in the 15th century, but in the combination *wr* only before *u*: OE **wruncle* 'wrincle' (beside *wrincle) = *runkle*. Fisiak (1968: 7) suggests the monophonemic interpretation of the graphemes *wr* and *wl* even in Old English, basing his theory on the combination of distinctive features. According to this assumption <w> in the sequences *wr* and *wl* is regarded as a diacritic "indicating a certain value of the following consonant". The analysis of the alliterative patterns in *The Pearl* seems yet to favour the biphonemic interpretation of these clusters, e.g., l. 362 ('Ne worþe no wrathþe vnto my Lorde'). *Cleanness* supplies even more examples:

l. 204 And wex wod to þe wrache for wrach at His hert.
l. 326 I schal wast with My wrath þat wons vpon vrþe.
l. 1166 And þat wakned His wrath and wrast hit so hyge.

[3] Kjellmer (1975) takes the first 300 lines of the four Cotton Nero poems and *Sir Erkenwald* as samples and analyses them according to alliterative patterning, i.e., the use of vocalic or consonantal phonemes or consonant clusters. The results prove that the alliterative links of *The Pearl* differ significantly from the remaining four poems, thus providing one more piece of evidence for the negative answer to the question posed in the title.

The above examples show that even if the grapheme <w> in the prevocalic clusters like */wr-/* only marked a different sound quality, it still must have been very strongly velarised, judging by the alliterative patterns.

Another controversial issue concerning the treatment of consonant clusters appears again with reference to Northup's examples of introverted alliteration (l. 74 Wyth crystal klyffes so cler of kynde.) and henceforth his assumption that *kl* should be created as a separate group. Undoubtedly, there are in *The Pearl* instances of *kl* alliterating with itself only (e.g., ll. 2, 969) as there are lines containing *r* alliteration (e.g., l. 17) or *gl* alliteration (e.g., l. 70, 114, 171, 1144) but we cannot be totally convinced that the poet's licence went so far as to accept this combination of sounds as an independent group and thus employ it consistently throughout the poem. A few more examples should suffice to prove that the cluster *kl* was treated indiscriminately by the poet and alliterated with itself almost as frequently as it alliterated with *k* (e.g., ll. 66, 259, 271, 320, 803). This peculiar and rather liberal treatment of consonant clusters may account for the discrepancy in the statistics; Northup finds ten examples of introverted alliteration including the two dubious lines discussed above, whereas Oakden (1930: 241) mentions only three, and the one that he quotes (l. 439), though so obvious, seems to have been overlooked by Northup.

The issue of the mutual relation between the Middle English sibilants /s/ and ///, their functioning in consonant clusters, and occurrence in alliterative patterns also presents an intricate problem worth signalling. It has always been accepted as a rule that when dealing with alliteration, we should be concerned with phonetic correspondences only. Therefore, some analysts (e.g., Kjellmer 1975: 67) would not admit pairs like *schyne* and *sunne* as alliterating. Such an approach, however, is inevitably arbitrary and does not necessarily have to reflect the poet's intention. Both sounds are sibilants, differing only in one distinctive feature referring to the place of articulation, i.e., /s/ being diffuse – articulated in the front part of the mouth, whereas /// – compact, articulated against the hard or soft palate, including velars and palatals. This single feature can play a decisive role in combination with plosives and resonants in initial margins, as shown by Cygan (1971: 64-82) with reference to present-day English, but phonetic parallelism in poetry can be realized in terms of partial identity or rather audible similarity of sounds. Giving examples of semi-alliteration and semi-consonance, Leech (1969: 90) assumes that "there can be foregrounding of certain classes of sound, such as sibilants, nasals, back vowels, etc., as well as of individual sounds and sound classes". A considerable liberty in the treatment of /s/ and ///, observable already in Old English verse, has been pointed out and illustrated by Schipper (1910: 43). Later alliterative poetry likewise permitted the /s/ : /// alliteration, for example:

I sayle now in þe see as *schip* boute mast.

(example from Schipper 1910: 90)

One may find it surprising that these two sounds were allowed to alliterate with each other in view of the fact that the main principle of alliteration was that the sounds must be exactly, not approximately, the same. In an attempt to explain this phenomenon one should bear in mind that the English alliterative tradition in the times for which we have attested evidence, relied sometimes on graphemic alliteration, as for example, in the case

of *g* and *c*. Velar *g* [g] and palatal *g* [j] were found to alliterate indiscriminately with each other; similarly velar *c* [k] and palatal *c* [tʃ]. Given that the phoneme /// was in Old English graphically represented by <sc>, in Middle English by <sh> or <sch>, i.e., always contained the sibilant <s> in the initial position, we cannot exclude the possibility of graphemic alliteration also in this case.

Graphemic alliteration can likewise shed some light and offer a solution to the puzzling question of *w* alliterating with *wr* and *wl*.

Applying the above theoretical considerations to *The Pearl* and focusing on concrete lines containing /s/ and /// alliteration, we may observe the following facts. Out of 14 lines (28, 42, 58, 106, 203, 213, 254, 569, 801, 877, 965, 982, 1057, 1162) in which /// appears initially in stressed or potentially stressed words, only five (ll. 42, 166, 213, 254, 877) can be said to possess "pure" /// alliteration (i.e., /// alliterating with itself exclusively) whereas the remaining lines show clearly that the possibility of /// alliterating with /s/ or even /sw-/ or /st-/ cannot be ruled out. It is worth mentioning, however, that these "inconsistencies" resulting from the distribution of sibilants in alliterative patterns tend to occur in the middle or final stanzas, in which – as we have indicated – the poet's licence appears to have a broader application. This laxity in the treatment of /s/ and /// has also been pointed out by Oakden whose research on Middle English alliterative poems has proved that the latter sibilant is "seldom treated as a group consistently" and although many lines show the alliteration of /// with itself, the authors "did not hesitate on occasion to allow it to alliterate with /s/" (Oakden 1930: 165). The lack of a unified treatment can also be discussed in *The Pearl* with reference to any clusters containing the sibilant /s/. In Old English three of such groups (*sp, st* and *sk*) were treated as single consonants for alliterative purposes. In early Middle English only *sp* and *st* were strictly observed, except in *The Brut* and *The Bestiary*. Later Middle English continued the same practice. Although Oakden makes a stipulation that *sp* and st "are treated as groups, yet isolated examples of *s, sp* and *s, st* alliterating together are found in not a few poems" (Oakden 1930: 165), in our examination of *The Pearl* we cannot resist the impression that the consonant clusters in questions are treated by the poet with strict consistency mostly in the beginning stanzas. Let us take the *st*-group as an example. Out of thirty lines where this cluster occurs in alliteration, fifteen can be said to have *st* alliterating with itself only. Most of these (seven) fall on the initial stanzas, five are to be found in the medial stanzas, three in the final ones. In the case of the remaining fifteen lines (which happen to be included in the medial and final stanzas), the cluster under discussion alliterates either with the sibilant /s/ alone or with its combination with another consonant or semivowel (e.g., l. 1180). There is a similar case with the *sp*-cluster, which alliterates with itself only in twelve lines, out of which six fall in the initial stanzas, five in the medial, and one in the final. If we now recall that the middle sections contain twice as many stanzas as the beginning ones, it then becomes apparent that the poet's scrupulousness for the exact alliterative patterns gradually decreases.

In our discussion of alliterative patterns in *The Pearl*, a mention should be given to the apparent inconsistency in the treatment of *w, wh* and *qu*. There are abundant examples of the same word spelled with either *wh, qu* or *qw*, as, e.g., ll. 1011 and 1102. In these two lines, the discrepancy in the spelling seems to be justified by alliterative

requirements. There is, however, a rule saying that *qu* varies with *wh* and *w* in the spelling of words which in Old English began with *hw*. The use of *qu* appears largely to be on the one hand a question of dialect (it is convention adopted from the North to represent [w]) and on the other hand a representation of [kw] (from OE *cw* and OFr *qu*).

6. The Problem of 'to be', "Visual Alliteration", Alliteration and Stress

One of the factors affecting the alliterative patterns in *The Pearl* is undoubtedly the treatment of the inflectional forms of the substantive verb and especially its stress patterning. It is not always so straightforward in practice how the stress in a line should be distributed; sometimes an odd stressing in the line seems to be intentional, as when the semantically irrelevant (functional) words occur in the stressed positions. There are in *The Pearl* numerous instances of the occurrence of the verb *to be* in its various realizations, which make us speculate about the inclusion of *to be* in the alliterative pattern of the line. The lines: 65, 71, 169, 375, 384, 748, 1107, 1112 and 1156 provide us with interesting cases where the substantive verb, normally unstressed, as results from its nature and function as a grammatical word, not only appears to occupy a stressed position in the line, also participates in the alliteration.

One explanation of this phenomenon is that alliteration, once structural, has become in the later Middle English period more and more ornamental, and, at times, excessive. We mentioned earlier increased "grouping" together of lines by identical alliteration or interplay of one or two alliterating sounds throughout the stanza as devices serving ornamental purposes (e.g., augmenting the musical effects). In the case of the substantive verb, we would venture a suggestion that its occasional treatment on a par with lexical words is symptomatic of those new tendencies and indicative of the direction which the later alliterative poetry was taking.

It becomes even more apparent with three lines containing a rather unsual for the *Pearl*-poet form *wace* 'was' in the two remaining lines spelled *wasse*. Since normally elsewhere in the poem the poet uses the form *watȝ*, this sudden turn to *wace* (l. 65) would seem utterly unjustified if we overlooked the neighbouring rhyming words, i.e., *grace* and *face*. According to Gollancz (1923: 43) this peculiar usage of *wace* may have been intended to emphasize the eye-rhyme. This plausible explanation likewise holds true for *wasse* in l. 1112 which bears a visual, as well as audible, resemblance (eye-rhyme and rhyme proper) to *glasse* and *passe*. Cases like these seem to support Oakden's view (1930: 177) that "the tendency [...] to bear in mind alliteration for the eye as well as for the ear" was not uncommon amongst the late Middle English poets. In the text of *The Pearl*, we can trace more instances of "eye alliteration", for example:

l. 397 "Now blysse, burne, mot þe bytyde"
l. 436 Blessed bygynner of uch a grace!'
l. 658 Bytwene vus and blysse bot þat be wythdrow,
l. 1119 bise aldermen, quen he aproched ...

What characterizes these lines is a potential visual agreement on the first letter in: *bytyde, bygynner, bytwene aproched* in compliance with the pattern of the line.

In our discussion of the correlation between stress, rhyme and alliteration, we cannot omit cases where there is an evident violation (or adaptation) of the natural stress for the sake of alliteration. One of the most conspicuous examples is *delyt* which seems to conform to the requirements of the alliteration on *d* in l. 1153 (Delyt me drof in yye and ere,) or else may alliterate on *l*, e.g.:

l. 1129 Delit the Lombe for to devise
l. 1128 Iwysse I laght a gret delyt
l. 1141 The Lombe delyt non lyste to wene.
l. 1152 For luf-longyng in gret delyt.

The above observations and remarks do not, of course, exhaust all the problems of the alliterative patterns in *The Pearl*. Many have only been touched sketchily. The present paper focuses on some interesting features of alliteration, and the author's intention was to concentrate on the decorative functions of the alliterative medium in *The Pearl*, rather than present a detailed metrical analysis of the use of alliteration in this poem. The aim of this paper was to prove that the alliterative patterns are not stable in *The Pearl*. Their regularity decreases throughout the poem, but is compensated for by other kinds of ingenious prosodic linking.

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ACTA UNIVERSITATIS WRATISLAVIENSIS
No 1254

Anglica Wratislaviensia XXI

Wrocław 1991

LITERATURE

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SPELEOLOGY OF THE GROTESQUE — AN INVESTIGATION

> There were much of the beautiful, much of the wanton, much of the bizarre, something of the terrible, and not a little of that which might have excited disgust.
>
> E. A. Poe, *The Masque of the Red Death*

It is relatively easy to recognize the grotesque in a work of art, but to comprehend it or to define the nature of the impression it makes has proved to be a far more difficult task. Since the famous Vitruvian statement in *De Architectura* (about 27 B.C.)[1] the baffling phenomenon of the grotesque has elicited a variety of critical discourse, usually in the context of philosophical and aesthetic theories prevalent in a given period. As a result, the semantic field of the word "grotesque" has become broad to the point of confusion, with a plethora of possible meanings attached to it. In common usage, the adjective "grotesque" is employed to denote such qualities as: eccentric, bizarre, extravagant, fantastic, absurd, preposterous, as well as terrible, gothic, monstrous, macabre, sick, etc.

It is significant that, unlike such categories as satire, irony, parody and other related genres, the grotesque originated in pictorial art. The majority of statements

[1] Pollio Vitruvius — Roman architect living in the first century B. C.; his tract *De Architectura* appeared in print in 1486 and had enormous impact on the Renaissance art, as well as on the development of the modern theory of architecture. Vitruvius attacks the grotesque style of ornamentation in these words: "All these motifs taken from reality are now rejected by an unreasonable fashion. For our contemporary artists decorate the walls with monstrous forms rather than reproducing clear images of the familiar world. Instead of columns they paint fluted stems with oddly shaped leaves and volutes, and instead of pediment arabesques, the same with candelabra and painted edicules, on the pediments of which grow dainty flowers unrolling out of roots and topped, without rhyme or reasons by figurines. The little stems, finally, support half-figures crowned by human or animal heads. Such things, however, never existed, do not now exist and shall never come into being. For how can a stem of a flower support a roof, or a candelabrum pedimental sculpture? How can a tender shoot carry a human figure, and how can bastard forms composed of flowers and human bodies grow out of roots and tendrils?" (Kayser 1963: 20).

on the grotesque are corroborated with examples taken from different realms of art, and they mention the writings of Rabelais, Swift, Kafka, Hoffman or Poe together with hellish Pieter Brueghel's, Arthur Durrer's or Jacques Callot's paintings, with gothic sculpture or the diablérie of the medieval folk festival[2]. The body of criticism on the grotesque provides ample evidence of the unique syncretism of this category. The grotesque draws attention to the fact that the rift between visual arts and literature is not so unbridgeable as it is usually believed to be, and the way in which we perceive, for instance, the monsters of Hieronymus Bosch is not entirely unlike our reception of E. T. Hoffman's tales. The details of a literary description easily evoke an image, a certain indirectness the presence of which is compensated by the unequivocal presentation of feelings, emotions and states of mind.

In order to narrate the history of the grotesque, one would have to go back to the origin of man. As has often been stressed, some primordial element always suffuses a grotesque work of art — the unnameable quality redolent of very old age. For instance Harpham (1982, chapter III, part 4) traces the grotesque already in the wall paintings of the troglodyte homo sapiens, while Bakhtin (1975) derives the genealogy of the grotesque from primaeval fertility rites which gave rise to the folk tradition of the carnival.

Many of the works now classified as grotesque were created *avant la lettre*, before the term was actually introduced, as in the case of ancient murals in Roman villas, and in the Middle Ages — in the gargoyles of gothic architecture, in dance macabre paintings or in the works of Hieronymus Bosch. In literature, although it was generally more compliant with the principle of decorum and artistic harmony, the heterogenic and bizarre combinations characteristic of the grotesque appear as early as in the ancient comedy of, for example, Aristophanes[3]. In medieval literature, grotesque monstrosities lurk in Dante's *Inferno* and in Boccaccio's tales, or manifest themselves in literary presentations of death as skeleton.

The word "grotesque" first emerged around 1500 A. D. to denote the decorations on the walls of excavated Roman villas, especially Nero's Domus Aurea, in which human, animal and floral elements were fancifully interwoven. The first record of the word (from Italian *grotta* 'cave' and, by extension, *grottesca, grottesco*) occurred in the contract for "certain fantastic designs which Pinturiccio was to paint at Sienna" (Barasch 1971: 16). From Italy, the fashionable kind of ornamentation spread to France and onto a wider range of visual arts, and eventually it entered literature. For the first time, it appeared in the writings of Rabelais, Ronsard, Du Bartas, Montaigne[4], and other representatives of the French Renaissance, and was used to denote the quality of strangeness and monstrosity, usually of a playful kind.

[2] For instance, Harpham (1982) introduces his theory of the grotesque on the example of paintings and sculptures, and later applies it to the discussion of several works of literature.

[3] In *Ars Poetica*, Horace condemns any such fanciful combinations in pictorial art and literature as an outrage against the sacred principle of mimesis.

[4] In *Les Essais*, Montaigne gave the first literary definition of the word, and abstracted from paintings the quality of strangeness, disorder and monstrosity to characterize his own writing style.

Barsch (1971) emphasizes the fact that the grotesque was not recognized as an art term until late 17th century and it was only in the 18th century when the first attempts were made to give definite meanings to the grotesque as an aesthetic category. These aesthetic considerations revealed the basic ambivalence immanent in the grotesque: the attitude of utter condemnation in the wake of Vitruvius would run parallel to or contest the Vasarian view[5] which praises the grotesque as the most noble manifestation of the artist's imagination. In the Age of Reason and Neoclassicism, however, the characteristics of the grotesque style of art were most often the object of disapproval if not contempt. The critics of the grotesque would mainly recognize in it the qualities of the ridiculous and the bizarre which violated the established canon of the sublime and the beautiful. In a general sense, the word "grotesque" as an adjective meant "ridiculous", "distorted", "unnatural", and as a noun — "absurdity, a distortion of nature". These pejorative connotations were used along the original meaning of the word (referring to the peculiar style of ornamentation). Even the writers who accepted the grotesque in art, treated it as a vulgar species of comic[6]. It was not until the 19th century when the grotesque was first appreciated in its aesthetic potential for beauty. In 1853, John Ruskin wrote an apology of the noble grotesque, in which he maintaind that this category involves the true and ideal appreciation of beauty since it had been born out of conflict between man's intuitions of the infinite and his physical limitations. He claimed that "there is no test of greatness in periods, nations, or men more sure than the development, among them or in them, of a noble grotesque" (Ruskin 1853: 158). Santayana (1961: 146) remarked that the grotesque was capable of producing aesthetic pleasure because it incorporated into the beautiful the values of all sorts, such as ugliness or confusion, while the accumulation of values too exclusively "aesthetic" produced in our minds an effect of artificiality, and "so selective a diet cloys". Similarly, Chesterton (1903: 59) praised the poet for his novel "song of the beauty of refuse" and discovered a particular kind of technical beauty in the poet's grotesque style of writing. Chesterton insisted that "there is such a thing as a poetical metre being beautifully rugged" (145) and attributed to the grotesque the quality of positive energy, of joyous and unique vitality.

The dichotomy in the aesthetic assessment of the grotesque is closely connected with the question of its relation to the natural. The indignation of Vitruvius and his followers stemmed from the assumption that the grotesque did not exist in nature[7]. To these charges, Victor Hugo retorted in his historic Preface to *Cromwell*[8] with the

[5] Giorgio Vasari — Italian painter and architect, living in the 16th century, author of the first history of art, *Le vite de piu eccelenti architetti, pittori et scultori ijaliani*.

[6] For example, Justus Möser in *Harlekin oder die Verteidigung des Grotesk-Komischen* (1761), Thomas Wright in *A History of Caricature and Grotesque in Literature and Art* (1865), and John Addington Symonds in *Caricature, the Fantastic, the Grotesque* (1890).

[7] Just to mention Thomas Browne's famous statement in *Religio Medici* (1643), "There are no Grotesque in Nature" (Harpham 1982: XIX).

[8] On p. 12 of his Preface to *Cromwell* (1881) Victor Hugo writes: "Nous dirons seulement ici que comme objectif auprès du sublime, comme moyen de contraste, le grotesque est, seleon nous, la plus riche source que nature puisse ouvrir à l'art. [...] Cette beauté universelle que l'antiquité répandait solemnellement

statement that the grotesque was to be found in nature as the necessary counterpart to the sublime and the beautiful: the grotesque is realistic since it reveals the intrinsically antithetical character of the world. In 1853, Theophile Gautier asserted with confidence, "Le grotesque a toujours existé dans l'art et dans la nature" [The grotesque has always existed in art and in nature] (Harpham 1982: XIX). This attitude was confirmed by John Ruskin (1853: 142) who claimed that in the grotesque "we shall find the evidence of the deep insight into nature". For Walter Bagehot (1864) the grotesque, as characteristic of Browning's poetry, dealt with abnormal specimens that, by some lapse, have occurred in nature. Chesterton (1903: 149) likewise maintained that Browning's verse, in so far as it was grotesque, was not complex or artificial but "natural in the legitimate tradition of nature".

Gradually, a larger and larger measure of naturalness has been atrtributed to the grotesque. A progression towards full recognition of the truhfulness of the grotesque culminates, in the second half of the 20th century, in its being proclaimed the best expression of our times. Jean Onimus (1980), for instance, says that the grotesque best expresses the "true" nature of the universe as it reveals its essential emptiness and the collapse of the natural order of things. The grotesque confers on man the awareness of the crisis of all his assumptions and thus becomes the most active category of contemporary art. Michael Steig (1970: 263) adds that the grotesque speaks directly to our situation in its evoking "a world in which the dreamlike and the real are no longer clearly distinguished". Harpham (1982: 263) maintains that the contemporary reality is suffused with the grotesque: "the grotesque, in endlessly diluting forms, is always and everywhere around us".

The paradoxical nature of the grotesque as an aesthetic and artistic category becomes apparent if one compares the conceptions concerning its nature and origin set forth by the two most prominent theoreticians of the grotesque in the 20th century — — Mikhail Bakhtin and Wolfgang Kayser. Bakhtin (1975) introduces the term "grotesque realism" as referring to a specific kind of presenting reality which originated in the tradition of the medieval folk festival. During the carnival, the low element of the body and earth becomes dominant and reigns in the cosmic process of rejuvenation and growth. The overthrowing of the sublime and the degradation of the high is viewed mainly in the positive way because the low is always fertile, always merry, even if it is inseparable from death. Laughter means victory over the awe--inspiring mana and taboo (the sacred and the forbidden). Festive merriment and the grotesque cosmic body offer a break-through and liberation from restrictions.

By concentrating on the carnivalesque aspect of the grotesque, Bakhtin limits it to the festive vision of the world as unified in the cosmic body. He seems to underestimate the quality of discontinuity and negative degradation in the grotesque, and loses sight of the element of alienation inherent in it. Contrariwise, Wolfgang Kayser (1963)

sur tout n'était pas sans monotonie; la même impression, toujours repétée, peut fatiguer à la longue. Le sublime sur le sublime produit malaisement un contraste, et l'on a besoin de se reposer de tout, même du beau. Il semble, au contraire, que le grotesque soit un temps d'arrêt, un terme de comparaison, un point de départ d'où l'on s'élève vers le beau avec une perception plus fraiche et plus excitée."

maintains that the grotesque is the estranged world in which natural and familiar elements suddenly turn out to be alien and ominous. It is evoked by man's sudden awareness that "the familiar and apparently harmonious world is alienated under the impact of abysmal forces which break it up and shatter its coherence". (Kayser 1963: 37). The grotesque, according to Kayser (1963: 60), totally destroys the illusion of order and deprives man of his foothold, compelling him to recognize that, in the words of Bonaventura, "Life is only the fool's garb, worn by the void, which proudly displays it, but in the end angrily tears it up."[9] The grotesque gestates in the deepest layers of man's psyche — it is produced by impersonal and inexplicable forces of the subconsciousness, and its ghastly uncanniness stirs man's whole being because it awakens his primordial fears. The process of building up and perceiving the grotesque world involves, nonetheless, gradual disarming of the terrifying element by means of the recognition of the ludicrous. Eventually, Kayser (1963: 189) arrives at the definition of the grotesque as "an attempt to invoke and subdue the demonic aspects of the world".

In the grotesque world as construed by Kayser, Bakhtin's uproarious diablérie is substituted by black demonism, and the merry devil of the folk festival by a gristly figure of Satan. Although both theories rely on the assumption of exorcizing the terrifying element, the accompanying ritual is envisaged in completely different ways. Moreover, unlike the Russian theoretician, who fully embraces this "other world" governed by a different set of norms and categories, Kayser evaluates the grotesque from the standpoint of the normative and never steps outside the familiar reality. Consequently, he hardly recognizes the function of laughter in the grotesque, and by overemphasizing the demonic, overlooks the fanciful element in the grotesque, which makes it the hallmark of the free mind, unencumbered by the onus of custom and tradition.

Kayser speaks only of the defensive laughter as the reaction to the grotesque. It is satanic and horrible, and marks an involuntary response to the situation which cannot be handled in any other way. Apart from that, he only admits that the comic in the grotesque is difficult to account for. Such an evasive explanation is hardly satisfactory in face of the fact that the comic element is always present in the grotesque (Baudelaire called the grotesque *le comique absolu*). It seems that any exhaustive discussion of a grotesque text must include the uncovering of its comic patterns and structures, as well as examining the causes of laughter. Apart from empty and hysterical defensive laughter, these will include, for instance, delight in seeing taboos violated, a sense of release from inhibitions and authority, intellectual pleasure at perceiving the joke and sadistic, essentially physical pleasure in the cruel[10].

Still, a comic element itself would never suffice to produce the effect of grotesqueness. As Kayser (1963: 118) has noticed, "in the humorous context, a certain

[9] The passage comes from The *Nightwatches* (*Nachtwachen*, 1804) by the unknown author of the German Sturm und Drang movement, writing under the pen-name of Bonaventura.

[10] For this purpose, Henri Bergson's famous book *Le Rire: essai sur la signification du comique* will undoubtedly prove beneficial.

distance is maintained throughout and, with it, a feeling of security and difference". Jennings' study (1963) is, to a large extent, an attempt to reconcile the polarized views of Bakhtin and Kayser. Jennings (1963: 17) insists that, in the grotesque, the playful and the terrifying elements occur simultaneously in an unresolved tension[11], and he defines the grotesque as "the demonic made trivial". Similarly to his two outstanding predecessors, however, Jennings assumes that in the grotesque the transition is made from fear to laughter, from the apprehension of the terrifying to the perception of the comic. He does not recognize that the grotesque consists not only in the anxiety overcome by humour but also, conversely, in the comic pushed to an extreme, which evokes the sensation of strangeness and uneasiness. This twofold nature of the grotesque has been noticed by Michael Steig (1970: 256) who claims that a sensitive reader/spectator of the grotesque reacts in both ways simultaneously, and his perceptive processes operate in two directions: "the grotesque is double-edged, it at once allays and intensifies the effect of the uncanny".

It has to be noticed that the majority of statements on the grotesque recognize that it can be defined eiher in relation to the artist, his deliberate intention and his reactions to circumstances, or as the effect or impression created upon the reader/spectator. Usually, one of the attitudes would prevail in the argument and, in some cases, take the whole ground. This essential dichotomy was noticed and discussed by Arthur Clayborough (1965). The English theoretician resorts to Freudian and Jungian psychology in an attempt to find in the human psyche the causes that would account for the creation of the grotesque. He starts from the premise that man's fascination with the grotesque can be explained in terms of a specific dialectic of consciousness and unconsciousness in both the creator's and the receiver's mind. Nonetheless, he primarily essays to clarify what psychic mechanisms and processes are involved in the *making* of the grotesque and for this purpose he examines the primitive impulses which manifest themselves in this kind of creativity. According to Clayborough, the grotesque fits into two categories of art: the regressive-negative, when the artist's frustrations compel him to reject common sense and seek compensation in art (the resulting vision of the world will lack unity, and will be suffused with the atmosphere of futility and casualness), and the progressive-negative, in which the grotesque appears as an aggressive device in the service of satire and related genres in order to ridicule the object of attack. As to the receiver of the grotesque, Clayborough contents himself with the general idea that, depending on the prevailing psychic disposition, the reader/spectator will be prone to either perceive or dismiss it and explain a perplexing phenomenon in terms of categories congenial to him. Unfortunately, Clayborough is disappointingly terse and often vague in his discussion of the grotesque as operating in the *receiver's* mind. The analysis of the grotesque as suggested by Clayborough poses the danger of abandoning the text itself and concentrating on the (pre)supposed attitude of the artist.

[11] L. B. Jennings emulates the idea of John Ruskin (1853: 126) who asserted: "the grotesque is, in almost all cases, composed of two elements, one ludicrous, the other fearful, the two antithetical elements being inseparable."

Similarly, the chief idea behind Jennings' (1963) argument supports Clayborough's tendency to seek the source of the grotesque in the artist's mind. For Jennings, the grotesque should be viewed mainly as the function of the artist. In contrast, Harpham (1982) largely dissociates the work from its creator and concentrates on the relationship between the reader and the text (spectator and the work of art). His exposition continues the idea propounded by Santayana (1961: 175) of the grotesque as the function of the receiver, as an „interesting effect."

The issue of artistic intention and the reader's (spectator's) response brings into focus further incertitudes. It is possible that the receiver encounters some sophisticated rational symbolic system (for instance, Indian cult masks and totems) which is culturally alien to him, or which has become obsolete for him in the course of time. Since he cannot decipher it, and it is in conflict with his conception of what is natural and fitting into standards, he will cognize the inexplicable phenomenon as grotesque, while the artistic intention behind it was by no means such. Nadia Khouri (1980) illustrates a similar point by giving an example of the figure of an angel which operates symbolically in Christian religion and is not regarded as grotesque within this system, but may be received as such outside it (for instance, in surrealist paintings), being in its combination of human and animal elements a monstrosity typical of the grotesque. Khouri is convinced that the grotesque is embedded in a cultural, social and ideological context and the mechanisms involved in the making and perceiving of the grotesque cannot be comprehended fully if it is divorced from its background.

In face of the general disagreement as to the nature of the grotesque and the ways in which it should be viewed, a broad definition seems to allow for a more comprehensive analysis of a particular grotesque text. Philip Thomson (1972: 27) enumerates several features always present in a grotesque work: disharmony, a mixture of the comic and the terrifying, extravagance and exaggeration, and abnormality. Thomson comes up with the definition of the grotesque as "the unresolved clash of incompatibles in work and response." Parallel to that, he stresses the ambivalent nature of the abnormal in the grotesque (the paradox of the simultaneous attraction and repulsion), hence providing the secondary definition of the grotesque as "the ambivalently abnormal." This definition is general and inclusive enough to comprise the conclusions on the nature of the grotesque arrived at by the previously mentioned theoreticians.

It seems, though, that the nature of "unresolvability" of the conflict between antithetical elements in the grotesque requires further elucidation. If the clash is "unresolved", it means that the grotesque consists in a continual dynamic of forces, in the dissolution of forms and the emergence of new ones, which precludes its ever solidifying into a complete, stable unity. Mikhail Bakhtin made an important observation that the temporal dimension is a constitutive and paramount feature in the grotesque. Thus, on the level of representation, the grotesque image always reveals a phenomenon in the course of changing, in the state of becoming. The ambivalence of the grotesque, according to Bakhtin, lies in the fact that it contains the two opposite temporal extremes: what is old and what is new, what is dying and what is being born

— the end and the beginning of the metamorphosis. Consequently, the grotesque image is always protean, infinite and unrestricted.

It is significant, however, that amidst a jumble of endlessly metamorphosing elements, the grotesque emerges as an autonomous whole, governed by the principles inherent in it and independent of external reality. It constitutes an organic entity which impresses itself on our imagination as *unity*. As Santayana (1961: 175) remarked:

> If the confusion [of forms] is absolute, the object is simply null; it does not exist aesthetically, except by virtue of materials. But if the confusion is not absolute and we have an inkling of unity in the midst of the strangeness of form, then we have the grotesque. It is the half-formed, the perplexed, and suggestively monstrous.

Thus, the distortion in the grotesque does not result in nonsense, but the elements of reality known to us become rearranged so as to produce a new whole which is alien to that reality. The most revealing insight into the nature of the grotesque in Kayser's study is that the grotesque must be seen as a comprehensive structural principle, namely, there must exist in it a fundamental structure perceivable in both the work of art and its effect. Khouri (1980: 13), in turn, interprets the process of creating the grotesque world as uncoding of the familiar reality in order to build a new one. She defines the grotesque as "an anti-mimetic structuring dynamic which breaks the familiar code of nature, which interprets and transforms it in order to produce an aesthetically estranged and ideologically revealing new code". According to Khouri, the grotesque is a reaction to the normative and it draws on the inversion of official values. In the grotesque world, the norm is substituted with the anti-norm which provides a new ordering principle according to which a new entity is organized. Nonetheless, the grotesque never attains a statutory position or represents a single ideology, but rather expresses itself "in a global context of mediated ideologies containing the very moment of history with its continuity and ruptures, traditions, archaic models and new models." For Khouri, the organization in the grotesque does not denote that it rigidifies into a set of rules that have substituted the other order, but it is a dynamic, a dialectic of norms and ideological systems.

Similarly, the response to the grotesque also has to be viewed as a dynamic process, a state of transition between the initial lack of understanding on the part of the receiver and the state of ultimate understanding and acquisition of the new system. In this process, the reader/spectator is swept from a steadfast position amidst familiar aesthetic forms as well as cultural codes and ideological systems, and included into an act of building of an alternative order in which the incongruous elements may become normative and meaningful. As Santayana (1961: 171) once said, "reason, after all, is one convention picked out of many." The dogma of man's cultural community constitutes a kind of epistemological grid imposed on his consciousness, which is inhibitive in the sense of blocking access to certain realms of experience. The perception of the grotesque consists in the momentary uplifting of the grid — the dissolution of the constraints of a period culture, and subsequent revelation of hermeneutic gaps in which the reader/spectator's mind is invited to operate.

Harpham (1982: 119) draws attention to the fact that the original paintings referred to as "grotesque" (e.g., in *Domus Aurea* or those by Pinturiccio and Raphael) existed on the margin of a mural or painting, as if encircling the central scene which was presented in accordance with the principle of mimesis. On the margin, the artist fully indulged his fancy, irrespectful of artistic canons or iconographic principles. The margin, the frame, was not intended to mean, but in drawing attention to itself it was building up an alternative system of signification which threatened to take over the meaningful center. By analogy, all of the grotesque may be regarded as an act of the margin swapping places with the center, and the meaningless ousting the meaningful. In the grotesque, in Derrida's words, "exteriority is constitutive of interiority." Harpham (1982: 43) concludes,

> All grotesque art threatens the notion of the center by implying coherencies just out of reach, metaphors or analogies just beyond our grasp [...] in its purposeful rearrangement of familiar details, it teases us with intimations of 'deep' or 'profound' meanings. Grotesqueries confront us as corrupt or fragmented texts in search of a master principle.

Tomasz Gryglewicz (1984) says that in the light of the theory of information, the center contains the signs which are transparent — their form is conceived in such a way as to allow unimpeded comprehension of the message. The frame, conversely, draws attention to itself, it is opaque in the sense that it obstructs access to any definite meaning. The grotesque, being a dialectic of the margin and the center, as well as of the representational (mimetic) and non-representational art, dispels the illusion of "the transparent signifier" which would reveal the meaning directly and unequivocally. The grotesque points to the ambivalence of the signifier, its immanent "opaqueness." It empties the center, creating vacuum in place of meaning; to use Harpham's (1982: XX) suggestive metaphor, the grotesque is "a black whole into which everything/others fall if they are not securely anchored."

The concept of grid imposed on man's consciousness and on his ways of perceiving reality should be also analysed as pertaining to another important aspect of the grotesque text — the language and the relationship between the medium and the substance. Kayser (1963: 149) made a crucial observation that the grotesque world cannot exist independently of language, and that "the processes of speaking complete the destruction of the world." Similarly, one of the major contributions to the theory of the grotesque by Mikhail Bakhtin is his recognition of the function of language in the grotesque. Liberation from authority, from the shackles of habit and convention, as well as from the prisonhouse of literary canons, is reflected in the language of a grotesque text. This is the language which is running rampant in defiance of the normative language. As a result of this challenge, the dead, superficial layers of the word crack open, and the resulting crevices allow insight into the many-sided nature of the word. In the linguistic sense, the uplifting of the grid reveals gaps into which new meanings can be poured, some of them — the meanings which have long been lost. In these gaps, new semantic relationships emerge, not only as pertaining to a single linguistic sign, but also in connection with mutual influences and fluctuations that occur between words. In this way, the grotesque may be viewed as an alternative

linguistic system in which the familiar norms appear topsy-turvy, and which is devised in such a way as to sneer at the illusion that reality can be encompassed and bridled by language. Consequently, the rational, language-based systems of thinking are exposed as fallacious and incapable of delimiting the semantic field of the word (cf. Halloram 1980). The grotesque operates in such a way that it simultaneously invokes these systems and fraudulently repudiates them. The reader of the grotesque text, as Harpham (1982: 176) underlines, is suddenly made to doubt his comfortable relationship with the language because he discovers that "the truth of language is notoriously fallible." For Jean Onimus (1980: 327) the grotesque, in its linguistic aspect, is a kind of modern heroism, a desperate effort to break through, to get beyond the "world of the word" in order to confront "wild reality", raw and unrelentless as it is.

Again, the processes taking place in the grotesque on the level of language never result in the emergence of a new, stable linguistic unit, but are endlessly dynamic. Moreover, the form and substance of grotesque work never remain in a static relationship to each other. They not only mutually influence each other, but appear to be in constant struggle for the dominance of the center. As Harpham (1982: XXI) remarks, both the means and the content are foregrounded in the grotesque, and one is left with the impression that the form resists interpretation it simultaneously encourages, or that certain content refuses to be constrained by form. He further adds that the very word "grotesque" is "a storage place for the outcasts of language, entities for which there is no appropriate noun." Thus, the grotesque designates the condition which is out of the reach of language, and indicates that certain portions of human experience escape verbal formulation.

Viewing the grotesque as a dynamic of forces which are constantly shifting, as an autonomous whole governed by the principle of flux, may also help us overcome the dichotomy in the aesthetic appreciation of the grotesque. Erich Auerbach (1953) maintains that all systems of decorum are devised to keep the low and the marginal in their place. These systems gradually deteriorate into clichés and formulae which become meaningless. The meaning migrates to the low, the marginal, and revolutions seek to reverse the meaningful/meaningless opposition, moving the bottom to the top in the name of greater fidelity to reality. The grotesque exists in the indefinite interval marked by change and transition from the high to the low and vice versa. Thus, the argument whether the grotesque belongs to the high or to the low, the beautiful or the ugly, can be replaced by the view of the grotesque as the expression of the dynamic state of low-ascending and high-descending.

In its refusal to compromise, in its radicalism and resistance to the official norm, the grotesque has always been a most vital artistic category. It is endowed with enormous force of destroying barriers and breaking the rigid frames of convention and habit. It constantly poses an epistemological challenge to man, as it both invites an attempt to grasp its nature and simultaneously repudiates any such effort; beleaguering the senses, it always remains protean and elusive. The grotesque endlessly changes in a dialectical process, and it always gnaws at the incipient but gradually solidifying patterns of reality. In this way, it never loses its position in the avant-garde and, as Harpham (1982: 21) puts it, "with its incongruous pieces unified by a half-perceived principle of coherence, the grotesque stands as a type of that which generates progression."

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ACTA UNIVERSITATIS WRATISLAVIENSIS
No 1254

Anglica Wratislaviensia XXI

Wrocław 1991

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SYMBOL — ALLEGORY — METAPHOR
SOME REMARKS ON RICHARD CRASHAW'S SACRED POETRY

The sacred poetry of Richard Crashaw provoked a considerable number of scholars which could be proved by the fairly long list of bibliographical items. However, what seems characteristic of these studies is the frequently apologetic tone offering excuses for the poet's excessive and tasteless use of stylistic figures as well as chaotic structure. A review of Austin Warren's *Richard Crashaw*, which was published in TLS in 1957[1], comprises some of the essential arguments against this poetry, labelling it as "pretty well completely inhuman", i. e., "devoid of human interest", which refers to its being "devotional and objective" as opposed to the more "civilized" approach to experience and "balanced" poetry of either Jonson or Marvell. Austin Warren himself is depicted, further on, as pretentious and unable "to find the man behind the ornamentation." The difficulties with accepting Crashaw in Anglo-Saxon scholarship[2] may to a certain extent derive from his poetry's continental and Catholic Counter-Reformation, or otherwise Jesuit, background. It has already been proved by scholars that Crashaw found his "real models" in *Epigrammatum Sacrorum Liber* published in Cambridge in 1634 (Raspa 1966: 37-38). L. C. Martin (1957: 432-433) suggested that some of his poems (e. g., *The Teare, The Weeper*) were either indebted to or translated from Jesuit poetry (e. g., models provided by Francis Remond as well as by the Jesuit poetical theorist Famianus Strada and his *Prolusiones Academicae*, printed in Rome in 1617). Nevertheless, the persistent manner in which Crashaw's poetry is rejected on the one hand, and the often obscure efforts of its advocates on the other, have stimulated and encouraged my investigation of this phenomenon.

The hitherto published research concerning Crashaw's poetry has not avoided the pitfalls of evaluation affecting both Crashaw's ardent advocates and his equally uncompromising enemies. The investigation of this situation in criticism/scholarship;

[1] The review entitled "The Inhumanity of Crashaw!" was published anonymously in *The Times Literary Supplement* on Friday, August 9, 1957. The review concerns Austin Warren's *Richard Crashaw: A Study in Baroque Sensibility*, Ann Arbour 1957.

[2] Analogous remarks appear in, e.g., C. V. Wedgwood, *Seventeenth-Century English Literature*, O. U. P. 1961; *The New Pelican Guide to English Literature*, vol. 3, B. Ford [ed.], Penguin 1982; *Sphere History of Literature in the English Language*, vol. 2, Ch. Ricks [ed.] Sphere Books 1970.

the theoretical roots of this unreconcilable division especially, rather than a survey of scholarship; another apology for Crashaw's poetry or an attempt at a totally new reading, forms the essential task of the present study. Its subtitle points to samples from Crashaw's poetry which can be used as an illustration of the proposed viewpoint. Thus the aim of my study is limited to the presentation of some general directions enabling a certain elucidation of the peculiar position that Crashaw's poetry seems to hold within, or perhaps on the verge of, the literary domain.

Despite the indispensable references to Jesuit techniques reflected in Crashaw's poetry, it is not the aim of this presentation to seek political and ideological explanations. On the contrary, my attempts shall focus on some questions concerning the literary status of this poetry, at least partially, rooted in the ages-old debate on the notions of symbol, allegory and metaphor and thus affecting some more marginal forms such as meditation (especially its application in both sacred and profane poetry). The paper does not undertake the task of presenting a complete historical survey of the foregoing terms as this has already been dealt with by individual authors as well as scholarly programmes, both sources yielding collections of articles[3]. Therefore the following passages will concentrate on relatively, from my point of view, important moments in this terminological debate in order to arrive at some differentiations throwing light on the controversy over Crashaw's sacred poetry.

As the acknowledged degree of similarity between, sometimes even total mutual inclusion of the terms variously arranged in pairs, e. g., symbol and allegory, allegory and metaphor, metaphor and symbol, changes from one period to another one is tempted to look for a minimum unit, a *tertium comparationis*, as a starting point: even if it will have to be rejected or abandoned in the course of the discussion.

The present thesis assumes that the concept of sign as defined by Eco may serve as a temporary point of departure due to both its abstract and concrete character enabling the penetration of the above terminological sequence[4]. A particularly pertinent

[3] This presentation avoids any standardized survey of the twenty four centuries of post-Aristotelian studies on metaphor. Despite the continual investigation, the discussion concerning this controversial term has not ceased and seems, due to the experiments in contemporary poetry, to experience another renaissance. Among more recent publications are the collections of texts on metaphor in *Teksty* 6/54: 1980 and *Studia o metaforze*, PAN, Ossolineum 1980, vol. 1-2. Except for philosophical texts, most of the recents studies place metaphor within the sphere of linguistic and stylistic phenomena thus reaching a consensus sufficient enough. Analogous views are expressed by M. R. Mayenowa, (1979: 216-217); Umberto Eco, who follows Roman Jakobson, in his *A Theory of Semiotics*, Indiana U. P. 1979, p. 279-280. Similar definitions appear in *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*, Alex Preminger, F. Warnke, O. B. Hardison Jr [ed.], The Macmillan Press, London 1975: "Metaphor. *A condensed verbal relation* in which an idea, image or symbol may, by the presence of one or more other ideas, images or symbols, be enhanced in vividness, complexity" [underlining mine], and in *Słownik terminów literackich*, S. Sierotwiński [ed.] Ossolineum, Wrocław 1986.

[4] The concept of sign itself can be formulated in several ways. The Greek philosophers considered semeia as abstractions. Still, most of the examples were concrete objects (Pelc 1984: 68). The twentieth-century semiotic reflection opens with de Saussure's (1916) *Cours de linguistique générale* and the proposition that signs should be considered as having a twofold structure: a combination of signifier and signified (Pelc 1984: 69). Accordingly, the sign becomes an essential communicative device, intentionally used by ***human beings*** trying to communicate or to express something (Eco, *op. cit.*: 15). On the contrary, for

advantage of such a general definition is its capability of pointing out the transgressions of linguistic boundaries. It also provides a useful tool for the analysis of the terms reaching beyond the realm of pure literariness, or otherwise beyond the universe of purely linguistic transformations.

The subsequent discussion focuses primarily on symbolism, a mode in relation to which the remaining allegorical and metaphorical modes will be defined. Facing the plurality of theories, I suggest St. Augustine's formulation as the starting point. Here, the symbolic mode is conceived of as potentially transgressing the boundaries of linguistic combinations (substitution contiguity etc.) in terms of which the aforementioned concepts have been defined by most semioticians who followed Roman Jakobson and Umberto Eco. Although, most proverbially, everything in the theory of literature starts with Aristotle, the present study begins with St. Augustine and the Neoplatonic tradition (the philosopher is quoted in relation to metaphor). The advantage of this preference consists, essentially, in St. Augustine's much broader concept of the symbolic. And thus, his definition holds that "a sign is a thing which causes us to think of something beyond the impression the thing itself makes upon the senses"[5]. From this point of view the sign itself becomes a "shadow", an "impression" whose essential function approaches that of a sign post (comparable to the theatrical deixis). Thus the chief function of designation is replaced by that of *indication*, on the one hand, and *communication* (if to signify is to externalize knowledge), on the other. A consequent elaboration of those assumptions leads to the doctrine of universal symbolism and to the questions concerning the nature of this communication, or from the opposite perspective, the process of signifying instead of the sign itself. A further consequence is the annihilation of the Aristotelian distinction into the proper and transposed (otherwise direct and indirect) signs. Perhaps this polarity is not completely eradicated, but within the new context of universal symbolism it is certainly no longer the essential one. These transformations, in turn, affect the status and the tasks of rhetoric as well as the possibilities of aesthetic valorization. Tzvetan Todorov (1982: 60) describes the rhetoric before Tacitus as an art of persuasion (communication), a transitive means with emphasis on efficacy, accompanied by the gradually disappearing difference between poet and orator.

St. Augustine's concept may generate two situations. The first occurs when persuasion, i. e., communication, becomes the centre of the poets interest and thus

Charles Sanders Peirce the subjects of semiosis are not human but rather *abstract semiotic entities* and the essential function is that of *standing for* something else to somebody due to the third element — interpretant (Eco, *op.cit.*: 15. Eco (*op.cit.* p. 16), following Charles Morris (1938, *Foundation of the Theory of Signs*), proposes a very general definition of sign as everything that "on the grounds of a previously established social convention, can be taken as something standing for something else." Thus, something may become a sign due to being interpreted as such by any interpreter. A similar definition appears in Kmita's lectures (1976: 32) where the autonomous sign, whether an abstraction or a concrete object, is anything that communicates on the basis of the recognized cultural rules of interpretation. The present thesis follows the broad definitions proposed by Eco and Kmita as well as the complex concrete/abstract nature of certain signs.

[5] The quotation comes from St. Augustine's, *On Christian Doctrine* (II, i, 1) and follows Todorov's translation (1982: 41).

rhetoric deals with the description of effects achieved due to particular figures (the relation between expression and thought), which may lead toward an ornamental concept of style. The second is an ascetically functional concept of rhetoric capable of resulting even in a definite refutation of aesthetic judgement as such. Everything becomes, in a sense, "literal". The latter line of thought reminds us of the so called primitive, if one avoids evaluation, or degenerate non-metaphorical ways of thinking which either have not acquired or have already lost the capacity for constructing theories (abstract thinking). "Literal" or concrete is to a certain extent very close to symbolic thinking which either might have been preceded by or might have potentially evolved into tabooistic and fetishistic forms. The latter makes no difference between word/object and *sacrum*: the unknown, inscrutable or infinite; reducing them all to object itself.

On the other hand, the tabooistic, despite witnessing or being aware of the growing polarity of word and object, interrupts the process of signification by fossilizing it into sacred forms (compare the use of objects in Crashaw's poetry. They are important in relation to themselves and any aesthetic interpretation proves futile). In both cases the form becomes static and hinders all the processes of rationalization that would lead back to symbolic thinking with the ambivalent heterogeneity inherent in the structure of this phenomenon. The elusiveness of symbolic structure is reflected in the variety of often contradictory statements.

A characteristic example of such a statement is provided in Todorov's (1982: 161-162) discussion of Karl Philipp Moritz's concept of allegory and symbol. Thus symbol should be a complete whole in itself and signify nothing outside itself as opposed to allegory which is always linked with the outside. Hence the process of signification is placed within the symbol and implies "an ordered relationship of its parts." Neither the character of the relationship nor the meaning of the term "parts" are further explicated. Nevertheless, not only Moritz's but also Goethe's concept admits and emphasizes the existence of either a "part" or "the general" *within* the boundaries of symbol and not as objects of reference:

> There is great difference according to whether the poet is seeking access to the general *through* the particular or sees the general *in* the particular. [...] The second approach is nevertheless properly the nature of poetry; it states the particular without thinking on the basis of the general and indicating it. But the reader who immediately grasps this particular receives the general at the same time, without realizing it, or realizing it only later[6].

Even if this definition is motivated by the unfavourable treatment of allegorical modes in Romantic reflections on literary theory (allegory treated as the epitome of classicism), it becomes clear that what can be indicated or signified is here internalized. Thus, I would like to argue for a hypothetical definition of symbol as the sum of the two domains, however only reminiscent of the two "parts." The first retains or has recently acquired the capability of signifying, the second (described by Goethe as the "general") constitutes the object of signification. At the same time the latter should not

[6] The quotation comes from Goethe's *Jubiläumsausgabe* vol. 38, 1822, p. 261, and follows Todorov's translation (1982: 204).

be confused with an allegorical abstract idea and is more likely to become the inscrutable object of hermeneutic study. As the latter part is to some degree present in the symbol, one may easily succumb to the illusion of a closed symbolic form or a dynamic totality[7].

According to this definition, symbol both indicates and signifies but it does so in the course of a two-step process: the first stage occurs within the symbol and is conceived of as a *visible* sign of something present though inscrutable, the second indicates something absent within the directly accessible form. To sum up, this tentative approach would suggest that, contrary to K. P. Moritz's theory (Todorov 1982: 209), symbolic forms comprise both the faculties of signifying and of being. However, what is essential to such interpretation is the possiblity of considering symbols as transitive structures transforming the inaccessible or cognitively problematic into objects available for further intellectual processing such as analysis and explanation. Thus the frequently attributed dynamic qualities derive from the epiphanic transformations/liberations which are generated owing to and via symbolic forms. Another potentiality revealed by these forms is their capability of rendering the sphere of the nonhuman as accessible to historical, i. e., temporal concepts.

Todorov's (1982: 224-225) history of semiotic evolution offers several examples which may be used as illustrations of the above symbolic functions: for instance, the description of Lucien Levy-Bruhl's concept of the evolution of language from "primitive, prelogical" toward "mystical" or, in terms of individual development, the predomination of symbolic thinking among children and its near-absence in the adult life (this, for instance, points to the expected attitude on the part of Crashaw's reader. Instead of an intellectual analysis of interrelations, each object as such, e. g., teare, pearl, should appeal to the reader and provide him with a divine insight). The mutuality of the two examples is in a way analogous to the concept of philogenetic and ontogenetic development. It is a complementary relationship which enables and sustains tension resulting in a certain distance between the respective domains of the symbolic form.

In terms of the spacio-temporal differentiations symbol can be identified as atemporal *par excellence*. However, it often employs and subjects typically temporal, e. g., allegorical forms[8]. The vertical movement within the symbolic forms allows the essential passage from the concrete sensuous signifying domain (allegorical, emblematic — both verbal and visual forms) toward the infinity of the signified spiritual domain. Thus, contrary to the tropological modes, it can be conceived as a means particularly capable of arousing religious feelings and leading toward teophanic visions. It follows that symbols, on the one hand, appear as extremely condensed (impenetrable) forms, enclosing the process of signification within themselves and hence standing for atemporal value systems. On the other hand,

[7] Cf. the discussion on open and closed forms in G. Durand, *Wyobraźnia symboliczna*, PIW, Warszawa 1986.

[8] Here, as well as in the following discussion, allegory is considered as an essentially narrative form — whether in linguistic or pictorial terms — and therefore formally involved in the temporal. Cf. late editions of Ripa's emblems which evolved from symbolic to narrative allegorical forms of representation.

symbol may enable us to create a distance between past and present allowing the process of rationalization and the rise of semiotics. This seemingly paradoxical relationship constitutes another fundamental ambiguity of symbolic representation. This difficulty in defining the symbolic forms was also recognized by M. R. Mayenowa (1979: 212) who observes, from a strictly linguistic point of view, that the problem is placed already on the verge of *verbum* as an element of language and an object bestowed with symbolic function or symbolic action. Once again symbol appears as a form capable of transgressing the boundaries of literariness and perhaps therefore appealed to the writers of sacred poetry in particular.

The enigmatic mode of symbolic discourse can also be defined in terms of the extrinsic approach (Kmita, Ławniczak 1970: 104-108). With this result it becomes a symbolic situation with the following accredited characteristics: (1) it is a statement formulated on the basis of the accessible knowledge, (2) its domain is fantastic as opposed to the nomothetic domain of knowledge, (3) its meaning is unique, individual and cannot be established on the grounds of "cultural competence." The above implies that symbolic situations can be only hypothetically and arbitrarily reconstructed. Both the extrinsic and intrinsic endeavours confirm the elusive character of symbolic forms, their inexplicability in terms of the present cultural competence and hence the implication of the doubtful adequacy or even, generally, the applicability of aesthetic criteria. These failures are often reflected in studies concentrating on a superficial comparative analysis of pictorial representations (emblems, paintings and sculptures) and Crashaw's poetic images.

Within an ideally symbolic concept of universe also ornaments (formerly *insignia*), later considered as marginal in relation to the central discourse of a literary work, are endowed with a definite meaning. In the course of expanding the domain of the empirical sciences certain symbols are gradually losing their status of the inexplicable; first of all, the so called ornaments which from this moment on may be, and tend to be, evaluated by purely aesthetic criteria. On these new grounds ornaments can no longer retain their previous place in the shrinking hierarchical structure, their point of reference, and therefore appear as redundant or excessive. They cease to function as *insignia*, i.e., signifying, sometimes indirectly, or indicating the inexplicable. On the other hand, their sometimes positive evaluation may occur on a totally new basis resulting, for example, in modern renderings which translate old masters into contemporary cultural landscapes. Such is also the recognition of the gothic "two ways of thinking" and its peculiar representation as grotesque. An analogous case, I presume, is the reading of Crashaw's sacred poetry from a post-Romantic point of view. However, despite the general process of dissolution to which insignia prove particularly susceptible, there are symbols immune to those revolutionary unmaskings. They are, for example, sacred symbols whose object of signification is infinity itself. Thus I would like to suggest that a serious reading of Crashaw's poetry should consider the "redundant ornaments" as *insignia*, i.e., meaningful symbolic embodiments of the absent and not merely wild aesthetic experiments. Their iterative character can be compared to the rosary beads or to a litany.

Contrary to the more frequently recognized unifying experience of symbolism, I would also emphasize its "destructive" effects, at least on the level of the represented and presentational structures, or of syntax. A radical subjection of syntactic elements to otherwordly ideas affects the narrative order (e.g., the allegorical one) by dissolving the syntagmatic relations and supplementing them with paradigmatically related items. Hence, every word may acquire an independent reference to the absolute or infinite and, in consequence, may render all human action (including aesthetic valorization) doubtful and a mere simulacrum of more permanent states.

The origins of allegory are usually described in philosophical and theological terms, which emphasizes its links with symbolic and mythological forms. However, the treatment of myths as mere allegorical stories evokes the feelings of certain inadequacy or is likely to be conceived as a particular interpretation depriving myth of something essential. And so, for example, J. A. Cuddon (1982) proposes such a colloquial but frequent definition:

> Much myth [...], is a form of allegory and is an attempt to *explain* universal facts and forces. The myth of Orpheus and Eurydice, for instance, is a notable example of the allegory of redemption and salvation.

The word "explain", i.e., elucidate by means of intellectual processing, is coherent with the allegorical mode but not quite compatible with either a symbolic or a mythological mode[9].

Nevertheless, it is possible to transform myth into an allegorical form and many of the early allegories prove to have drawn upon mythological stories (Sarnowska-Temeriusz 1969: 183). It was, however, not the structure but content which attracted the authors of allegorizations. An analogous process occurs in visual arts and results in the proliferation and elaboration of emblems. Before a mythological element enters allegory it becomes conventional, which refers not only to its frequent repetition but also, what is more important, to its rationalization, i.e., pre-allegorization. In short, first, the use of myth in both literature and fine arts provides examples of symbolic forms being gradually deprived of their symbolic status in the course of rationalization and secondly, though allegories may contain mythological material, their ontological status and original structure are different.

In this thesis allegory will be defined as a thoroughly rationalized form despite the possibility of distinguishing its multiple levels. Even Cassian's (MacQueen 1978: 49) categorization of figurative meaning in allegory in terms of the four levels: literal, allegorical, tropological and anagogical need not be considered as a transgression of the boundaries of the profane. Allegory tends to contain material that can already be logically arranged, according to a precisely defined concept. Allegory is the representation of a past experience while symbol is capable of being an experience itself. Hence, I would argue that the allegorical enigma can be shifted from one level to another till it is fully exhausted, whereas the symbolic inscrutable will elusively avoid

[9] Preminger's *Encyclopedia* comprises both views on myth: "Myth may be defined as a story or a complex taken as expressing, and therefore as implicitly symbolizing certain deep-lying aspects of human and transhuman existence" pointing, at the same time, to the controversy: "This definition is framed in such a way as to avoid two contrary and one-sided views of the matter." The split inherent in this definition results from the possibility of either a literary or a borderline status of the mythical and symbolic modes.

such clarification by withdrawing into infinity. Similar views are expressed in terms of the already quoted extrinsic approach (Kmita, Ławniczak 1970: 106). Accordingly, an allegorical situation is explicable in terms of the given cultural competence. It offers an insight into the general through the presentation of the particular, assuming that both are contained within the allegorical realm which, in this respect, appears as closed. And so the use of allegory in relation to Crashaw's poetry appears as very limited and in most cases yields negative results. Even if applied to the "pictorial image", its explicatory power is very poor as the organization of the purely pictorial seems to be subjected to a different organizing principle, i.e., to the symbolic. Hence allegorical interpretations must inevitably show the "deficiencies" of Crashaw's poetry.

The essential movement in allegory consists in the temporal sequencing of signs even at the expense of suppressing the possible analogious and anagogical levels. While symbolic forms offer both access to divinity and a path toward rationalization, the allegorical mode avoids questions concerning either "arche" or "telos":

> Whereas the symbol postulates the possibility of an identity or identification, allegory designates primarily a distance in relation to its own origin, and, renouncing the nostalgia of the desire to coincide, it establishes its language in the void of this temporal difference. In so doing, it prevents the self from an illusory identification with the non-self, which is now fully, though painfully, recognized as a non-self (de Man 1979: 207).

(Crashaw's poetry often focuses on the *telos* by trying to establish a mystical relationship with the devine). However, I would perhaps paradoxically suggest that the above suspension and thus absence of answers (concerning "arche" and "telos") preserves the very questions. As a result there appear the frequently noticed arbitrary *beginnings* and *ends* of allegories such as *deus ex machina*, a type of miraculous ending, or a completely arbitrary *summation scheme* which closes a potentially endless sequence (Fletcher 1964: 175-178).

Finally, there is the category of transitivity, usually attributed to allegory, as opposed to the presupposed intransitivity of the symbolic mode. Consequently, if we assume that allegory focuses on signification within itself, transitivity becomes a category confined to purely semiotic activities with the process of signification enacted by the interplay of the particular levels, i.e., narrative sequences. Nevertheless, I would argue that this kind of transitivity is only a variation limited to the sphere of rational discourse. In this study I assume that allegory is conditioned by the preexistence of the symbolic mode (see: on rationalization, p. 7). And therefore, allegory is subjected to or included in the transcendental symbolic transitivity.

Following this interpretation the two apparently contradictory modes emerge as considerably interrelated and seem to be approximated by the form of the so called "extended metaphor", originationg from this enigmatic, unspecified and dynamic co-existence. Maria Szmidt defines the "extended metaphor"[10] (1980: 132) as a metaphor resulting from two possible transformations: (1) the allegorization of

[10] The term is used according to *Słownik terminów literackich*, J. Sławiński (ed.), Wrocław 1976, and Szmidt (1980).

symbol, and (2) the attribution of symbolic qualities to allegorical forms. The foregoing could be expressed in terms of the concept of transitivity although, to me, it remains doubtful whether the results of the two contradictory processes, i.e., rationalization and symbolization, may finally contribute to the emergence of an identical form. Hence the very term becomes questionable. At least theoretically the logocentric (de Man 1979: 88) quality of the symbolic should find its manifestation in the destruction of the rigid allegorical schemes inasmuch as the former should confirm the relevance of rhetorical argument or logical narrative in poetry. For instance, the application of style/period categories might include the two processes in mannerism and baroque respectively.

Any attempt to approach metaphor as well as its variously delimited domains must begin with Aristotle's concept and his identification of the four basic tropes: metaphor metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. To quote Aristotle, "Metaphor is the attribution of a name belonging to something else: either from the genus to the species, or from the species to the genus, or from species to species, or by analogy" (Aristotle 1968: 21, 28-31). Later in the comments on the function of loan-words, metaphors and fancy words the philosopher adds that they "give dignity and transform the common speech" (*ibidem*, 22, 21-23). Among all of the "out of the way usages" metaphor acquires a particular status as it "demands" originality and is a sign of genius (*ibidem*, 22, 133-135). This definition implies the opposition between proper and transformed signs and is generally part of the discourse on names, i.e., linguistic phenomena and not symbolic structures for which language provides only one of the possible modes of manifestation.

Although Aristotle perceives metaphor as a particularly valuable departure from the standard (dignified, versus low), he does not consider it as a more efficient means of cognition. As a consequence, this approach may lead toward some extreme emotive theories of metaphor as pure ornament, or different register, static and *non*-referential. On the other hand, the opposite and what might be called tensive theories emphasize the interactive, dynamic aspect of metaphor and, as a consequence, must define symbol as a stable means of "fixing and closing the system of knowledge" (Hester 1967: 16-17). And thus in contradistinction to the fundamental classical approach, reflected also in some modern linguistic theories, there is the romantic view with its twentieth-century anthropological extension. These theories emphasize that metaphor is central and inseparable from language in the sense of constituting its creative potentialities. For the romantic poets, e.g., Coleridge, metaphor becomes an organic whole refuting the artificial boundaries constructed by Aristotle and his neoclassical followers. Evidently, from our point of view, the romantic definitions blur the distinction between symbol and metaphor by forgetting about the origin of symbol as well as by using the terms interchangeably. The same can be traced in the post-romantic criticism.

Nevertheless, it is not the task of the present study to explicate the nuances of either neo-classical or romantic theories although in the history of the term this polarity certainly indicates the extremes between which most definitions oscillate. The present endeavours are directed mainly toward a certain differentiation of metaphor in

relation to symbolic and allegorical modes. Hence, it is assumed that, first, metaphor as opposed to both of the latter forms, is a totality in itself and not a sensorial equivalence of a more general, ideal meaning or of the spiritual; it is the idea itself, just as much as a possible abstract expression (de Man 1979: 196). Secondly, both symbol and allegory were previously defined as varieties of open forms due to their respective positive or negative reference to the transcendental source. Metaphor, from this angle, is closed and all the dynamic processes occur within its boundaries which seem to be verbal, despite the various terms in which they tend to be described, e.g., object-subject tension, signifier-signified etc. The above does not indicate that it is possible to designate the precise semantic boundaries of each metaphor. Besides, it should be added that this difficulty is irrelevant to metaphor. Metaphors can be both relatively simple paraphrases or extended and condensed forms oscillating between lucidity and enigma, which proves the exceptional flexibility and inclusiveness of this mode as opposed to symbol and allegory. On the other hand, if either allegory or symbol are defined in terms of the category of metaphor, they emerge as reduced and differentiated by barely one feature. Thus, for example, the definition suggested by Markiewicz (1983: 12) presents them both as designates of evocative metaphor (based on paradigmatic equivalence) referring either to an abstract (allegory) or to an ambiguous object (symbol).

The above considerations aimed at defining the relation between the symbolic mode, on the one hand, and the allegorical and metaphorical, on the other. The co-existence of symbol and allegory is more pertinent to the present investigation and thus shall be more extensively exemplified in the following. In the preceding theoretical argument I attempted to show that the proposed category of transitivity should be recognized as essential to the symbolic mode for it enables us to express what I would consider as the two vital functions of symbolic thinking: first, rationalization and secondly, symbolization. The former accounts for the rise of the allegorical mode, of a historical concept of time and enlarges the domain of semiotic activity. The latter, usually accepted as proper symbolism proves destructive in relation to allegorical mode in returning the previously rationalized forms and objects into the sphere of sacrum. The second part of the present paper will provide samples of the possible applicability of the present concept to Crashaw's poetry.

And so the 1646 London edition of *Crashaw's Steps to the Temple*[11] includes an interesting preface written by an anonymous author identifying himself as the poet's friend. Apart from exclusively occasional flatteries it contains some remarks on the peculiar quality of this poetry and the poet himself. And thus he appears as Herbert's equal "who hath retriv'd Poetry of late, return'd it up to its Primitive use; Let it bound back to heaven gates, whence it came." What follows is a pertinent digression: "Think yee, St. Augustin would have steyned his graver Learning with a booke of Poetry, had he fancied their dearest end to be the vanity of Love-Sonnets, and Epithalamiums?" (Martin 1957: 75). The later 1652 Paris edition of *Carmen Deo Nostro* removed the old preface and, apart from a series of considerable changes concerning both the very poems and their arrangement, added the well known epigram by Thomas Car (Martin 1957: 235) which comments on the pictures accompanying the poems and probably made or chosen by the poet himself. It opens with the following lines: "Twixt pen and pencil rose, a holy strife/Which might draw vertue better to the life" (Martin 1957: 235). Thus the two prefaces may serve as an introduction to the problem of emblematic visualization in Crashaw's poetry.

[11] All the references to Crashaw's poetry as well as the prefaces follow L. C. Martin's edition (1957), unless marked otherwise.

The poet's capacity for visual expressiveness has already been noticed by several scholars such as Ruth Wallerstein, Austin Warren, Louis Martz[12] (who identified the visual counterpart of Crashaw's *St. Theresa*), Shonoshuke Ishii and, finally, Norman Farmer in his comparative study on poetry and the visual arts in the Renaissance. Most of the above studies are satisfied with the very statement of certain analogies between the visual and the poetic, some use the emblematic compositions as sets of *loci* or a kind of pattern which may be imposed upon the text so as to provide it with a certain structure. The emblematic or pictorial quality may also be employed as an excuse or an counter-argument in the discussion on Crashaw's "bad taste" (Farmer 1984: 47). The present study suggests that the origin of the visual in the poet's sacred poetry should be investigated via the two "prefaces." The author of the earlier one observes that Crashaw "return'd" poetry to its "Primitive use", by which he referred not only to its exlusively religious character but also to its peculiar quality, spontaneously or intuitively defined in terms of a reference to the past. The subsequent digression, or argument, mentions St. Augustine and in this way prabably suggests a possible explanation of the former statement. As a matter of fact it was St. Augustine's *De Trinitate* in which the pan-symbolic vision of the universe was formulated and spread all over the medieval Europe. Challenging the equally prominent Aristotelian trends, it found its continuation in the Neoplatonic thought and, later on, among the mystic followers (Białostocki 1982: 21).

One of the entailing consequences of this doctrine was the belief that the contemplation of the symbolic pictorial (concrete) forms of representation guaranteed a more immediate access to the higher, sacred knowledge as opposed to the more abstract signs of language. The emphasis on *istoria* and thus the domination of language appears, somewhat later, in the Renaissance and is characteristically marked by the frequent use of allegorical modes both in literature and in the visual arts. Hence, for example, the second edition of Ripa's emblems in 1603 contains a set of already completely rationalized symbols, i.e., allegories which, in turn, became a source material for literary works. Further editions developed *fattoes* representing a definite *istoria* and functioning as exempla. However, the temporarily suppressed undercurrent of Neoplatonic and mystical concepts of symbolism was restored especially around 1604 due to Carel van Mandera, Cristofor Giardo's *Bibliothecae alexandrinae icones symbolicae* and later due to Bernini's aesthetic views (Białostocki 1982: 26-33). Symbolic visual images become more prominent and are again

[12] R. Wallerstein, *Richard Crashaw: A Study in Style and Poetic Development*. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison 1959; Martz (1971), Warren, *op. cit.*

considered as capable of unveiling the mysteries inaccessible to *ratio*. The process of rationalization is reversed and allegories become "painted enigmas" pointing toward symbolic forms. There appear individualized *impresa* and *hieroglyphs*. Crashaw's "holy strife" may refer to this controversy focusing on the priority of either visual or linguistic expression, which at that time reached the stage of co-existence: the advocates of both views were numerous.

The Weeper belongs to the poems most frequently quoted in reference to Crashaw's poetic strategies[13]. Its structure is compared to rosary beads (however, only superficially), to a mosaic or to a set of variations. All of the above key-words derive from comments presupposing a definite idea of harmony which is not quite applicable to this kind of metaphysical poetry. And so the very term *metaphysical*, used as a label designating a group of poets including both Donne and Crashaw, once again displays its incongruities and controversial character. Despite the use of analogous technical devices, such as oxymoron, references to a cosmological concept or certain spiritual exercises, Donne's sacred and somber poetry is always closer to the tradition of sonnet with its exploration of darker emotions, originally related to the penetration of the self, as well as certain formal requirements. Their style is repeatedly that of tense argument and proof (see Donne's *Holy Sonnets*), of a continual commentary or exercise in dialectical skill, and in this way always reminiscent of *istoria*, a kind of rationalized narrative structure strongly relying on *verbum* and rhetorical principles. Although Crashaw's poems do not invariably lack narrative structures they do not recognize the importance of logical, cogent action even in such poems as *Nativity* or *Epiphanie*. Others like *Sancta Maria Dolorum* or *To the Countess of Denbigh*, make use of subordinate narrative and orational structures, but their effect is obscured by the equally powerful meditative structure.

An analogous situation is to be observed in Crashaw's use of visual images. All of the pictures preceding his poems in the 1652 edition are either emblems or imitations of emblematic representations. Hence there arises the question of whether they should be considered as symbols or allegories. So far the latter approach has prevailed at least in the analysis of particular poems, and resulted in the attempts at interpreting, notably *The Weeper*, as a quasi-topographical poem:

> Crashaw's verbal evocation of the meaning inherent in the portrait offers an example of the importance of the pictorial component in his poems. There the idea of the subject is said to reside *within* the engraved presentation. [...] For Crashaw, perhaps more than for any other seventeenth-century poet, picture is the very *incarnation* of the logos [underlining mine — E. K. Ł.] (Varmer 1984: 49).

As the underlined words are treated only metaphorically the analysis that follows the above pronouncements inevitably reduces the image of Mary Magdalen to a merely allegorical form of representation. It becomes clear even in the author's course

[13] The examples are numerous. Three different interpretations were suggested by: (1) Warren, *op. cit.*; (2) M. Praz (in the *Flaming Heart*. Doubleday, New York 1958) who pointed out the epigrammatic style of the poem and its various sources but failed in establishing its total poetic effect; (3) W. Empson (in *Some Versions of the Pastoral*. New Directions, New York 1974) whose critical remarks focused on the thirty-one variations with no definite theme.

of analysis that the pictorial in *The Weeper* does not offer a coherent allegorical level, or an idea itself, for the poem. On the contrary, assuming that the poet rediscovers the symbolic status of emblems, it is not the idea but the object itself that is, at least partially, present *within* the engraving and thus may become the incarnation not of *logos* or Penitence as concepts but of the penitent Mary Magdalen. An allegorical approach to the engraving should enable a static description or reveal systematic correspondences between its visual and verbal aspect — if the former is treated either as the literal or the already analogous level. However, even if the potential critic was not biased against Crashaw's style, such a description would hardly be attainable. Another particularly lucid example of such endeavours is provided by Shonoshuke Ishii's (1979: 199) article in which the author concludes that each of the 23 stanzas of *The Weeper* is a separate picture, thus admitting the impossibility of their merging into either a coherent pictorial image or a narrative scheme. The only unifying principle the author is induced to discover is the very form in which any text can be printed and which he compares to a Japanese scroll.

The effect achieved by Crashaw seems to originate in the process of re-symbolization marked by the interruption and disregard of the narrative as well as the fragmentation of syntactic sequencing pertinent to the allegorical mode. By assuming a pan-symbolic stance the author feels no longer compelled to follow the principle of analogy in the choice of details he elaborates. The relation between text and image is not that of correspondence but of continual interaction characteristic of mediation[14] as opposed to oration. The poem becomes a means of communication rather than an end in itself. Further on, from this viewpoint, the particular, concrete aspects of the emblem are capable of assuming a symbolic quality and, as such, their semantic domain can be expanded *ad infinitum*. In this light Ishii's vague dissatisfaction with his own idea of the 23 emblematic engravings emerges as symptomatic:

> if he [Crashaw] wished his stanzas to be given accompanying engravings, he desired that they should be made both more natural and more credible, anticipating, incidentally the type of engravings used by Shaftesbury fifty years later (Ishii 1979: 202).

To sum up, if Crashaw's poetry is considered in either metaphorical or allegorical terms, it proves in many ways (already pointed out by scholars and critics) deficient. These deficiences, however, result from approaching the phenomenon of Crashaw's sacred poetry as pure poetry, i.e., literature or fiction, analysed in terms of either neoclassically defined allegory or romantically defined metaphor. On the other hand, if this poetry is conceived of as a borderline phenomenon and therefore considered in borderline categories (i.e., symbolic), which render purely aesthetic evaluation problematic, there arises a possibility of a different approach. At the same time, it also explains the persistent occurrence of certain phrases in both criticism and scholarship, e.g., the adjective "inhuman" which now may acquire a new meaning.

[14] Donne's concept of meditation, however, influenced by the Jesuit tradition (Ignatius Loyola) departs from Crashaw's emotive form. The *Holy Sonnets* are, on the one hand, capable of presenting the Petrarchan 4-4-6 form and, on the other hand, of absorbing the meditative principles of rendering them in considerably rationalized, intellectual terms.

Thus the "primitive" character of Crashaw's poetry can be conceived in terms of a re-symbolization of previously conventionalized, i.e., allegorical forms, as part of an attempt to restore the pan-symbolic concept of universe and, by extension the medieval Neoplatonic concept of aesthetic valorization in which the amalgam of truth and beauty achieve a theological status. This is why positive valorization is construed as participation in the divine and requires forms of expression that would penetrate beyond the verbal boundaries. Crashaw's search of this new expression is present not only in his use of the pictorial but is also reflected in the imitations and translations of Marino, in which he does not rest in the ingenuity of the Italian master. Whereas Giambattista Marino deals with the complexity of pure forms, the English poet is striving for a new access to meaning which springs neither from the image nor from the language.

The poetic debate *On Hope* composed by Richard Crashaw and Abraham Cowley provides remarkable evidence of how the witty and allegorical mode, strongly reminiscent of Donne and Marvell, can be subjected to the process of symbolization. The poem consists of nine stanzas and, according to C. H. Miller's (1964: 67-69) arrangement, forms a dialogüe in which Cowley's arguments follow a logical plan and Crashaw's answers, point by point matching Cowley's, do not properly meet them. This process of re-symbolization can be illustrated by the two stanzas:

stanza V

(Cowley)

Hope, Fortunes cheating Lotterie!
Where for one prize an hundred blanks there bee;
Fond Archer, Hope, who talk'st thy aime so farre!
That still or short or wide thine arrowes are!
Thin, empty Cloud, which th'eye deceives
With shapes that our owne Fancie gives!
A Cloud, which guilt and painted now appears,
But must drop presently in tears!
When thy false beams ore Reasons light prevaile
By *Ignes fatui* for North Starres we saile.

stanza VI

(Crashaw)

Fortune alas above the worlds law warres:
Hope kicks the curl'd heads of conspiring starres.
Her keele cuts not the waves, where our winds stirre,
And *Fates* whole Lottery is one blanke to her.
Her shafts, and shee fly farre above.
And forrage in the fields of light, and love.
Sweet Hope! kind cheat! faire fallacy! by thee
Wee are not where, or what wee bee,
But what, and where we would bee; thus art thou
Our absent presence, and our future now.

(Miller 1964: 67-69)

Cowley assumes the role of a worldly philosopher guided by reason and the third step of his argument (stanza V) focuses on hope as almost never fulfilled. The subsequently employed images are enclosed within quasi-couplets elaborating the

themes of illusion. The semantic domain of Hope is reduced, via Fortune, to "Lotterie" in which the chances of winning are almost none. Fortune, Lottery and Hope are also present in Crashaw's reply but their semantic domains are transformed. Fortune (an originally sublunary mechanism) is placed beyond the "earthly" sphere and as a result achieves a divine status preventing her from interference into the human world. The idea is strengthened in lines 2 and 3 in which the "conspiring starres" are kicked by Hope or moved aside like waves by the keel. Now, though Hope is visualized as the emblematic ship, its status is not allegorical but translated into the sacred. Cowley's "Fond Archer", resembling Cupid in his careless entertainments, shoots out arrows which fail to reach the elusive target. *Fate* becomes Crashaw's archer and its single aim is at the same time the only blank in the Lottery, here interpreted as the positive unknown of the afterlife. His shafts mark the upward movement towards "Sweet Hope", "faire fallace" as counterparts of Cowley's "empty", "painted" Cloud. The final three lines in Crashaw's reply illustrate how the paradox of "to be" and "not to be", juxtaposed with Cowley's praise of Reason, can be resolved in a process of transsubstantiation. The temporary absence of the "I speake" in the sphere of the divine is filled in by the presence of divine hope (= Faith). Simultaneously, the speaker is shown as transported into a different sphere and already uplifted as his peculiar absence suggests (1.6; compare the use of capital letters in Martin p. 346 as opposed to p. 145). The idea of spiritual elevation is thus expressed in the process of secondary symbolization of previously allegorized forms and so approaching the concept of the so called extended metaphor. In visual arts it is, by analogy, depicted by apotheosis. Following Miller's proposition, *On Hope* can be compared to a dispute between Aristotle and St. Augustine (Miller 1964: 73). Yet, the poem is not a mere opportunity of exploiting tensions between the secular and the sacred, or a series of parllel lines but rather a transmutation of the Aristotelian:

As lumps of sugar lose themselves, and twine
Their subtile essence with the soule of Wine
(11. 89-90)

Crashaw's reader was expected to "take a poem hence, and tune thy soule by it; and thus refined and borne up upon the wings of meditation, in these poems thou maiest talk freely of God, and of the other state" (Martin 1957: 95). In this manner, accepting the role of a mediator between God and Man, he makes his poetry comparable to a spiritual exercise and exposes it to the dilemmas of the aesthetic versus the ascetic. The various influences of meditation upon Crashaw's poetry (e.g., *Sancta Maria Dolorum*) were, at length, investigated by L. L. Martz and Anthony Raspa (Raspa 1982: 143-163). It should, therefore, be only added that both Puente's (Martz 1971: 113-115) description of the meditative techniques and the principles of meditation distinguished by Raspa (1966: 37), resemble the symbolic structure and seem capable of performing analogous functions.

And so the remaining question is that of the place which can be designated to metaphor within such a concept of poetry. The validity of metaphor in Crashaw's poetry seems to rest on an attempted likeness of experience. The similarity is always illusory as Crashaw's poetry concentrates primarily on the rendering of the passage

from a concrete object (scene from the Bible or a pictorial image) to the "abstract" or to the undefinable. To arrive at an almost perfect analogy the author is induced to formulate series of often paradoxical juxtaposition which do not result in a cogent argument but resemble tentative definitions probably reflecting the effort of contemplation. This is how most metaphors are neither the Aristotelian substitutions, covering the greater part of metaphorical territory, nor transformations. The prevailing mode is the metaphor of proportion extended by the symbolic meditative aims and departing from Aristotle's discussion on names. The essential function is to express and intensify the experience of an already symbolic universe. The "marvellous discourse" practiced by Giambattista Marino and advocated by Emmanuele Tesauro several years later (Schwenger 1976: 67) in *Il Cannochiale Aristotelico* (1654) becomes a "divine discourse" in Crashaw's poetry:

> Wellcome, all WONDERS in one sight
> Aeternity shutt in a span.
> [...]
> Heauen in earth, GOD in MAN
> Great little one! whose all-embracing birth
> Lifts earth to heauen, stoops heauen to earth
>
> (11. 79-80, 282-284 p. 250)

Tesauro propagated the illusionistic aesthetic as a source of sophisticated pleasure despite its deceitful qualities. Crashaw's application of similar strategies emphasizes the symbolically expressed sense of transition and results in "kind contrarietyes" rather than truly paradoxical witticisms.

To conclude, the aims of the present study were, first, to propose a certain re-definition of the symbol — allegory — metaphor sequence in order to enable a different approach, rather alien to the English and American scholarly tradition, to both Crashaw's poetry and the hitherto accumulated studies. Secondly, the paper tried to provide some examples of its applicability. And so it is suggested that the assumption of a coherently symbolic structure, as opposed to the approaches distinguishing either individual symbols or metaphors, reveals the possibility of a different evaluation of this poetry. Given this, the occurrence of such pejorative epithets as "inhuman", "unbalanced", "uncivilized" or "tasteless" can be attributed to the expectations born on the grounds of an aesthetic approach to this poetry. This is how Crashaw's poetry becomes "inhuman", if the human amounts to the rational, and how it also becomes both "uncivilized" and "primitive" as it re-discovers (via the symbolic) and re-vitalizes some of already transformed modes of thinking by re-symbolizing the allegorical. Consequently, to some degree, the "unbalanced" and thus "tasteless" originates in the above processes. As far as the aesthetic criteria are concerned, points of reference are provided by the tradition of the metaphysical poetry epitomized by Donne on the one hand, and as far as criticism is concerned, the Romantic tradition vacillating between symbol and metaphor on the other[15]. This influence can be

[15] Such propositions are included in G. W. Williams' *Image and Symbol in the Sacred Poetry of Richard Crashaw*. University of Carolina Press, 1963. A metaphorical approach was proposed by Schwenger (1976). The so called "perspectivist metaphor" is conceived of as analogous to baroque architectonic structure. This approach seems to originate in the post-Romantic tradition of the baroque criticism proposed by Wölfflin and capable of associating Palestrina with Wagner (Schwenger 1976). This Romantic tradition transposed the qualities ascribed to symbol onto metaphor and blended, in the following criticism, the Aristotelian and Platonic thought. This chaos is reflected in the Anglo-Saxon research on Crashaw, especially when inspired by Wölfflin's concept or the late nineteenth-century and pre-war German scholarly tradition.

observed in Wölfflin's post-Romantic concept of Baroque nostalgically expressed in Ishii's choice of "proper" illustrations to Crashaw's poetry as well as in several other "Baroque" approaches to these poems. Finally, in the present study, I would like to express my strong belief that Crashaw's sacred poetry should be treated as a borderline case, an example of transgression — via the symbolic mode — into an extraliterary realm. Thus the paper proposes not so much a re-evaluation as a re-discovery.

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ACTA UNIVERSITATIS WRATISLAVIENSIS
No 1254

Anglica Wratislaviensia XXI

Wrocław 1991

MARIA GOTTWALD

ROMANCE IN "THE SIRE DE MALÉTROIT'S DOOR" BY R. L. STEVENSON

The story *The Sire de Malétroit's Door* has been praised by Sean O'Faolain as a "superb piece of outrageous romanticism" (1983: 218) when he discusses Stevenson's recurrent motif of the closed door (also used in *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* and in the story *A Lodging for the Night*).

T. O. Beachcroft (1968: 108) has suggested that it was "the overspill from Stevenson's historical studies" for his story about François Villon that "gave him the material [...] for *The Sire de Malétroit's Door*." Yet Beachcroft thought that Stevenson may have found the basic situation of the story "in one of the Renaissance collections"" (1868: 110).

However, Stevenson's own reference (in a letter to Sidney Colvin, August 1877) to the story as "a *true*[1] novel, in the old sense" seems to indicate that factual account rather than fiction was his inspiration. A more plausible explanation is that Stevenson, an ardent Scottish patriot[2], was likely to have been familiar with a Border incident which happened in the reign of James VI, as recorded in Sir Walter Scott's *History of Scotland*, or with its metrical version by James Hogg[3]. In Chapter 3 of the *History of Scotland* there is a story of a young Border raider who, when defeated by the lord he had wronged, was given the choice of either being punished by hanging or marrying the lord's unattractive youngest daughter. The raider was said to be resigned to the gallows yet finally he was prevailed upon to marry the ugly girl.

The story is the more piquant as the hapless young raider referred to by Scott as "a young gentleman of a distinguished family belonging to one of these Border tribes or clans" (1881: 278) was actually one of Walter Scott's forebears, William (afterwards Sir William) Scott, the eldest son of Walter Scott of Harden.

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[1] Emphasis mine. M. G.

[2] In his boyhood Stevenson had avidly read *Rob Roy*, *Waverley*, and *Guy Mannering* which he found in his father's library. His interest and extensive reading in the Scottish history in his student's days in Edinburgh are also well known, and we are told that in 1873 and 1874 he made preliminary studies "for a projected volume on *Four Great Scotsmen*, Knox, Hume, Burns and Scott" (Hammond 1984: 5, 7).

[3] James Hogg, Scott's contemporary, is known to have supplied Scott with some ballads versions for *The Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border*.

On the other hand, a full name of the unattractive bride was adduced in Scott's account: she was Meg Murry, the youngest daughter of Sir Gideon Murry of Elibank. James Hogg's poem *The Fray of Elibank* refers to the bridegroom and the bride as Willie and Meg.

Both Scott's account and Hogg's poem are concluded with happy ending: Meg made an excellent wife and won her husband's affection.

The account of the Border incident contains the essential situation of *The Sire de Malétroit's Door* — that of a forced marriage which turned out to be a happy one. It is interesting though how Stevenson transformed Scott's simple narrative into that "superb piece of outrageous romanticism."

On the surface, the modifications introduced by Stevenson are not numerous or very important. The action of the story is transferred to medieval France (here Beachcroft's conjecture that Stevenson's background studies for his earlier story *A Lodging for the Night* have proved helpful, is fully convincing) and, accordingly, the protagonist is a young French aristocrat, Denis de Beaulieu. The prospective bride, Blanche de Malétroit, unlike Meg Murry is made attractive. Finally, the agent responsible for marrying Blanche to Denis is her uncle Alain de Malétroit (in Scott's account it was Meg's mother who prudently advised her husband to make the raider marry their daughter).

Yet it is precisely these changes that determined the actual shape of the story: both the setting of *The Sire de Malétroit's Door* and its preoccupation with chivalry, adventure and love realize the characteristic pattern of romance.

Romance involves distance by invoking the past and/or the socially remote (Beer 1970: 2) and Stevenson achieves it by his master-stroke of transporting the action of the story across the channel to Chateau Landon in 1429. The distance is not merely geographic and temporal; it also involves a political situation — the Hundred Years' War and the social system long discontinued — feudalism.

The political situation gives impulse to adventure: the protagonist, a French knight on safe conduct in the territory occupied by hostile troops makes a desperate attempt to avoid encounter with a group of enemy soldiers and falls into a trap set by Sire de Malétroit.

The protagonist's predicament — he is faced with an alternative: either he will marry Alain de Malétroit's niece or he will be executed — is a direct outcome of the setting: in the medieval world of chivalry the aristocratic notion of honour is regarded as the highest value. Sire de Malétroit believes his niece Blanche has slighted the family name by engaging in a furtive love affair and he is resolved to make the culprit marry her instantly or else kill him:

> The honour of my house has been compromised; I believe you to be the guilty person, at least you are now in the secret; and you can hardly wonder if I request you to wipe out the stain. If you will not, your blood be on your own head! [...] and if I cannot cure the dishonour, I shall at least stop the scandal (1897: 335).

For no one, even if he were a descendant of the royal house of Charlemagne, could decline "the hand of a Malétroit with impunity — not if she had been as common as the Paris road — not if she were as hideous as the gargoyle over my door" (334). And,

unlike the bride in Scott's story, Stevenson endowed Blanche with beauty, intelligence, discretion and tact. His is an idealized picture of an attractive noble maiden. Moreover, she is assigned the role of a lonely heroine tyrannized by her haughty and despotic guardian — both familiar figures in medieval romance and later in the Gothic novel.

Denis de Beaulieu is idealized as well. The eldest son of an aristocratic family he is not an adventurer but a knight fighting for his country. Except for his noble origin and his predicament, he has little in common with the Scottish raider "taken red-handed in the act of robbery and violence" (Scott 1881: 279). Indeed Denis proves to be a paragon of a knight — a true *chevalier sans peur and sans reproche*, especially when he assumes the part of Blanche's champion.

Adventure and love prove to be the mainspring of the story. Adventure in *The Sire of de Malétroit's Door* does not involve marvels or fighting, those staple commodities of medieval romance. The protagonist's adversary is human and his power and cunning make supernatural assistance superfluous. As for fighting, there are only some remote prospects of it. First, when Denis is being pursued by a band of enemies; again he is confronted with unequal odds when Alain de Malétroit's armed retainers are discovered to lie in wait for him; the third possibility of an armed combat, this time issuing from Denis himself, arises when he challenges Blanche's uncle to meet him in a duel. None of these expectations is, however, realized — no actual fighting takes place.

Even though there is no fighting the protagonist's life is in constant jeopardy, first when he is being threatened to be overpowered by the enemies and subsequently when he is hopelessly trapped by Sire de Malétroit.

In the first part of the story mystery is the chief vehicle of adventure and sustains suspense. There is the mysterious door which would let the protagonist in but not let him out; there follows a puzzling encounter with the lord of the castle and his strange insistence that, on pain of death, Denis should immediately marry his niece; then a young girl appears attired as a bride, all in tears, protesting she would take her own life rather than marry the stranger. All these mysteries are solved by Blanche's revelation which provides the first climax of the story. There still remains the mystery of Blanche's clandestine woer — the secret to be disclosed at the very end.

The interest in the latter part of the story, the one following Blanche's revelation, is being kept by the subtle love game for which there is no counterpart in Scott's unpretentious account. "*The Sire de Malétroit's Door* is essentially a love story, love being one of the great themes of romance" (Beer 1970: 3). Denis de Beaulieu becomes a scapegoat because of Blanche's innocent flirtation with the captain, yet the main interest of the story is the love which will bring the happy resolution of the conflict. As the story envelops both the girl and the young knight refuse to be compelled to marry each other. Blanche's discovery that her uncle had imprisoned the wrong man causes shock and indignation. She is a prey to violent change of emotions: "shame gave place to horror and terror" to be followed by "a tremor of anger and contempt" as she pointed at Denis: "I declare before God I will stab myself rather than be forced on that young man" (329, 330), Denis makes a courteous refusal to accept Blanche's hand against her will. Threatened with death he still persists in his refusal to marry the girl.

What follows conforms to a pattern of elaborate code of chivalry: as soon as Denis has learned about the girl's distress he becomes her champion and all his actions are subordinated to her wishes. His declaration, "Madam, [...] you have honoured me by your confidence. It remains for me to prove I am not unworthy of the honour" (333), is consistently supported by his actions — from his brave challenging Alain de Malétroit's forceful decision ("I will be no party to forcing the inclination of this young lady", 334) to his final reply to Blanche when she desperately inquires: "What shall we say to my uncle when he returns?" "What you will", said Denis (343).

It is at Blanche's mute request that Denis accepts her uncle's terms so that she could speak to him privately. There follows a complete reversal of the initial situation: Blanche declares she will marry Denis for she could not suffer him to risk his life. Denis's pride would not let him accept her sacrifice — he would not be pitied, and still worse pass for a coward. Besides he makes her understand he is not too keen to marry a girl who is in love with another man.

The girl's distress and her beauty make him soon regret this rude remark and he pays her another compliment by reasserting his readiness to die to render her service.

Blanche, in turn, compliments him by praising his courage, generosity and gallantry. At her renewed outburst of grief Denis feels obliged to comfort her by showing his concern for her: "Spare me, in my last moments, the spectacle of what I cannot cure [i.e., her distress] even with the sacrifice of my life" (339).

Blanche insists on rendering him some service as a token of her gratitude, to do "something more for him than weep" (340). Her admission that she is weeping for him and his attempts to belittle the value of his sacrifice force another confession on her part ("you are the noblest man I have ever met") followed by an open declaration of her readiness to marry him: "When I asked you to marry me, [...] it was because I respected and admired you, and loved you with my whole soul, from the moment you took my part against my uncle" (341, 342).

Still, even though he realizes that he has been attracted to Blanche, and that life is now even more worth living than before, Denis's ambition would not let him accept the girl's offer because he "was asked in pity and not for love."

Now it is Blanche's turn to dwell on family honour: she would not lower herself to beg for his consent to wed her: "I too have a pride of my own: and I declare before the holy mother of God, if you should now go back from your word already given, I would no more marry you than I would marry my uncle's groom" (342) to which Denis somewhat bitterly: "It is a small love that shies at a little pride."

It is the daybreak and the realization that the deadline is at hand that will ellicit Denis's passionate avowal of love: he would never degrade himself to marry the girl without her free consent but if she returns his affection he would devote all his life to serve her. He is rewarded by being told his earlier rival's name — the secret which all her uncle's threats and repressions could not wrench from Blanche — and the story is appropriately closed with the young couple in each other's arms, the old de Malétroit wishing his new nephew a good morning.

Though still preserving chivalrous trappings (for the protagonist persists in his determination to hazard his life to oblige the lady, his language faithfully reproducing

the chivalric jargon) the story evidently takes on a romantic turn when both the hero and the heroine, palpably attracted to each other, display selflessness and try to outbid each other in generosity, Blanche insisting she shall marry Denis, the latter refusing politely on account of his male ambition which he prefers to call honour. They become partners in the love game which is eventually resolved to a mutual satisfaction. This emphasis on the private world of the two lovers which constitutes "the extremely personal centre of the story" (Beer 1970: 63-64) is truly romantic in modern sense.

The term "romance" as applied to *The Sire de Malétroit's Door*, would then mean both the extroverted chivalric romance involving adventure and *amour courtois* convention of love, especially the adventure undertaken in the service of an oppressed lady, and also modern romance on account of the imaginative treatment of the main characters' inner experience which is presented with heightened intensity. What Sir Walter Scott said in his 1811 introdution to Walpole's *The Castle of Otranto* seems also valid of Stevenson's story since the latter, too, combines "the marvellous turn of incident and imposing tone of chivalry, exhibited in the ancient romance, with that accurate display of human character and contrast of feelings and passions which is, or ought to be, delineated in the modern novel."

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ACTA UNIVERSITATIS WRATISLAVIENSIS
No 1246

Anglica Wratislaviensia XXI

Wrocław 1991

ANNA BUDZIAK

MAGICAL ATTITUDES IN T. S. ELIOT'S EARLY POETRY

In his essay entitled *The Waste Land* written in 1932, F. R. Leavis opens the discussion of the poem's musical organization with an examination of the significance of the Tarot pack. The critic seems to suggest that "a wicked pack of cards" fulfils at least two functions: it supplies both a structural and an interpretative clue to *The Waste Land*. In Leavis' view Mme Sosostris section of *The Burial of the Dead* prompts "the scope of the poem, the mode of its contemplation of life" and "informs us as to the nature of characters" (Kenner 1962: 92). The latter of the specified functions, namely a momentary insight into the psyche of the poem's personages will be the major concern of the present paper on Eliot's references to black magic.

Dispersed throughout the poetic work of the early Eliot the intimations of magical attitude are indicative of a specific perception of reality, and breed peculiar forms of quasi-magical activities with which the Prufrockian characters strive to soothe their latent fears and obsessions. Thus, before trying to examine the therapeutic features of black magic and clairvoyante practices as they appear in *Prufrock* (1917), *Poems* (1920), and *The Waste Land* (1922), it may be worthwhile to take a closer look at the ways reality makes its impact on the Prufrockian mind. In other words, the aim of the present paper is to concentrate on the mental characteristics of the Eliotic personae — — their "geography of mind and imagination"[1] — and, subsequently, to specify the nature of reality as perceived by Prufrock, Mme Sosostris and their spiritual kin. (The said sphere is, in the natural course, a derivative of the urban environment delineated by Eliot's early imagery.)

First, it seems worthwhile to reiterate the manifestations of the Prufrockian obsession with the menace of death, decay and insecurity of future contingencies, which cause the early Eliot's characters to seek resort in occultism and fortune-telling. For a Prufrockian character, death has no mystical meaning, but implies only a disintegration of himself. Thus, it shatters "the countenance" and "self-possession" of

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[1] Cf. J. Martin, "T. S. Eliot's «The Waste Land»", [In:] *A Collection of Critical Essays on "The Waste Land"*, p. 13: "But it is the geography of mind and imagination in which he is really interested, and that scene, obviously has become fantastic and nightmarish, grotesque and surrealist [...] a genuine dreamdump of the imagination as Nathanael West later said."

the male protagonist in *Portrait of a Lady*. The grim experience of death is the only event that can conduce the lady's interlocutor to shake off his egoism as well as his apparent invulnerability:

> Well, and what if she should die some afternoon
> Afternoon grey and smoky, evening yellow and rose
> Should die and leave me sitting pen in hand
> With the smoke coming down above the housetops;
>
> (*Portrait of a Lady*, v. 31-34)

Similarly, J. Alfred Prufrock fails to preserve his conventionally pleasing, "politic, cautious and meticulous mien" in the face of "the eternal Footman":

> And I have seen the eternal Footman hold
> my coat and snicker,
> And in short I was afraid.
>
> (*Prufrock*, v. 86-87)

The "eternal Footman" (significantly the word is capitalized) seems to have replaced here the traditonal animated skeleton armed with a scythe and an axe — — accessories rather out of place in an elegant, 20th-century drawing-room. Still, even in this domesticated, modern disguise the Eliotic Death preserves his unavoidable terror pressing the protagonist to quit the party with a silent, but importunate insistence of the "footman" holding a coat. And the party, in turn, is equated with Prufrock's life which is endless party-going and tea-drinking.

Beside those suggestive death implication the awareness of the final disintegration haunts the lines of Eliot's early poetry in the form of numerous literary allusions and repulsive images. The students of T. S. Eliot are referred to the ominous verses of A. Marvell[2]. The allusion to Marvell's death co-exists with decay imagery. The awareness of mortality enters these poems in its dreadful, physical aspect as the "rattle of bones and chuckle spread from ear to ear" (*The Waste Land*, v. 186), or "the skull beneath the skin" (*Whispers of Immortality*, v. 2-4), or, else, "breathless creatures under ground [that] leaned backward with a lipless grin" (*The Waste Land*, v. 31-32).

The apparent horridness of the death imagery suggests nervous derangements stirred in the Prufrockian characters by their acute awareness of the imminent mortal experience conceived in its physical aspect exclusively. In that way, the obsessive fear of physical transitoriness intimates the universe divested of spiritual content.

Having alienated themselves from the metaphysics of any religious creed the Prufrockian personages cannot raise the question of the post-mortem existence. On the other hand, they lack of perserverance and resolution to accept the grim consequences of the Nietzschean nihilism. Eliot's protagonists are deficient in

[2] Cf. A. Marvell, *To His Coy Mistress*, v. 21-24:

> But at my back I always hear
> Time's winged charriot hurrying near
> And yonder all before us lie
> Deserts of vast eternity.

Nietzsche's courage and honesty to invite the "preachers of quick death"[3]. Consequently, they seem to be the victims of Nietzsche's announcement of "the end of Christianity at the hands of its own morality" (Kaufmann 1969: 110). Deprived of any solace from the side of Christian mysticism, they are too weak to live a life without any transcendental sanction. Thus, having no resort to an all-inclusive metaphysical system, on the one hand, and being unable to face the imminence of physical death as well as the ultimate decay of physical reality, on the other, they deteriorate to the status of neurasthenic Jungian patients tormented by their ill-controlled, nightmarish visions.

Importunate, nightmarish images, emotional derangement and lack of self-assurance come into sight as the second dominant landmark of the early protagonists' mental "topography". The score of the horror-striking images tantalizing the unbalanced personages includes visions of "towers upside down in air", "bats with baby faces" or "the empty chapel, only the wind's home" — to mention only *The Waste Land*. Earlier, in *Rhapsody on a Windy Night*, one's imagination is haunted by an "eye [That] Twists like a crooked pin", "a twisted branch upon the beach", "a broken spring [...] hard and curled and ready to snap", "an automatic hand of a child" which "slipped out and pocketed a toy", "an old crab [that] [...] gripped the end of a stick", "hand [that] twists paper rose" and, finally, "the last twist of the knife". These twisted, crooked and curled objects recur at random, producing unexplained anxiety in the central consciousness that cannot embrace reality as a coherent whole. Hence, even the shapes of trivial objects are perceived as disturbing, unpredictable flashes of curly and winding lines.

The lack of emotional balance is further manifested by a hysterical laughter or unexpected bursts of desire for strength and assurance. The unrestrained, demonical laughter of *Mr Apollinax* disorganizes a carefully arranged afternoon of a party which discusses banalities and trifles. It resounds once again in *Hysteria* — a poem of the same collection (*Prufrock*, 1917). In the poem, the speaker's absorption in joyless laughter gives an impression of participation in a neurotic shock which discloses unnamed obsessions with the figures of Eliot's early poetry. Further sudden movements (such as a leap of the cat-like fog in *Prufrock*, or Prufrock's yearning for

[3] Religious scepticism of the early Eliot shares some characteristics with Nietzschean nihilism. In this respect, one can compare the lines of Eliot's *The "Boston Evening Transcript"*:

> I mount the steps and ring the bell turning
> Wearily, as one would turn to nod good-bye to
> La Rochefoucauld,
>
> (*The "Boston Evening Transcript"*, v. 6-8)

with an extract from Nietzsche's *Ecce Homo*: "They [Germans] have never gone through seventeenth century of hard self-examination like the French: men like Rochefoucauld or Descartes are a hundred times superior to the most eminent Germans" (Kaufmann 1969: 112). Both fragments (the first — self--reflexive, the latter — referring apparently only to Germans) describe, in fact, the spiritual atmosphere of the turn of the century. The intellectual and spiritual aura is marked by lack of certainty, of assured beliefs and reliable religious basis, and, in turn, produces nervous derangement, which is captured in Prufrockian characters. They can be viewed as contrasted with the moralists — the "preachers of quick death" — who accept the self-demanding consequences of the collapse of Christian values.

In the light of the Church's insistence on the undistinguishable nature of miracles — because God's intervention occurs in History and not in Cosmos — an arrogant demand for a miracle itself must appear a sign of deterioration of the religious faith.

The gradual obliteration of religious dogma yields to gnosis and magical practices. Miracles are respected exclusively for their inherently miraculous quality and magical attractiveness, not as God's intervention in Time. Hence the symbolical significance of the lost vision and blundering in the universe of Eliot's early poetry may be interpreted (in Eliade's terms) as man's inability to perceive hierophanies in the tensions of history.

Having defined the three stigmas of the Prufrockian consciousness — as the sense of spiritual blindness, the neurotic aberrations finding outlet in ill-controlled projections and irrelevant reactions, and finally as the obsessive fear of imminent death — one could now attempt to reconstruct the reality as seen through the matrix of the Prufrockian mentality. The next step would possibly yield the specification of a common denominator of the three respective features of reality, which, in turn, might have induced Eliot's early protagonists to secure magical measures for their mode of existence.

In fact, each of the proposed modes of response to reality seems sufficient to prompt an assumption of a quasi-magical attitude. Thus, the lack of spiritual vision and the sense of blundering in darkness are indicative of the reality divested of any mystical elation. A lack of deep and earnest exultation is characteristic of decadent boredom and incurable spleen. Moreover, the "Prufrockians" and the "wastelanders" seem to conform to R. Caillois (1973: 246) description of societies breeding sects and confraternities. Hypocritical, morally laxed and apparently decent, the early protagonists are too bored to abandon any belief. Hence, they seek an exciting thrill in the celebration of a black mass ceremony in *Gerontion*.

Moral relativism and decadent boredom are accompanied by a neurotic confusion. As it has already been indicated, neurotic derangement is bred by the sense of incomprehensible chaos and segmentation of reality. As reflected in the Prufrockian consciousness, the universe of Eliot's early poetry takes the formless appearance of a disturbing confusion devoid of any fixed centre.

In this sense *The Waste Land* depicts the world of scientific encyclopaedia rather than of a stratified metaphysical system; practical centrifugal philosophies rather than centripetal philosophical synthesis; and libertin relativism rather than fixed morality — it portrays an era of exhaustion[4]. Consequently, the epigonic and effete world developed in this poetry breeds the sense of insecurity and helplessness in the face of total chaos. Hence, magic functions as a kind of solace or panaceum to soothe the sense of exposure to chaotic distraction. B. Bettelheim (1976: 51-52) claims that the less secure a man feels in the world the more ardently does he believe in magic.

Finally, the apprehesion of death and physical decay suggests the third aspect of the perceived reality — its physical transitoriness. The overwhelming physicality of the

[4] The atmosphere of the beginning of the 20th century answers G. Poulet's characterization of the 18th century "spleen"; cf. Poulet 1977, ch. "Wiek osiemnasty".

Prufrockian world seems to prompt that although it is chaotic and muddled, it is invariable and mechanized at the same time. As such, it is subject to a limited repertoire of manipulatory techniques with which man wishes to impose his will upon the universe and avoid thus his obligation to propitiate superior divine powers (Frazer 1932: 222-224).

If reduced to a common denominator, physical impermanence, chaotic disruption and decadent "*ennui*" (or spleen) of the world depicted in this poetry are symptomatic of a lack of metaphysics. There is neither religious creed that would secure the post-mortem existence nor an all-inclusive metaphysical system to integrate the disparate modernist experience. Nor is there any mysticism that would demand ardour and devotion in the place of moral laxity. On the contrary, metaphysical void is whiled away with magical practices, spiritism, fortune-telling, clairvoyance and black mass celebrations. These, however, should not be viewed exclusively as the activities satisfying the need of an exciting shiver or the pleasures of sectarian conspiracy; instead, in Eliot's verses, they seem to fulfil the function of a solace. Hence, T. S. Eliot's references to magical practices may be considered in their deeper undertones as the only possible form of an active response to the world[5].

The most conspicuous allusions to black magic and divining are incorporated in the texture of *Gerontion* and *The Waste Land* (*The Burial of the Dead* in particular). Additionally, the forms of behaviour and the assumed postures of the early protagonists may, too, fall under the category of magical attitude. In more specific terms, these are the postures of manipulatory and instrumental approach to the universe[6].

[5] The examined stigmas of the early protagonists' mentality together with the transformation of religion into magic appear to be the direct consequence of the modernist collapse of cultural and moral values, and can be viewed within a broader historical and cultural context of the modernist era.

The most conspicuous perplexities of the time may be defined as a sense of loss in the incoherent reality, the apocalyptic worldview and a sense of alienation from the sacred universe (or the deterioration of religious creed). The sense of dispersion of reality and fragmentation can be traced back to the abrupt development of science (discoveries of paradoxical nature), achievements of Freudian psychology (dissection of the concept of individual self) or the development of communication, as pointed out by R. Barthes (Bradbury, McFarlane 1985: 20-21).

The chiliastic effect of the ending century together with the First World War produced the sense of transition into the new. Kermode (1968: 2) defines the spirit of modernism as a thoroughly apocalyptic one. Finally, the collapse of Christianity at the hands of 19th century positivism and Nietzschean philosophy, Marxist ideology and Freudian psychoanalysis caused the modernists to seek quasi-religious supplement in oriental philosophy and magical or occultic occupations.

The motif of magical attitude cannot be, however, confined exclusively to the therapeutic function appeasing Prufrockian fears. Magic, and the whole repertoir of ritual techniques provides a vast and exhaustive source of archetypal symbols which heighten the intensity of imagery and poems' allusiveness. Also, archetypal symbolism can serve as a point on which one can hinge the comparison between primitive religious ardour and contemporary spiritual squalor.

[6] Frazer (1932: 221-224) claims that magic consists in manipulating the mechanisms of the rigid order of universe. As such, it is different from religion that may be defined as "propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control human life." Eliot (1942) expressed his aversion to the vulgarized approach to universe regarding the world as something disposable. The essay includes Eliot's admonition against treating Christian dogma in a practical way as providing merely a foundation for morality.

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The instrumental posture governs the realm of Eliot's early poetry under the disguise of technology. Its impact contributes to the sense of confusion evoked by the queer amalgamation of motifs which is *The Waste Land*. The civilization depicted in the poem is a mixture of the low and the exalted or, as put by P. Maranda (1973: 16-17), an epoch mixing pets and hair tonics with political ideologies and religion. The piling of trashy technological achievements is to show how tasteless the constituent elements of contemporarary myths are. They litter the landscape of Eliot's poetic world and clutter up the rooms of the "wastelanders." Technological rubbish lingers "in a factory yard" and spoils the natural landscape with an automatism of "a toy that was running along the quay" in *Rhapsody on a Windy Night*. Cheap, mass culture products — "food in tins" or "a record on the gramophone" reiterating some sentimental tune — mark the setting of a grim love experience of the typist and a "small house agent's clerk" in *The Waste Land*. Even the collocations coined by the poet are indicative of the epoch levelling the trivial with the sublime; in *Whispes of Immortality*, Grishkin's "friendly bust" offers a bliss which is, significantly, a "pneumatic" one.

In *The Waste Land*, technology functions as the modern counterpart of magic, providing people with means to pull the strings of fate. This is particularly the case of the low London pub scene, where a woman admits her abortion:

> "It's them pills I took to bring it off she said"
> (She's had five already, and nearly died of young George)
> "The chemist said it would be all right, but
> I've never been the same."
> (*The Waste Land*, v. 159-161)

This passage seems exemplary of the basic similarity between magic and technology, i.e., of an attempt to control one's lot by means of incantatory or technological formulae respectively. The very endeavour to gain control betrays the troubling sense of insecurity. As claimed by B. Bettelheim (1976: 51) "the more insecure a man is in himself and his place in the immediate world, the more he withdraws into himself because of fear, or else more outward to conquer for conquest's sake."

If it is possible to regard technology as a conquest, it would seem justifiable to consider the phenomenon of shrinking away from the society ties (and subsequent segmentation of the Prufrockian society) as a manifestation of the withdrawal prompted by fear. The analysis of the Prufrockian society and the "*beau monde*" of *The Waste Land* in respect of the integrity of social relations may clarify another aspect of the Prufrockian consciousness as regards magical postures. The early characters eiher remain completely isolated from other human beings or associate themselves in suspicious sects and confraternities for the pursuit of occult practices.

In the first case, communication is totally inhibited. People are closed within limited realms of their particularized visions — as in *Preludes*. Analogically, in *The Waste Land*, they are hindered from sincere conversation as are the couple imprisoned within the confines of egotism:

> [...] I have heard the key
> Turn in the doors once and turn once only
> We think of the key each in his prison
> Thinking of the key each confirms a prison.
> (*The Waste Land*, v. 411-414)

or, else, desperately lonely like "*le Prince d'Aquitaine à la tour abolie*"[7].

The other option turns out no better; neither spiritist fraternities nor sects revive the true modes of communication. Just the opposite: they collaborate in the progressive atomization of the society. As a result of that there appears conspiracy of Mr Silvero, Hakagawa, Madame de Tornquist and Fräulein von Kulp who gather to celebrate a black mass ceremony in *Gerontion*. In *A Cooking Egg*, an appropriate company is provided by Lucretia Borgia, notorious for her dexterity in handling poison, and Madame Blavatsky, a famous propagator of occultism. Finally, there is a cluster of admirers of Mme Sosostris' clairvoyant competence — a closed social circle in *The Waste Land*. The air of conspiracy can be easily detected in Mme Sosostris' request:

> If you see dear Mrs Equitone
> Tell her I bring the horoscope myself:
> "One must be so careful these days."
> (*The Waste Land*, v. 57-59)

Such a preservation of habits of solidarity and discretion together with losing ethical substance is, according to R. Caillois (1973: 246), symptomatic of degeneration of confraternities.

Actually, the early poetry personages "shifting candles", "leaning together among whispers" (*Gerontion*) or taking precautions when handling horoscopes (*The Waste Land*) indulge in the Habsburgian aura of death and insanity[8]. The cosmopolitan company in *Gerontion* pronounce the words of liturgy that are no loger comprehensible for them:

> The word within a word: unable to speak a word.
> (*Gerontion*, v. 28)

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[7] The problem of the loneliness and social isolation of the early protagonists, which is merely mentioned here, is extensively examined in Sienicka (1970). The author distinguishes two types of the early protagonists (the Prufrock type and the Sweeney kind). Neither introvert Prufrock type, nor extrovert *l'homme moyen sensuel* are capable of reaching beyond self. The early poetic characters are self-possessed, impotent of any action or, else, they indulge in sensuous life and nourish casual interests. In both cases, there is no balance between emotion and thought, which makes them unable to respond to experience and causes frustration and hysterical reaction.

Spiritual atrophy is accompanied by social isolation. The early protagonists are dissociated from social and political institutions (the cosmopolitan society in *Gerontion*), family ties (the lonely child in *Rhapsody on a Windy Night*) or from church (*The Hippopotamus*).

Finally lack of vigour, sympathy and power in men accompanied by artificiality and possessiveness of women results in the total inhibition of love in the universe of Eliot's early poetry, or its deterioration to voluptuous sensuousness giving no emotional contact.

[8] G. L. K. Morris points to the connection between *The Waste Land* and the autobiographical book of Countess Marie Larish, who was associated with the Habsburgian dynasty and subsequently with the Mayerling tragedy (Kenner 1962: 86-89).

The significant lack of capitalization of "the word" that is lost among other words (or of Logos dissociated by prattle, in other terms) implies the evanescence of the Christian awareness. On the other hand, their avoidance of the tension of everyday toil will be punished by Christ who appears as "Christ the tiger." From that moment onward, the images of the poem acquire increasingly sinister or even demonical qualities:

> In depraved May, dogwood and chestnut flowering judas
> To be eaten, to be divided, to be drunk
> Among whispers: by Mr Silvero
> With caressing hands at Limoges
> Who walked all night in the next room;
> By Hakagawa bowing among Titians;
> By Madame de Tornquist, in the dark room
> Shifting the candles, Fräulein von Kulp.
>
> (*Gerontion*, v. 21-28)

In H. Kenner's (1969; 111) view, the hushed voices in *Gerontion* may be the whispers of treachery, or the ones of tourists sharing their impressions. Yet, it is not improbable that they are the whispers concomitant with the black mass ceremony. In this light, the subsequent insomnia of Mr Silvero seems to be a stamp of a troubled or bedevilled consciousness, while the figure of Madame de Tornquist moving the candles functions as an organizer of a spiritualist seance.

The characters of *Gerontion* gather for a sort of worship, but they are guilty of injurious or at least inadmissible choices, as regards the cult they pursue. Although eating and drinking is for them a kind of an obscure communion the very act is not the rite of elevated mysticism, for the object of their adoration seems to be of vaguely sinister quality. The significance of a proper choice in the realm of religious archetypes has been plainly formulated by Beinaert:

> The act of faith brings about a division of the world of archetypal representations. Henceforth the serpent, the darkness, satan designate that which one renounces. One recognizes as the only representation capable of mediating salvation, those that are put forward as such by the historic community (Eliade 1961: 160)

Yet, first and foremost *Gerontion*'s characters separate themselves from "the historic community" and veil their activities with discretion. Secondly, sinister overtones are evoked by the poetic choice of the season and a curious selection of plants used in the ceremony. The season is referred to as a "depraved May", while the vegetation elements include "dogwood and chestnut, flowering judas." A popular belief was that Judas hanged himself on a branch of a tree referred to as "judas" in folk tradition. Similarly, "dogwood" — being, actually, a bush with edible fruit — acquires sinister ambience in the particular configuration of the remaining elements of T. S. Eliot's poetic idiom. Its satanic associations are encouraged by the first part of the word with which that peculiar bush is designated. In *The Waste Land*, "dog" carries rather negative overtones. In the poem "dog" is paradoxically an animal hostile to man: a fiend rather than a "friend to men" that will dig up man's corpse and thus prevent his rebirth.

> That corpse you planted last year in your garden,
> Has it begun to sprout? Will it bloom this year?
> Or has the sudden frost disturbed its bed?
> "O keep the Dog far hence, that's friend to men",
> "Or with his nails he'll dig it up again!"
>
> (*The Waste Land*, v. 71-75)

Curiously enough, the word "Dog" is capitalized, which may incite further speculations. A contemporary anthropologist, E. Leach, observed that in the 17th-century England the unlearned believed that a devil haunts a witch in the shape of a dog. The superstition was based on the fact that "Dog" is a metathesis of "God." Analogically, the priest's collar is called dog's collar, instead of God's collar (Maranda 1973: 42). Returning to the notion of "dogwood" and its associations with the obscure ceremonious proceedings in *Gerontion*, one realizes the intricacy of the choice of the tinest elements that deepen the general sense of the sinister character of these practices.

Apparently it is not necessary to seek the sources of the black magic imagery outside the realm of Eliot's poetry or to trace it back to Frazer's observations on the black masses of the Holy Spirit or St. Secaire. Still, Frazer's definition of magic as will-imposing practice may shed some light on the early protagonists' attitude to life. In Frazer's view, it is not the very scenario of the black mass or the sensational elements of that gruesome ceremony that are essential. Neither Mrs Tornquist nor Mr Silvero mumble the mass backwards "finishing at the knelling of midnight hour" as the wicked priest of Frazer does. Yet, their close affinity with the lapsed priest may be specified, once again, as an arrogant, manipulatory attitude to the universe. Frazer stresses the fact that there is no humility and submissiveness on the side of the black mass participants. Rather, they try to compel God to act according to their most importunate demands (Frazer 1932: 231-232).

The sense of being in jeopardy prompted the early protagonists to indulge in other occult practices such as clairvoyance and divining. If regarded as a realistic reminiscence of the atmosphere that shaped the beginning of the 20th century, Mme Sosostris fragment in *The Waste Land* seems representative of the general mood of decadence and disillusionment with positivist sciences. The very beginning of the modernist era witnessed a revived interest in astrology, numerology, palmistry, crystal gazing, dowsing and necromancy. An increased attention paid to the "debatable phenomena" included hypnotism (earlier discussed as "mesmerism" or "animal magnetism"). Such interests went hand in hand with somnambulism, animism, automatism or hallucinatory experiences (Bradbury, McFarlane 1985: 76). All those practices gave a deceitful sense of a possibility to outwit fate and to predict what is unpredictable.

Still, being indicative of the "Occultic revival" in a mimetic sense Mme Sosostris passage comments on the ethical crisis as delineated by the earlier poems. The view of the above fragment as expressive of the deterioration of modern sensiblity may be encouraged by the tone of mockery with which Mme Sosostris is introduced:

Madame Sosostris, famous clairvoyante
Had a bad cold, nevertheless
Is known to be the wisest woman in Europe.
(*The Waste Land*, v. 43-45)

The bathetic effect is heightened if viewed in terms of J. Campbell's (1971: 277) remark classifying Mme Sosostris as one of the literary witches of the Eddic prophetess kind. In this respect she may be defined as a preposterous embodiment of mythical divinities or fairies spinning or weaving human destiny. Mme Sosostris is only a pitiable and very remote relative of Shakespeare's three Weird Sisters or the classical triad of the Moirai.

Nonetheless, responsibility for the mutilation of the symbolical meaning of the Tarot pack (which were originally used to predict vegetation events important for a whole community) resides not only on the side of the fortune-teller. The questioner himself is guilty of triviality of his questions which concern exclusively his personal life, which otherwise suggests an impoverished self-centredness.

The inquirer is satisfied with enigmatic warnings against "lady of situations" and the notice to beware of "death by water." Similarly, the anxiety of the lady in *A Game of Chess* concerns nothing except her personal obsessions:

What shall I do now? What shall I do?
(*The Waste Land*, v. 131)

And, likewise, "dear Mrs Equitone" needs a horoscope to control her own, trivial affairs. There is, thus, no Perceval in *The Waste Land* to raise the question of the most general nature or (in Eliade's words) the one concerning "the Supreme Reality, the Sacred, the Centre of Life and the source of immortality"[9]. Hence, the "Waste Land" cannot be regenerated before somebody inquires about the sense of life in metaphysical, not in magical terms[10].

However, this supreme question is not raised, as "the wastelanders" are "forbidden to see." Even the Tarot pack symbols do not reveal their meaning to the participants of the seance. Mme Sosostris missed the wealth of connotations carried by the Tarot designs. The moment the fortune-teller does not find "the Hanged Man" she fears only

[9] M. Eliade (1961: 56) calls the question raised by Perceval the central one. This is (according to Eliade) "the question of salvation", or the question formulated as: "Where is the Supreme Reality, the Sacred, the Centre of Life, and the source of immortality, where is the Holy Grail?".

[10] N. Frye (1972) postulates that *The Waste Land* cannot be regenerated because neither the "wastelanders" nor the Prufrockian protagonists (though perplexed by the compulsion to ask) venture to raise the Question:

And would it have been worth it, after all
[...]
To have squeezed the universe into a ball
To roll it towards some overwhelming question. (*Prufrock*, v. 88-94)

To exemplify this Frye refers the reader to Jessie Weston's study of the Grail legend. According to Weston (1974) the regeneration of *The Waste Land* and the subsequent recuperation of the maimed Fisher King depended on asking the question what the Grail is and what purpose it served. As Campbell (1971: 424) claims, although there is no answer to the above question, the very act of raising the issue by the questioner proves his readiness to learn the meaning of existence.

"death by water", missing the implications of sacrifice, surrender or renunciation traditionally associated with this card.

The grotesque clairvoyante practices of Mme Sosostris testify to the spiritual squalor to the same degree as secret participation in the black mass ceremony does. If analysed in terms of archetypal criticism or if put within the psychoanalytical frame of reference Mme Sosostris passage is an evidence of her metaphysical void. Mme Sosostris' deprivation of her professional prowess (she cannot read the symbols properly) is the effect of her dissociation from the sphere of the sacred. Consequently, the fortune-teller is unable to integrate the symbols within any coherent whole. Thus, she reminds us less of a Cumean Sybil than of a primitive sorcerer whose aim is to abreact the tensions of his patients. But even in the therapeutic aspect (as conceived in psychoanalytical terms) Mme Sosostris is far from being a good healer: a proper abreaction implies incorporation of disorganized states of apprehensions and perplexities within a coherent framework (Lévi-Strauss 1967: 173-179). And Mme Sosostris, like the rest of the Prufrockian society, is deficient in metaphysical or mythological system. Hence, as there is no coherent cultural or philosophical framework behind it, her contextual interpretation of symbols is inhibited.

Before closing the above presentation of the "geography of mind and imagination" (to use J. Martin's metaphor again) one should perhaps reiterate the terminal question: which aspects of Eliot's early protagonists' mentality might have prompted their resort to magic and other debatable phenomena? Keeping in mind the black mass and clairvoyance passages in *Gerontion* and *The Waste Land* as the terminal points of analysis, one can again specify these aspects as the obsession of death, neurotic abberations, and the obtrusive sense of "the lost vision". In view of these mental characteristics the Prufrockian reality may be regarded as thoroughly chaotic, irrational and devoid of any transcendental sanction. It is a reality perceived as a muddle uprooted from any metaphysical or mythical system. The sense of spiritual muddle (which is the effect of metaphysical loss) and the consequent sense of insecurity breed two reactions: a desire to force a conquest, or an attempt at escapism. While the former passes under the disguise of technology or a manipulatory attitude, the latter prompts Eliot's protagonists to apprentice themselves to confraternities which indulge in clairvoyant and black mass practices.

Assumed postures look different in T. S. Eliot's later poetry. Magic, which used to fulfil a therapeutic function for the early characters, is rejected in the poems written after *The Hollow Men*. Already in *The Waste Land* the attempt to quench the desire for magical strength (symbolized by fire) is made with the formula "Shantih Shantih Shantih"[11]. Thus, it seems plausible that the concluding line of *The Waste Land* plays the function comparable to Prospero's epilogue in *The Tempest* (which is said to give a Christian resonance to Shakespeare's play):

[11] According to Eliade (1974: 186) fire symbolizes intensification of magical power ("sidhi") both in the Upanishad and in the Vedic hymns. A yogin, however, should overcome the temptation to increase his magical abilities and strive after the metaphysical union with the divine and peaceful understanding — "shantih."

Now my charms are o'erthrown
[...]
And my ending is despair
Unless I be relieved by prayer.
(*The Tempest. The Epilogue*, v. 1-18)

Moreover, the final rejection of magical attitude after *The Hollow Men* is evident in the juxtaposition of Mme Sosostris (from *The Waste Land*) and Virgin Mary (from *Ash-Wednesday*). The poems belong to two different realms of Eliot's poetic work, verging on the pivotal point which is *The Hollow Men*. While the figure of Mme Sosostris dominates the poetic world of chaotic, desperate wandering astray (i.e., the poetry in the meshes of confusing religious and mythical relics) Virgin Mary is the central figure of *Ash-Wednesday* (which inaugurates the poetry of spiritual ascent towards explicitly Christian, discursive verses of *Four Quartets*)[12]. In this course, *Ash-Wednesday* heralds the replacement of an arrogant manipulatory or magical posture by the attitude of Christian humility and acceptance in later poetry.

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[12] *The Waste Land* is frequently regarded as a poem based on a quest motif of the Holy Grail legend. Campbell (1975: 67-76) points out that in such myths and legends one usually encounters figures who represent "the benign protective power of destiny". Analogically, Virgin Mary functions as the protective figure in the Christian Saints' legends.

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ACTA UNIVERSITATIS WRATISLAVIENSIS
No 1254

Anglica Wratislaviensia XXI

Wrocław 1991

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MANIFESTATIONS OF THE CYCLICAL TIME CONCEPT IN T. S. ELIOT'S EARLY POETRY

Both as a critic and a poet T. S. Eliot was a writer endowed with a firm historical consciousness and a sense of tradition. However, it is only in Eliot's later poetry that the positive notion of history and of meaningful time are communicated to the reader. The poetry of the volumes *Prufrock* (1917), *Poems* (1920), and *The Waste Land* (1922) relies on the concept of time reminiscent of Baudelaire's "brutale dictature"[1].

While K. Weinberg (1969) speaks of Eliot's "obscure burden of time" marked by the Baudelairian spleen, N. Frye (1972) develops respectively the notion of the seasonal cycle as a recurring theme in the early Eliot[2]. Seemingly incompatible with each other, these two aspects of time become complementary within the universe of Eliot's early poems. The ambience of the Baudelairian fatigue and inaction points to a negative valorization of the cyclical notion of time as it functions in *Prufrock*, *Poems*, and *The Waste Land*.

The cyclical concept of time in the said volumes exhibits — if confronted with the originally regenerative seasonal vegetation cycle — its inferiority to the primitive seasonal cycles. Alienated from the primitive vegetation cults, the concept of cyclical recreation appears here as a deplorable and inefficient relic of the originally re-creative rites[3]. The cyclical time — mechanized and devoid of regenerative qualities — trails

[1] Ch. Weinberg (1969: 52) considering Eliots and Baudelaire's time consciousness refers to Baudelaire's *La Chambre Double*, to explain the notion of spleen consequent on Time reigning with a "*brutale dictature*."

[2] The earlier poetry was usually considered in the respect of cyclical notion of time, lack of significant rectilinear history, boredom and "ennui" or the theme of dangerous re-enactment. Particular attention was paid to *Gerontion* and *Four Quartets* as the poems which handle Eliot's notion of time in the most explicit way. While in the first of the poems history and time are viewed in their destructive aspect, as a weary burden, the latter communicates the notion of apocalyptic rectilinear time and significant Christian history.

[3] The deteriorated cyclical concept of time as it functions in T. S. Eliot's early poetry is viewed as contrasted with the sacred time or "*illud tempus*", which was cyclically recovered by ritual ceremonies. Religious rituals (which are no longer valid in the profane world of Eliot's early poetry) made time reversable and recreation possible. The repetitiveness in the poetic universe of the early Eliot is thus

on, making Eliot's protagonists aware of the vacuity of any moment and the insignificance of history. In that sense Eliot's time repetitiveness is synonymous with the Baudelairian blending of time boundaries. Owing to their automatic cyclical reversibility, historical events lose their uniqueness and merge into a timeless continuum. This transformation, in turn, is indicative of the deteriorated modern response to the demands of history and the obliteration of the natural recreative cycle.

If one could assume that one of Eliot's main thematic preoccupations (although the theme as such will not be discussed here) is the reduction of the notion of time from primitive cyclical renewal to modern dull repetitiveness, it might seem interesting to view its realization as the result: (1) of the poet's insistence on chronicity, (2) of the use of symbolism to evoke the notion of cyclical movement, and finally, (3) of the employment of certain formal devices.

Before trying to examine this threefold way the notion of meaningless repetitiveness recurs in that poetry it could be of use to hint at another point of analogy between Baudelaire and Eliot. Namely, the issue of recurrence is essential both in the case of Baudelaire's symbolism and Eliot's use of an objective correlative[4]. Ch. Chadwick (1978: 16) points out that one of Baudelaire's most striking characteristics was the repetition of "the same thing in various guises." Similarly, in Eliot's poetry, the recurring "guises" of chronicity, of the distorted archetypal symbolism together with images implying circular motion, and of formal devices indicate a particular understanding of the flux of time. Consequently, they will be considered as communicating the theme of degeneration of the vegetation cycle notion into that of an absurd repetitiveness.

First, an oppressive chronicity seems to be introduced for the purpose of blurring natural time boudaries with the absurdity of its inhuman, mechanized intervals. The automatic segmentation of the flux of time into identical repetitive intervals does not compare with the primitive notion of seasonal cycles marked by quasi-religious events which set the significant time limits. In Eliot's earlier work time passage assumes the "guises" of Chronos either in the form of clockwork timing or in the shape of oblique references to ancient, frightening Time divinities (as in *Burbank with a Baedeker: Bleistein with a Cigar*).

By compulsive sticking to daily routine and vain timing or dating, the personae of Eliot's earlier poems try to exercise their control over the time flow. In the course of an

regarded as juxtaposed either with the sacred time of primitive vegetation rites, Australian "Dream Time" and millenial movements or with the time of eastern and western mysticism (i.e., buddhist disentanglement from the cyclical return and Christian apocalyptic history). Eliotic time of the early poems resembles rather the time of cyclical dying and decay in the re-incarnation cycle or Ecclesiastes' sense of futility and unintelligibility of cyclical return, which relieves men of creative effort.

[4] It seems possible to draw an analogy between Ch. Baudelaire's use of symbolism and T. S. Eliot's employment of an objective correlative, as both of them intended to recreate a specific emotional state of the poet in the reader. Ch. Chadwick (1978: 11) explains the phenomenon of a persistent re-appearance of certain images in Baudelaire as "an attempt [...] to re-create in the reader, through an accumulation of symbols, an emotion experienced by the poet." In the similar manner, T. S. Eliot (1974: 100) defines an objective correlative as "a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion."

obsessive noting of the passage of time, chronicity, having replaced the original vegetation cycle, takes a dominating position in Eliot's poetry. Chronicity permeating this peculiar universe is conspicuous in the way the yearly cycle is recorded in *Portrait of a Lady*. The poem begins with a record of a *December afternoon*, chronicles the days "when the lilacs are in bloom", makes a note of *April sunsets* and *April afternoons*, and closes its yearly account with *The October Night*. Similarly, *Preludes* measure out the daily cycle, beginning with the winter evening and passing on to the gloomy city morning scene to conclude with a falling dusk.

Yet, neither the natural yearly cycle nor daily and seasonal changes determine the rhythm of life of the protagonists. The seasonal cycle, which was recreative for primitive peoples (as it fixed the harvest time and dates of fertility rites) remains obscure for the protagonists in *Portrait of a Lady*. Thus, on the one hand, spring enters the poem in the splendour of April sunsets, of smells of hyacinths in the garden and of lilacs in bloom. On the other hand, however, it appears as faded recollections or half remembered pleasures of a Parisian spring. The characters do not participate in the seasonal events of growth and fertility. Significantly enough, summer — the time of fecundity and ripeness is not recorded in the poem, which corresponds to the emotional barreness of the protagonists. Alienated from the seasonal time change, Eliotic protagonists remain static, ossified in the assumed poses and lonely because of egotist posture.

The seasonal cycle is not regenerative for the protagonists of the poem. On the contrary, the gradual change of seasons brings continuous degeneration of physical prowess, vitality and spiritual strength. It is rather the face of a clock than the vegetative cycle which determines the rhythm of life and death. In *Aunt Helen*, the death of the female protagonist passes unnoticed among trivial daily events: the feeding of the dogs or the death of a parrot. The event of aunt Helen's death does not disturb the dull flow of Chronos:

> The Dresden clock continued ticking
> on the mantelpiece.
>
> (*Aunt Helen*, v. 10)

As observed By F. Kermode (1973: 46), to endow inhuman chronicity with meaning is to

> defeat the tendency of the interval between "tick" and "tock" to empty itself: to maintain within that interval following "tick" a lively expectation of "tock", and a sense that, however, remote the "tock" may be all that happens, happens as if "tock" was certainly following.

In other words "kairos" must be "poised between beginning and end" (Kermode 1973: 47).

Yet, neither did aunt Helen's death terminate anything on earth (the footman continued his love affair with the housemaid) nor did it commence anything important in afterlife:

> Now when she died there was silence in heaven
> And silence at her end of the street.
>
> (*Aunt Helen*, v. 4-5)

Hence, there is no meaningful event marking either the beginning or the end. Consequently, the metaphorical ticking of the *Dresden clock* recapitulates the theme of oppressive chronicity.

Moreover, the sense of obtrusive chronological notation enters the early poetry as recurrent timing. The protagonists of *Portrait of a Lady* correct their watches by "public clocks"; in *Preludes*, city dwellers pass wearily across the streets "at four, at five, at six o'clock", the time flow in *Rhapsody on a Windy Night* begins arbitrarily at "twelve o'clock", then its flux is divided into artificial segments which terminate at "half past one", "half past two", "half past three" and "four o'clock." Even in *The Waste Land* (where reality and experience split into disparate images) there remain inflexible bells "that kept the hours" of a neurotic couple planning "the hot water at ten / a closed car at four."

In this way mechanistic chronicity looms over the world in which the seasonal regeneration cycles remain unrecognized to its inhabitants, and the empty time haunts the consciousness of Eliot's early protagonists in the guise of the Greek Chronos. As indicated by O. Cullman and J. Marsh:

> Chronos: is "passing time" or "waiting time" — that which according to revelation "shall be no more" and "kairos" is the season, or point in time filled with significance, charged with a meaning derived from its relation to the end (Kermode 1973: 46-47).

"The end", however, is either considered as non-existent or regarded with awe and neurotic fear of a humanist who dreads the idea of final disintegration of himself. Not participating in "the end" or failing to identify oneself with the symbolical death of God, man cannot escape the weary, inhuman successiveness of chronicity. S. G. F. Brandon draws in this respect a parallel between the death of Osiris and the death of Christ. The post-mortem existence of the Egyptians was thought to be achieved by the ritual perpetuation of the past event, which was the death and consequent revivification of Osiris. Similarly, a Christian who participates in Christ's death through the ritual of baptism ensures for himself eternal life. As stated in St Paul's *Epistle to Romans*:

> We were buried therefore with him, through baptism into death: that like Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father so we also might walk in newness of life (Brandon 1965: 27).

The life within the confines of mechanized chronicity indicates the obliteration of the significance of sacrificial death. Thus, there is neither hope for eternal existence (in terms of the Christian creed) nor possibility of seasonal regeneration of temporal life (in terms of seasonal renewal beliefs). Time becomes but a bodeful deity bringing desolation and destruction. Also in *Burbank with a Baedeker; Bleistein with a Cigar* the deterioration of cultural standard breeds desacralization of time notion, which in turn brings nothing but further devastation and the slackening of vitality. Both Bleistein's senility and the degradation of architecture are due to the process consequent on the strength-devouring time. Burbank — another victim of Chronos impending over Venice — is devoid of spiritual vitality and is cast in an inactive, meditative mood. In this context the question:

> Who clipped the lion's wings
> And flea'd his rump and pared his claws
> (*Burbank...*, v. 29-30)

acquires particularly sarcastic overtones. If one regards "the winged lion" as reminiscent of Shakespeare's "Devouring Time" that could blunt "the lion's paws", then the victory over the menacing beast seems particularly doubtful (Southam 1977: 52). Neither passive Burbank nor senile Bleistein are victorious over Time — the archetypal lion. Both of them are left helpless in the face of desolation caused by Time's passage. Their spiritual squalor will appear even more striking if one regards them as contrasted with the ancient worshippers of Time — a wrathful deity.

The above proposed juxtaposition may be encouraged by the striking similarity between the Eliotic "lion" and the Mithraic personification of Time as the Aryan (Iran) God: Zurvan — Ahriman. The devouring nature of time is symbolized by the lion's head, and its swift passage is implied by the wings on both sides of its body[5]. While Burbank's and Bleistein's physical and spiritual decay serves as an ironic commentary on Burbank's meditations on the victory over Time the lion, the worshippers of the Mithraic cult do not aspire to curb the flux of time. On the contrary, their attitude is that of pious propitiation of the wrathful deity, which saves them, at least, from being objects of Time's ridicule. The implied contrast between modern, time-checking attitude and the primitive propitiation of Time the divine, again, testifies to the inferiority (or at least inefficiency) of the modern vulgarized notion of time. The physically and spiritually lame representatives of the modern civilization seem to be afflicted with the menace of time more seriously than the primitive worshippers of repulsive Kali, of morose Demiurge or of Phanes — all of them ancient personifications of the devouring Time[6].

In this way, the intrusive timing and dating combined with the ironic overtone evolved from Bleistein's boastful tone deploy the deteriorated sense of the time passage. Being alienated from the ancient propitiatory cults and from the sphere of the Christian creed alike, the image of time in the early Eliot seems to be a warped remnant of the originally regenerative cycle. While the latter was marked by significant events of seasonal changes, the former is delineated by what Kermode defines as humanly uninteresting successiveness of "tick" and "tock."

Turning to certain recurrent symbols which materialize the poet's intuitions of man's alienation from the sacred, meaningful Time, the reader finds that they are images of an unprogressive circular movement as well as corrupt archetypal symbols which seem to communicate Eliotic notion of time in the most explicit way.

The lame archetypal symbolism enters Eliot's poems predominantly as a warped lunar symbolism. Originally, the moon was believed to determine the rhythm of cyclical renewal due to its recurrent metamorphosis from a crescent to a full moon. The symbol of the moon unifies the whole regenerative lunar symbolism, inclusive of the elements such as fertility, womanhood, death and regeneration. The presence of

[5] Cf. S. G. F. Brandon 1965, Plates III, IV.
[6] Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 63-66.

any of these items breeds associations comprising other aquatic and lunar symbols that mediate between death and regeneration. As indicated by M. Eliade (1966: 171-177) the Moon is the first deceased. But when the crescent Moon appeared on the fourth day of the moonless period, the dead who were associated with the Moon through the Osirian ritual gained a new mode of existence.

Yet, the lunar symbolism in the universe of Eliot's early poems does not offer the hope of revivification. The degraded elements of lunar symbolical sphere are indicative of deterioration of the cyclical recreation concept. The "lunar synthesis" from *Rhapsody on a Windy Night* is hardly comparable with Eliade's chain of death and subsequent resuscitation. It comprises only the items of urban litter:

A crowd of twisted things;
A twisted branch upon the beach
[...]
A broken spring in a factory yard,
Rust that clings to the form that the strength
has left [...]

(*Rhapsody* ..., v. 24-31)

The Moon itself exhibits the signs of degeneration on a face ravaged by disease. Personified as a defaced woman "twisting a paper rose", the Moon does not evoke any regenerative associations, but stirs the remembrance of the hideous reality in which "the smell of chestnuts in the streets" is mixed with "female smells in shuttered rooms."

While in *Rhapsody on a Windy Night* the archetypal lunar symbolism is replaced by its repulsive equivalent (the moon with a face "cracked" by "a washed-out smallpox"), the moon in *Conversation Galante* is reduced to the status of a theatrical requisite of a sentimental rendez-vous. Its function is to provide a pretext for the display of the interlocutor's wit:

It may be Prester John's baloon
Or an old battered lantern hung aloft
To light poor travellers to their distress

(*Conversation Galante*, v. 3-4)

However, the lady's interlocutor seems to sense intuitively the fact that the regenerative symbols have been obliterated and have become illegible for men. His frivolous mood is disturbed by a melancholic nocturn evoking unexpected nostalgy:

[...] Someone has framed upon the keys
That exquisite nocturn, with which we explain
The night and the moonshine: music which we seize
To body forth our own vacuity

(*Conversation Galante*, v. 7-10)

Yet, the very object of the nostalgic yearning — the lost understanding of archetypal regenerative symbols — remains obscure. The protagonists of the poem are left within the symbolical archetypal void.

In a later poem *Sweeney Among Nightingales* (included in *Poems*), the symbol of the moon acquires even catastrophic qualities. It is not only removed from the regenerative Osirian ritual but, moreover, the moon itself evokes death. The moon in the poem is "the stormy moon", accompanied by "Death" and "the Raven." The

setting for this catalysmic set of phenomena is the estuary of the "River Plate." At a closer look, the person in the Spanish Cape, who is seemingly in a murderous conspiracy with "the silent man in mocha brown", as well as "the Convent of the Sacred Heart" (whose branches were spread in South America) direct train of one's associations to the past of American civilizations viewed in a symbolical retrospective. The poem's symbolism recalls the memories of death and desolation brought upon American civilizations by Spanish and Portuguese conquistadors, and the moon presides over this scene of the past holocaust. In a more recent perspective, the moon is transformed into an ominous sign looming over the cafe scene, in which a dehumanized female "tears at the grapes with murderous paws." Correspondingly, a joyous fertility ritual is reduced to a trivial cafe scene with a waiter bringing fruit. As the moon is no loger a sign of resuscitation for a slayed fertility god, the poem ends in a gloomy act of murder with no regenerative significance attached to it. Death is reduced to a criminal, sordid act, leaving behind a "stiff, dishonoured shroud" instead of the promise of renewal.

A Cooking Egg (a poem from the same collection) can, also, be analysed from the angle of queer archetypal symbolism, although the interpretation of its cyclical aspect may seem rather too far-fetched. The very title serves as a key notion for the proposed reading. According to B. C. Southam (1977), it indicates an egg "too old to be eaten on [its] own" when its staleness is easily smelt. On the other hand, an egg is a symbol of regeneration and is expected to inspire new life as employed symbolically in cyclical fertility rituals. S. G. F. Brandon (1965: 48) points out that the devotees of the Orphic communities were forbidden to eat eggs in order to inhibit a possible re-incarnation and a consequent chain of repetitive deaths. Similarly, in the Brahmanic tradition the egg functioned as a symbol of cyclical renewal though in a positive aspect here. The cyclical re-enactment implied in *A Cooking Egg* seems to convey the notion of time which is affiliated to the pejorative resonance of cyclical, repeated deaths (that of Orphic convictions) rather than to the optimist Brahmanic concept of cyclical renewal. The implied staleness of the egg alludes in a humorous way to gradual aging of man who regrets the joyful experiences of his childhood, and to the historical events which are consigned to oblivion:

Where are the eagles and the trumpets?
Buried beneath some snow-deep Alps

(*A Cooking Egg*, v. 29-30)

The time flow, then, is identified with the decline of physical and spiritual energy as well as with the obliteration of historical events. The title, implying staleness, augments the sense of time depredations. Yet, considering its archetypal connotations another modulation could still be suggested. In archetypal terms, the breaking of the weary cyclical (or rather downwards directed spiral) movement was presented as the breaking out of the egg's shell (Eliade 1966: 408-409). Ironically enough, despite the clearly expressed weariness of the time flow, the poem's title is significantly *A Cooking Egg*, and not "A Broken Egg" preventing thus the protagonist from extricating himself from the depredatory time bondage.

While in *A Cooking Egg* the impossiblity of breaking out from the chain of

repetitive deaths is communicated in the tone of a learned and rather obscure joke, in *The Waste Land* it finds a more straightforward expression. In the *Unreal City* fragment, a peculiar person is picked out from an anonymous crowd:

> There I saw the one I knew, and stopped him crying: "Stetson"
> You who were with me in the ships at Mylae!
>
> (*The Waste Land*, v. 69-70)

This striking greeting annuls time boundaries as does the manner of deploying the characters of Tiresian type. Like Tiresias, the characters of this extract witness both the past and present events. The encounter in King William Street (the poem's protagonist meets the man with whom he shared the memories of the First Punic War) makes history insignificant through the reversibility of an individual life cycle. A particular moment is divested of its religious and historical significance, as (owing to constant repetitiveness of an unindividualized human experience) it is never the ultimate one.

As indicated earlier, apart from the distorted archetypal symbolism also symbolical images of circular movement build up the recurrent theme of deterioration of the understanding of time. A clockwork, circular movement conveys the idea of transformation of the recreative cycle into an uninspired time flow devoid of the "end" and the "beginning." Unlike vegetation phases, the cyclical repetitiveness in Eliot's earlier poetry is left unmarked by any significant events; it is reduced to an insipid going round in a vicious circle.

The very frequency with which the verbs such as "revolve", "circulate", "go round", "curl", or "wrap" recur in this poetry is indicative with the obsession of the circular motion. In *Preludes*, the phrase:

> [...] a gusty shower wraps
> The grimy scraps
> Of withered leaves about your feet
>
> (*Preludes*, v. 5-7)

is followed by:

> You curled the papers from your hair
>
> (*Preludes*, v. 36)

and culminates in a personal confession:

> I am moved by fancies that are curled
> Around these images [...]
>
> (*Preludes*, v. 48-49)

Circular physical movements or gestures are accompanied by metaphorical repetitiveness of the morning rituals which are performed "in a thousand furnished rooms." This makes one aware of the insignificance of any particular moment that can be re-enacted together "with the other masquarades that time resumes." Hence, the ultimate conviction of a continuous absurd return:

> The worlds revolve like ancient women
> Gathering fuel in vacant lots
>
> (*Preludes*, v. 53-54)

The reversibility of the time of trivial daily events may be juxtaposed with the recreation of the time of seasonal vegetation cults, which comparison exhibits the barreness of continually re-enacted daily routine. There is neither primitive seasonal pattern nor Christian pattern of a liturgical year inscribed in the "circle." For this reason the circular movement becomes merely a monotonous and meaningless rotating.

The "Wheel" design on the Tarot card in *The Waste Land* acquires similarly ominous overtones in connection with the time concept. Its function may be specified as preparing the reader for the episodes of the London Bridge or the typist fragments. Each of them can be treated as a different "guise" of the recurrent theme of the cyclical time concept. In the case of the typist episod (where the female character puts on the record "with an automatic hand" and paces nervously around) the implications of the circular movement are obvious. On the poem's surface level the city episode (with crowds passing over London Bridge and flowing up and down King William Street) does not seem to point directly to the circular motion, being the movement along a horizontal or vertical axis:

> Signs short and infrequent were exhaled
> And each man fixed his eyes before his feet
> Flowed up the hill and down King William Street
>
> (*The Waste Land*, v. 64-66)

Yet, if regarded as a metaphysical representation of an unprogressive, aimless movement, the circular motion shares its symbolical implications with an equally unprogressive going up and down.

The recurrent motif of the circular movement assumes still another "guise" in *The Hollow Men*. The respective fragments of the poem not only restate the theme of an uninspired temporal reversibility, but also give a new modulation to the already mentioned scenes from *The Waste Land*. Thus, the vision of the "hollow men" going round "the prickly pear" recapitulates the motif of futility and purposeless motion, as it was earlier evoked in the London Bridge fragment. Similarly, the scraps of a broken prayer:

> For Thine is the Kingdom
> [...]
> Life is very long
> [...]
> For Thine is the Kingdom
> For Thine is
> Life is
> For Thine is the
>
> (*The Hollow Men*, v. 77-94)

echo the distortions of the music dispersed throughout *The Waste Land*:

> Weialala leia
> Wallala leialala
>
> (*The Waste Land*, v. 277-278, 290-291)

Both texts sound as if produced by a scratched gramophone record (which is actually played by the typist from *The Waste Land*).

Finally, it is formal poetic devices that modulate the theme of the cyclical time concept. Recurring refrains, repeated phrases and seemingly unskilful rhymes verging occasionally on epiphora emphasize the sense of an unchangeable re-enactment — the effect of their accumulation being a lulling reiteration of similar sounds. The sense of drowsiness or dormancy is further augmented by the travesty of nursery rhymes such as the one employed in *The Hollow Men*:

> Here we go round the prickly pear
> Prickly pear prickly pear
> Here we go round the prickly pear
> At five o'clock in the morning
>
> (*The Hollow Men*, v. 68-72)

or in *The Waste Land*

> London Bridge is falling down falling down falling down
>
> (*The Waste Land*, v. 426)

The combination of such devices creates an atmosphere of inaction in which the crowds from *Preludes, The Waste Land* and *The Hollow Men* tread unprogressive, circular tracks.

Prufrock, which sets the mood of the first collection of T. S. Eliot's poems, may be treated as exemplary of the way the formal devices contribute to the sense of futility of any action in time. Thus, the atmosphere of lethargy is adumbrated by Baudelairian images of "a patient etherised upon a table", or of an evening described as a cat that "curled once about the house and fell asleep"[7]. Having been introduced by such imagery the theme is further captured and carried on by the echoing refrain:

> In the room the women come and go
> Talking of Michelangelo
>
> (*Prufrock*, v. 13-14, 35-36)

and by the reiterated phrases ("Let us go", "There will be time", "Prepare face to meet the faces that you meet", etc.).

In conclusion it can be said that the theme of the devoluted time notion is manifested in at least threefold manner: through the intrusion of inhuman chronicity or the repetitiveness of mechanized time intervals; through the distortion and obliteration of the regenerative cyclical symbolism; and, finally, through the sense of inaction which is evoked by monotonous sound reiterations. The above discussed poetic "guises" of the time concept indicate the inferiority of the materialist absurd chronicity to its religious counterparts. As Brandon (1965: 207) observes:

> Where time has been regarded as a cyclic process of existence in a lower material world, such existence has been interpreted as the penalty imposed upon spiritual beings who had forgotten or fallen from their originally high estate.

[7] Cf. *Prufrock* l. 23; the image seems reminiscent of Baudelaire's *Harmonie du Soir* (one of the four *Spleen* poems): "My cat trying to find a place to rest/Twists and turns his sickly body."

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ACTA UNIVERSITATIS WRATISLAVIENSIS
No 1254

Anglica Wratislaviensia XXI Wrocław 1991

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PERSONALISTIC ELEMENTS IN TENNESSEE WILLIAMS' CONCEPT OF FREEDOM

The philosophy of personalism, having emerged as an organized concept in the US at the turn of the present century, chiefly through the writings of B. P. Bowne and R. T. Flewelling, was in fact, in its theistic version, a continuation of the main line of the Christian thought which can be traced back to St. Thomas Acquinas and his tradition. This modern version of humanism, which flourished before WW II in France, placed in the center of interest the condition of man, his nature and welfare and, what is particularly important, re-examined the relation of these to such traditional values as love, freedom and dignity. It saw man, in the first half of the 20th century, between the two world wars and among materialistic and skeptical movements in philosophy, again as an inseparable unity of the psyche and body (Bortnowska 1963: 409) capable of logical, free and moral actions for the sake of the harmonious self-development and the development of others (Granat 1985: 70). The fact that the trend laid so much emphasis on the question of man's development was caused by the assumption that man possesses the ability of choosing definite goals for his life, due to the property of free will, and of achieving them by self-determination of his actions (Krąpiec, quoted after Zdybicka 1963: 939). Thus freedom and a peculiar autonomy became not only one of the major characteristics of human condition, but also ideals which can and should be pursued. Freedom also became an irreplaceable funtion of man indicating the degree of his development, being at the same time its indispensable condition.

The following paper intends to present in a few selected plays of Tennessee Williams certain elements which closely approach the personalistic system of ideas concerning freedom. A reservation, however, should be made that the playwright did not follow consciously any of the current philosophical trends and that his ideas, even if similar, stemmed originally from his own thought and experience. Furthermore, it will be the aim of the discussion to broaden, through the personalistic approach the range of interpretation of Williams' characters in the selected plays. The selection comprises *The Fugitive Kind, Suddenly Last Summer* and *The Night of the Iguana*.

In order to show how important the notion of freedom was in Williams' creativity, one has to mention the group of major characters which the critics usually refer

to as "fugitives." The name, taken from the play *The Fugitive Kind*, is used for social misfits, alienated from the contemporary society because of their unusual, often neurotic personalities and because of their uncompromising opposition against materialistic values of average Americans. The characters classified under this label are characterized by their fear of traps that the society sets for them and, therefore, the only solution for them is to flee from one community to another. The problem of the "fugitives" in Williams' plays, much explored by criticism, presents, however, only one, negative aspect of freedom. It is always a freedom that can be gained by escape from social institutions, money, one's obligations, failures, oppressions or even death. To use Erich Fromm's (1970: 53) terminology, it is a "freedom from", not a "freedom to", i.e., one that can be obtained through some positive action aiming to find or support certain values which would be important for the individual.

The above-mentioned obstacles that the Williams' characters meet on their way to freedom can be divided into two groups: one referring to the inner life of an individual and the other connected with external circumstances. Both personalists and Williams recognize this opposition. The former assert that, what can be called, "outer freedom", understood as the absence of physical restraints or external pressures of the environment, is essential for human existence. For Williams, the motif of travels, unrestrained change of places appears in all the three plays and seems very important in the lives of the major characters. However, personalists argue that freedom to do anything one wishes is not all freedom (Ricoeur 1970: 847) but that, as Emmanuel Mounier (1964: 72) puts it, "external liberties are mere chances given to the spirit of freedom which is present only with those people who have a desire for it in themselves." In this way, personalists indicate a possibility for an individual to live an unliberated life in a completely free and tolerant society, that is to say, without having the experience of "inner freedom."

Apart from the desire to travel and live unmolested by the society, Wiliams' fugitives dream of possessing a certain inner independence, power of resistance and strength which would enable them to keep their identity. Although the notion of "inner freedom" never appears in the plays, yet from the action and dialogues one might draw a conclusion that this is actually the aim of their struggles.

The problem of great importance becomes, furthermore, the way of gaining freedom. In personalism, it is not something that one has, but experiences (Mounier 1964: 65) and it can be gained only in the process of continual struggle. The struggle for freedom manifests itself in the necessity of making choices between conflicting inner impulses which the individual experiences. The choice either liberates him to take up further action or makes him dependent on what he has chosen. Thus the struggle may result in freedom or in failure due to the possibility of errors which is a natural effect and indispensable condition of freedom (Mounier 1964: 84). Without it, freedom cannot exist and one who cannot accept this fact and abandons the struggle is deprived of the very chance of success. Additionally, the possibility of errors makes the struggle for freedom exciting and really worth the effort, and, as the result, may produce a well-developed and strong personality.

It has to be added here that the necessity of struggle, otherwise one of the major

demands of life, may be conscious or unconscious in the individual, the latter state indicating that the initiation into adulthood has already taken place.

The notion of freedom, in the personalistic theory, should, moreover, be accompanied by the notion of responsibility which requires the presence of higher values such as God, history, mankind, one's own conscience or another person to whom the individual is expected to give account of his actions. As Mounier (1964: 73) wrote: "free is the man whom the world asks questions and who is able to answer them: he is a responsible man." Responsibility, understood as the ability to accept consequences of one's own or someone else's action (Gogacz 1974: 127), is regarded in personalism as an element of mature freedom. Without it, freedom becomes a liberty of actions performed according to one's own desires, including those which may lead to inner dependence and, consequently, to the negation of freedom.

Finally, the struggle for freedom must be preceded by proper recognition and acceptance of one's own weaknesses and inherent limitations. Contrary to existentialists, who proclaimed absolute freedom without any limits or obstacles, personalists argue that it can never be attained at the expense of the natural conditions but in their presence and in spite of them (Mounier 1964: 66). The awareness and acceptance of the realistically seen human limitations may then become a peculiar support and lead the individual to appropriate actions which may, in turn, result in freedom.

In the three selected plays by Williams the idea of struggle appears as a recurring motif. It is most often manifested as the fight for the freedom to live according to personal convictions which usually clash with those of the environment. The playwright indicates by external appearance the character's desire of independence and thus emphasizes his or her conscious choice of a distinction from the society. In *The Fugitive Kind*, this meaning is achieved by Val Xavier's snakeskin jacket which symbolizes untypical, carefree existence of a wandering entertainer, with a stress on the mystery of his life. It also signifies Val's search for freedom and this particular meaning is easily recognized by another restless wanderer from the play, Carol Cutrere. The girl notices that the fact that Val has replaced his old snakeskin jacket by the blue uniform of a store clerk indicates his surrender to the demands of the materialistic society and thus his subconscious decision to abandon the struggle.

As far as Val's past is concerned, it presents his encounter with two kinds of freedom. The story of Val's life reveals, in the form of memories, the boy's initiation into the world of adults. After leaving the woods, Val gave up the life of a solitary hunter and entered bohemian circles of drug addicts and alcoholics in New Orleans. After some time he realized he "had something to sell besides snakeskins and other wild things' skins" (p. 65). He realized that he "was corrupted" (p. 65). For the first time in his life, Val faced the problem of inner conflicts. He became conscious of the fact that he could be a loser in a much deeper sense than the material one, and that hunting and selling may apply not only to visible objects. It is a clear reference, through the imagery taken from trade, to the experience of the loss of inner freedom, which is the opposite of corruption.

It can be observed from the tone of his utterances that Val, now conscious of

life-struggle, has failed to accept it as a fact in his own life. In his first dialogue with Lady, he speaks about his experience with regret and bitterness, and Williams indicates that they are both "sweetly grave as two children" (p. 63), which suggests both the beginning of their romance and, on Val's part, the lack of reconciliation with his past failure.

It is only after the act of stealing a watch that Val realizes the depth of his corruption. Therefore, he decides to break with his old life-style, takes up a new job and tries to adapt himself to the new environment. The first part of the play is devoted to Val's attempts to escape new romances, in which he may easily become involved. Among others he rejects advances of Carol Cutrere who represents for him the raffish circles he has just left. Nevertheless, he preserves his jacket, guitar and sexually--oriented behavior and, for this reason, cannot get rid completely of his corrupted past.

Furthermore, he develops an intimate relationship with Lady Torrance who goes as far as to offer him a lodging in the store instead of the cabin in a highway hotel. The offer and his reaction to it turn out, later on, to be highly significant for Val's life. As the stage directions suggest, he hesitates considering implications of the proposal: "His manner is gently sad as if he had met with a familiar, expected disappointment" (p. 91). Val realizes he has to make an important decision concerning his personal affairs. He faces an opportunity of another love-affair — hence his disappointment — and understands that his consent would imply a restriction of his personal freedom almost exclusively to the store. On the other hand, he is impressed by Lady's kindness and feeling for him and is, therefore, unable to arrive at the right decision. He postpones the final choice as long as possible and the whole scene is considerably lengthened. When he eventually succumbs to Lady's pleadings, he acts on a sudden impulse, moved by the power of her passion, disregarding the hatred of the townsfolk as the most probable reaction to his choice.

In a short time, Val becomes a victim of his decision. The above episode, crucial for his career in the town, reveals his general lack of responsibility, inner weakness, and marks a failure in his search for freedom different from that experienced as an entertainer. It should be stressed here that his failure in the struggle for inner freedom eventually brings about the loss of the outer one. Val suffers a series of threats and is finally lynched by the furious townsfolk. However, these events are the result of his decision to unite with Lady and, thus, his death seems closely connected with his compromise in the pursuit of freedom.

Another play discussing the question of the search for freedom is *Suddenly Last Summer*. Its protagonist, Sebastian Venable makes at the age of thirty-nine a series of attempts to break free from the dominating influence of his mother. Furthermore, it is also a presentation of Sebastian's intellectual search for identity, a struggle to find an adequate image of reality as it appeared to him after the thirty-year long, unbroken relationship with Mrs Venable. The three successive episodes from the travels of Mrs Venable's son: the Galapagos Islands (the "discovery" of God), the Himalayas (the Buddhist monastery) and the travel with Catharine Holly, ended with his tragic death, can be treated, according to Catharine's words, as Sebastian's desperate

attempts to "break the umbilical coed" (p. 77) which, metaphorically, still bound him to his mother, and thus prevented him from achieving full independence and maturity.

The first of the episodes, the tour of the Galapagos Islands, marks a significant point in Sebastian's consciousness. The all-day observation of the flight of the newly-hatched seaturtles away from the attack of carnivorous birds makes him realize the essence of life. Sebastian watches the cruelty of the attack, the small chances of the turtles for survival and their horrible death. The image that he sees appears to him as the truth about life and God. As Paul J. Hurley (1966: 396) comments on Sebastian's discovery, the god he saw was to him "a monster of cruelty and ugliness: the world he had created was a vile, hideous place where men [...] attack and devour their fellow creatures." And yet the reader has the impression that only such a man as Sebastian could create that image. As Hurley (1966: 401) suggests, it could arise only out of a deep and hidden hatred toward the world and people. From the psychological point of view, Sebastian's hatred was probably caused by the long-lasting restrictive attitude of his mother who, according to Catharine, excluded women from his company to keep him always by her side. In this way, she unintentionally stimulated his homosexual inclinations and prevented him from beginning a life of his own.

Mrs Venable followed Sebastian also in his journey to the Himalayas where he attempted to enter a Buddhist monastery, withdraw from normal life and commit himself totally to spiritual meditations. His attachment to the peacefulness of that religion and to the fact that it rejected ordinary life may be interpreted as a desire to escape the horror of existence, of which he so suddenly became aware. It may also be viewed as a turtle-like flight away from the oppression of maternal control over his life.

However, his desire unfulfilled, Sebastian had to return to life, this time having to determine his own standpoint toward reality, the principle of which he had already detected. As suggested in Catharine Holly's interpretation of events, Sebastian's death was not altogether accidental but bore some hidden relation to the philosophy which he adopted:

> Catharine: [...] I tried to save him, Doctor.
> Doctor: Save him? Save him from what?
> Catharine: Completing! — a sort of! — image! — he had of himself as a sort of! — sacrifice to a! — terrible sort of a —
> Doctor: — God?
> Catharine: Yes, a — cruel one, Doctor. (p. 63-64).

Catharine indicates that Sebastian chose for himself a role of a martyr to the image of God he himself created. As an apparent reaction to the "discovery" on the Galapagos, he began to regard himself as inevitably weak and helpless in the cruel world ruled by the cruel God. Paul J. Hurley (1966: 396), continuing his analysis of Sebastian's motivation, writes that since he has accepted such viewpoint, "the only reasonable attitude available to man, Sebastian felt, was resignation to that truth. Struggle is useless, for nothing changes the will of God." Indeed, Catharine in her relation of events reveals the application of the above idea in Sebastian's everyday life:

> Catharine: He! — accepted! — all! — as — how! — things! — are! — And thought nobody had any right to complain or interfere in any way whatsoever, [...]. He thought it unfitting to ever take any action about anything whatsoever! — except to go on doing as something in him directed... (p. 88-89).

In this way, Sebastian decided to rebel against the principle of struggle, which governs reality. He declared, what can be called his private "passive rebellion" against God's law, manifested in the form of non-interference and detachment from situations he was unable to change. Considering the fact that Sebastian thought of himself as essentially weak and always bound to be a loser, his decision of protest against the *status quo* may seem an act of courage. However, what he rejected was not only the cruelty of life but also its moments of happiness and joy, which are usually connected with human relationships. Sebastian was never able to reciprocate love toward a woman. As Catharine maintains, when she showed her affection to him, he "began to be restless" (p. 74) and, consequently, allowed her to love himself only "in a sort of motherly way (p. 63). Being thus unable to love or receive love and rejecting both positive and negative aspects of human condition, Sebastian excluded himself from real life and prevented himself from participation in its fulness and depth. By adopting the attitude of resignation and detachment he denied, in fact, the basic human privilege and duty of action and undermined the existence of freedom which can be gained through struggle and appropriate acts of will. His decision to abstain from the struggle as well as his "discovery" of God on the Galapagos Islands prove a great fear of life deeply hidden in his consciousness. The fear, manifesting itself as a reluctance to experience advantages and disadvantages of life, impeded Sebastian's individual development and made him unable to experience freedom.

However, according to Catharine's story, something unusual happened the summer when he decided to leave his mother. As indicated by the title, the play's main theme is a change which occurred in Sebastian's consciousness and which undermined his previous way of thinking. Under the influence of Catharine and away from his mother, Sebastian apparently began to revise his philosophical standpoint. He failed to write a poem as was his custom every summer, and, as Catharine noticed, that summer "he wasn't young any more" (p. 77). She also points out the fact that in the restaurant where they had lunch, just before his death, Sebastian, for the first time in his life attempted to change a situation, which was, as she adds, his "fatal error" (p. 89). This fact clearly demonstrates his departure from the philosophy of resignation which he adopted, although it seems also partly stimulated by his poor heart condition and by the feeling of panic caused by the molesting boys. However, it was too late for Sebastian to follow his new attitude. He fell a victim to both his previous peculiar approach to life and to his homosexuality, which coincided fatally and brought about his death.

Both Sebastian Venable and Val Xavier are unsuccessful as far as their attainment of freedom is concerned. Val, at one moment of his life, surrenders to the pressure of circumstances and has to suffer negative consequences of his choice. He cannot

consistently follow the necessity of the inner fight for freedom and, therefore, cannot enjoy its positive results. He also represents a sentimental attitude to reality by allowing his decisions to depend on feelings and their temporary satisfaction. He is lost amidst his passions which eventually bring him disappointment and bitterness and, by having transgressed the norms of the society he lives in, he becomes a victim of its judgement.

Sebastian Venable, on the other hand, represents passive attitude to freedom. He deliberately refuses to fight against adversities of life. He is unable to enjoy freedom because he rebels against the very possibility of its existence, thereby revealing a deeply hidden hatred toward life and people. It is characteristic that both Val and Sebastian have to suffer unusually cruel consequences of their attitudes to reality and of their failure in the pursuit of freedom: Val is lynched by fire and Sebastian is killed and virtually devoured by a gang of Spanish boys. Both deaths appear as a certain punishment for their failure to cope with reality. In this way, Williams reveals his conviction about the logic of life and the inevitably tragic effect of attitudes and actions undertaken against the integrity of man.

Not all Williams' characters, however, reflect the playwright's pessimism about the achievement of freedom. Hannah Jelkes and her grandfather Nonno, from *The Night of the Iguana* present a very different attitude toward reality. Hannah is, for many reasons, a Williams' outstanding *dramatis persona*. Her personality is summed up in her unusual external appearance:

> remarkable-looking — ethereal, almost ghostly. She suggests a Gothic cathedral image of a medieval saint, but animated. She could be thirty, she could be forty: she is totally feminine and yet androgynous-looking — almost timeless (p. 21).

The description indicates a certain universality, perhaps sanctity and, therefore, a certain superiority over the world and people around her although not accompanied by any contempt or vanity. Both she and her grandfather have chosen traveling as their life-style which, difficult as it is, with the continual necessity of earning their stay at hotels and frequent changing places in search of the new clientele, enables them to experience life with its various situations and problems and taste its quality. It also forces them to determine their own standpoint and they often have to look for a solution or refuge in themselves.

In the episode at the Costa Verde Hotel presented in the play, Hannah and Nonno face unusually severe adversities. The sprained ankle and slight cerebral stroke have made the grandfather unable to move of his own power and he has to be pushed in a wheelchair. However, it does not disturb the inner balance of the old man very much, and, despite the awarenenss of the trouble he is causing, he manages to keep up a good mood and tell jokes, which arouses wonder and admiration from Maxine and Shannon watching the scene.

> Nonno: Hannah, tell the lady that my perambulator is temporary. I will soon be ready to crawl and then to toddle and before long I will be leaping around here like an — old — mountain — goat, ha-ha-ha-ha... (p. 35-36).

Similarly, Hannah tries to save her dignity in spite of Nonnoy's condition and

against the inhospitality of Maxine. When the hostess makes it plain that they are not wanted at the hotel, Hannah immediately decides to leave despite the obvious danger of the journey in stormy weather. The stage directions indicate that "she is dominating Maxine in this exchange" (p. 77).

Apart from struggles against external adversities, Hannah reveals, in her conversations with Shannon, some of her inner problems. A severe depression which she experienced in her early youth, after the loss of her parents in an accident, confronted her with the truth about the weakness of her psyche. It also urged her to look for some *panacea* against the apathy which overcame her mind:

> Hannah: [...] I was lucky. My work, this occupational therapy that I gave myself — painting and doing quick character sketches — made me look out of myself, not in, and gradually, at the far end of the tunnel that I was struggling out of I began to see this faint, very faint gray light — the light of the world outside me — and I kept climbing toward it. I had to (p. 109).

The above image of the tunnel vividly reflects the difficulty and desperation of the struggle and shows Hannah's hope and unconquerable desire to survive even in hardest oppressions. Hannah used all the strength that was left in her as well as external means that were available to her: work and art to cure her from depression. Her efforts turned out to have been greatly rewarding and after some time she regained her psychic balance.

Hannah's experience in psychic struggles allowed her to perceive similar problems with other people. She noticed that "at the far end of the tunnel" was the world seen not only as an antidote to her apathy or a means of deliverance from the imprisonment within herself but also as a place of suffering for many people. She compares the suffering of the sick mind to difficult travels "that the spooked and bedeviled people are forced to take through the [...] unlighted sides of their natures" (p. 108). Moreover, from a mere observer of other people's sufferings Hannah turns into a helper even if her help is confined merely to showing genuine sympathy and understanding. Sometimes, however, it can be more concrete as in Shannon's case, whose inner conflicts and the spiritual breakdown she easily perceives and therefore decides to interfere. At the moment of the highest tension, Hannah is able to take responsibility for Shannon and prevent him by force from committing suicide. After the most severe crisis is over, Hannah discusses with him the reasons of his selfannihilatory impulses and points out to him his desire to be free from a sense of guilt. She observes in him a pattern of sexual sins, which he really commits, and of tortures, of mostly psychological nature, which he imposes on himself as a "painless atonement" for what he has done (p. 102). She reveals his escape from the struggle against this weakness of his personality every time he is tempted by sex and his choice of surrender rather than fight, only to regret it and look for another atonement later. Her efforts are intended to help him realize the truth about himself as the first step on his way to liberation.

However, her psychoanalytical observations and her care for him result in a mutual attraction and soon Hannah is exposed to a test of her own freedom. Shannon, seeing that the only way for him now is to unite with Maxine, proposes to Hannah that they could travel together as mere friends. However, Hannah, "a Nantucket spinster

pushing forty" (p. 78), realizes the irrationality of the idea. She is aware of his unrestrained indulgence in sex, mental indisposition for further travels and general weakness of his character. Therefore, pointing at the "impracticality of the idea" (p. 118) and despite her growing involvement she decides to stay alone. In this way, she chooses to follow her own conviction rather than comply with a proposal that would deprive her of her freedom.

It should be mentioned here that Hannah's refusal is motivated partly by a spinsterish fear of sex. It is suggested in the play that she "cannot stand to be touched" (p. 117), which indicates that she has not fully accepted or become reconciled to her own sexuality and, therefore, in this single respect, she cannot achieve freedom. However, her rejection of Shannon is caused to a larger extent by reasons other than sex, and therefore her decision cannot be treated as a mere escape.

Hannah's attitude to physical love — closely connected with the message of Nonno's last poem — can be summarized as follows: it should be regretted but sex is forbidden to those who want to stay pure and free because it always brings corruption. Thus she reflects Williams' own conviction about the impossibility of reconciliation between the physical and the spiritual aspect in man (Falk 1971:90). However, the above viewpoint places Williams' characters in a vicious circle, because, regardless of their choice, they will always lose something. It is either freedom without sex, or it is sex, with the loss of freedom. Thus, Williams' *personae* can never achieve wholeness or completeness in their lives but have to choose the lesser evil, according to what they regard a superior value. In this way, the traditional dichotomy of good and evil, otherwise present in Williams' plays, is obscure and, in fact, shatters the order of the world.

Generally, Hannah seems the Williams' only character who almost completely accepted reality with all its demands. Having achieved a large degree of self-awareness and recognizing the necessity of struggle, she has managed to overcome the weaknesses of her psyche and character. Although defeated in the physical world, she wins her victory in the spiritual. She resists the opportunity of the romance with Shannon and, due to an unusual faithfulness to her own convictions and great inner strength, she manages to retain both inner and outer freedom. Although her victory is accompanied by suffering and loneliness (she additionally suffers the loss of Nonno), there is no lament in the play over her fragility or vulnerability. At the final tragic moment of the play, of Nonno's death, Hannah retains her extraordinary power of endurance and, despite the fact of being highly emotional, she preserves her inner balance and dignity.

As the above analysis has pointed out, the question of freedom comprises such notions as dignity, responsibility and struggle. However, the notion of freedom can be also discussed within the scope of another important notion of personalism, namely that of love, in which freedom finds its logical and most natural development. In the personalistic approach, it is assumed that freedom is not merely a matter of one individual but a truly liberated person seeks the freedom of the people among whom he exists (Mounier 1964: 69). Thus by breaking the barriers of his own *ego* and through the outreach to other people the person continues his own liberation and, as a result of

his pursuit of freedom, the real depth and beauty of human relationships become possible. With this, freedom transforms itself into love, the highest value in personalism, closely connected with freedom. As it has been formulated by Gabriel Marcel, "love can be practised only in freedom, and freedom, in its turn manifests itself the most in love" (Marcel, in Dec 1986: 72).

Among the analized characters, only Hannah approaches the above ideal. Having attained the largest degree of freedom, she turns to other people in an attempt to help or sympathize in their suffering, or, if possible, to encourage them to a similar struggle for freedom. It is best manifested in her attitude to Shannon, whom she tries to liberate by revealing to him the truth about himself. In this way, she liberates herself from the limits of her own *ego*, overcomes her loneliness and is able to achieve a real communication with another person, which she calls "broken gates between people" (p. 106), in whose success she firmly believes.

Of the three Williams' characters: Val, Sebastian and Hannah, the first two suffer a failure in their pursuit of freedom, whereas Hannah is not only most liberated, but, additionally, displays love directed towards other people. It seems that Williams' understanding of freedom closely resembles the treatment of freedom in the philosophy of personalism. In both concepts it is built on such notions as self-awareness, struggle and responsibility, without which the achievement of freedom is impossible. The only difference is in the area of sex, which in Williams' concept, by being irreconcilable with freedom, distorts the balance of the presented world and has to be sacrificed for the sake of the real, i.e., spiritual victory. Both the achievement and the loss of freedom are closely connected with suffering. However, the loss, particulary the failure even to attempt to struggle, is accompanied by a severe external punishment, which shows a clear connection and interdependence of inner and outer freedom.

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A C T A U N I V E R S I T A T I S W R A T I S L A V I E N S I S
No 1254

Anglica Wratislaviensia XXI Wrocław 1991

REVIEWS

"SOME NOVELISTS RETRIEVE THE PAST"

Neil McEwan, *Perspective in British Historical Fiction Today*. The Macmillan Press Ltd. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London 1987.

After *The Survival of the Novel* and *Africa and the Novel* Neil McEwan, lecturer in English at the University of Qatar, has published his third book entitled *Perspective in British Historical Fiction Today*. As the starting point of his study Neil McEwan takes the conclusion of Avrom Fleishman's *The English Historical Novel: Walter Scott to Virginia Woolf* in which Fleishman claims that the modern historical novel will either "join the experimental movement or retire from the province of serious literature." McEwan suggests that the question about the experimental or realistic character of the genre is of minor importance because the British literary scene, since the 1950s, has been characterized by a noticeable discrepancy between avant-garde theory and the actual creativity of original writers. The criterion he adopts for his approach is that of perspective by which he means a view of the past adjusted to present interests. Thus a historical writer faces the crucial problem of how to be true to the time in which the story is set and to the time in which it is written, of how to see the past fairly from a contemporary vantage point.

Perspective in British Historical Fiction Today consists of eight chapters. In his Introduction McEwan considers the background and implications of contemporary scepticism towards history, by tracing the roots of scepticism in Victorian self-censorship; the "Whig" view which has made the past nothing more than a prologue to the present; the practice of using historical themes for modern propaganda; and, finally, in the imposing of the present on our readings of the past. In his opinion a threat to historical fiction also comes from those who argue that all history is fiction. They destroy the objective perspective, for if the past is thought of as the creation of the present, what happened is subordinated totally to what is thought to have happened. McEwan disagrees with the views of Roland Barthes and Frank Kermode that realist fiction and historical fiction are both dying. He tries to show that, contrary to such pronouncements, the union of the two modes enriches our culture by protecting the past. This argument depends on the traditional assumption that perspective is possible because the past remains independent of our reconstructions of it.

The author outlines the positions of four contemporary novelists: Mary Renault, Robert Nye, Anthony Burgess, J. G. Farrell, whose historical interests are shared by other writers, including John Fowles and William Golding. All of them are traditional in the sense that they respect the integrity of the past but approach it from a modern point of view. The novelists he discusses represent three varieties of historical fiction:

1. Mary Renault brings the full resources of modern realism to the portrayal of ancient life. Her Greek narrators seem relatively free from the author's modernizing, although the literary devices are "in fact silently modernizing" them. But all the time she is faithful to her basic claim that "the past is a part of the human environment and should not be polluted by falsehood [...]. Truth means capturing a world of the past as it appeared to those who knew it."

2. Anthony Burgess and Robert Nye resemble experimental post-modernists who use the conventions of ludic fiction in order to penetrate the past, especially through language. They constantly jolt the reader but the ludic nature of their novels and word games do not exclude a real relationship with the world.

3. J. G. Farrell blends realism and scepticism in new ways: he frequently crosses and recrosses the line between history and fiction.

The two following chapters are devoted to the discussion of Mary Renault's early fiction (*The Last of the Wine, The Mask of Apollo, The King Must Die, The Bull from the Sea, The Praise Singer*) and then the Alexander trilogy. McEwan stresses that she subordinates historical interest to the personal interest of people involved in history. All eight books present an approach to life which is religious, social and aesthetic. Renault aims at retrieving the past through knowledge and imagination in order to relate history to the reader's present. Yet she believes that judgements from a modern perspective are anachronistic: people from the past should not be modernized by standards unknown in their times. Nevertheless, Renault's truthfulness to antiquity does not exclude contemporary hints or parallels which are illustrated by her modern sense of humour, irony and treatment of realism.

The Alexander trilogy (*The Persian Boy, Fire from Heaven* and *Funeral Games*) is the most ambitious attempt to reflect the distant past in terms of present consciousness. These books are adventure-romances, historical documentaries, vivid studies of character and introductions to ancient history. Although the characters are seen from a perspective which is broader than their own, the author remains loyal to the ancient Macedonians. McEwan only regrets that in *Funeral Games* Mary Renault respected history too conscientiously, which spoilt the literary value of the novel.

In the fourth chapter McEwan discusses Anthony Burgess's *Nothing Like the Sun* and *Napoleon Symphony*. Burgess's perspective is seen as that of a teacher and entertainer at the same time. He blends fiction with literary and verbal games but he also reveals a taste for realism and tradition. The ludic and the realistic are mixed but there is no confusion about their identity. He exposes the fictional and the historical problems to the reader by starting from evidence and ending in fantasy. In *Nothing Like the Sun* the reader remains aware of a modern mind playing with what is known of the past. The novel is true to biography, to art and to human nature. Burgess is most conscientious about language. At the conclusion of his discussion of this novel, Neil McEwan agrees with Schoenbaum's evaluation that this work is "the only novel about Shakespeare acceptable in its own terms as a novel."

Napoleon Symphony, apart from playing games with music, language, history and literature, plays the game of historical understanding. It provokes the reader to think how one understands the past. In both novels Burgess shows that reconstructing the past is a kind of game: what we know is "distinct from what our own time disposes us to invent." Burgess believes in a real Napoleon and a real Shakespeare but he turns his comedy on the "limitations of our ability to know them."

The following chapter is devoted to Robert Nye's *Falstaff*. The novel is seen as a post-modernist fabulation in which invented characters detect their "fictionality" and assert their "reality." Nye extends the history of Shakespeare's Falstaff, though his own hero is Sir John Fastolf — a 15th-century soldier-adventurer. Nye pretends that they are the same and gives an account of Falstaff/Fastolf's life. Historical events from Shakespeare's plays are treated on the same level as those from real history. While other historical novelists minimize or disguise anachronisms, Nye stresses them because he makes it explicit that his character belongs both to 1400 and 1600, the confusion of periods resulting in comedy. The literary and historical truth the book achieves is to be found in the mythic quality of Falstaff because Fastolf has "the power and range of connotations we associate with the myth." McEwan stresses Nye's masterly usage of language — Fastolf speaks many registers and tones of modern English, yet his way of thinking remains that of his own times. In this way he speaks for his own age and for what remains of it in ours.

The sixth chapter, the longest one, presents the historical fiction of J. G. Farrell. In McEwan's view, Farrell resembles a philosopher who is curious about the nature of facts. Facts are made of ideas and of things and this is why in Farrell's fiction objects give reality to the past. In his Empire trilogy, Farrell treats the three historical events — The Irish Civil War of 1919, the Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the collapse of Singapore in 1943 — as examples of theory in conflict with contingency, of ideas at odds with facts. His novels communicate the idea that historical explanation is both necessary and unattainable. Thus Farrell exposes the problematic character of historical interpretation. His point of view is that of the heroes who are fighting for their lives and for what they believe in. Farrell is most interested in the impact of history on the British mentality which he presents through the metaphor of the siege.

Neil McEwan presents detailed analyses of the Empire trilogy in order to demonstrate Farrell's treatment of history. He concludes that ideas in Farrell's sequence reiterate rather than develop, despite the apparent progress in his writing: from the philosophical *Troubles*, through the more ambitious *Siege of Krishnapur* which perfectly transforms fact into fiction, to *The Singapore Grip* which incorporates a huge body of history and thus gets closer to "faction."

The following chapter is a very brief examination of John Fowles's *The French Lieutenant's Woman* and William Golding's *Rites of Passage*. Both works subject an old setting to modern scrutiny — the former explicitly, the latter implicitly. Fowles's novel, a post-modernist work sabotaging the realistic conventions of its story, grants the reader the old pleasures of the text while at the same time revealing the new

earnestness about literary problems. In his analyses, Neil McEwan concentrates on the changing points of view, different techniques and playfulness. He claims that Fowles, on the one hand, juxtaposes the past and the present mentalities, thereby creating an interesting and thought-provoking perspective whereas, on the other, his distrust of the imagination becomes the source of the novel's weaknesses.

According to Neil McEwan, *Rites of Passage* should be viewed in the context of Golding's whole creativity. In contrast to those critics who regard *The Inheritors* and *The Spire* as historical novels, McEwan claims that in these books the historical interest is irrelevant. It is only in *Rites of Passage* that the past is not subordinated to present purposes, even though it still remains a source of isolated settings in which to observe the condition of man. This invented tale, like other novels by Golding, aims at exploring the truth and can be read as a fable. Golding's point of view is that of the 19th century but modified for a modern reader with subtle and concealed art. McEwan concludes that Golding's porpose assumes that one age is very much like another.

In the concluding chapter the author states that the novelists discussed in his study neither question the discipline of history nor treat the past as alien or unknowable. They feel a link with the past in history, in human lives and in art which leads them to use modes derived from traditional literature. Neil McEwan disagrees with the view that our age is freed from its predecessors. Neither is it right that after the modernist movement all novelists should write "to disturb our normal experience of the world rather than exploit and improve it." Such ideas like "the death of the past", "all history is contemporary history", "history has no mythic authority" are harmful because, in McEwan's opinion, they lead either to fantasy or to propaganda.

The writers discussed by McEwan share the awareness that although there is no history without fiction/imagination, the freedom of the historical novelist is "subject to the authority of history to preserve it." Believing in this priority, they present the past in whichever mode they can express themselves best, whether experimental or realistic.

Neil McEwan's book is a valuable study, specially for students approaching the historical novel. It offers a short historical survey of attitudes to this genre and proves that, despite theoretical objections, not only is the experimental but also the realistic fiction artistically valuable. *Perspective in British Historical Fiction Today* complements Fleishman's study because even though the two critics frequently disagree on theoretical matters, in the analytic part Neil McEwan focuses on the novel after the fifties, and thus continues from where Fleishman left off. The main value of McEwan's study lies in his analyses which are detailed, penetrating and supported by numerous examples from the texts. The author concentrates on showing how his selected novelists use history and how it is realized on various levels of their texts. In particular, the chapters about Mary Renault are especially valuable since this novelist is frequently undervalued by other critics and has not gained much attention in other studies. Also McEwan's ideas about J. G. Farrell's point of view and perspective are interesting. On the other hand, it is difficult to agree that J. G. Farrell's fiction tended to history books or that he contemplated the past without explaining it to the present.

It is true that Farrell made no explicit judgements, but his explanation comes through implication and, devoid of simplistic moralizing, is present in all his books. It also seems that the chapter devoted to John Fowles and William Golding is the weakest because Neil McEwan rather states the obvious. Finally the reader may have the impression that McEwan's criterion of perspective is all-inclusive. However, it is applied in a flexible and convincing way. *Perspective in British Historical Fiction Today* is worth reading since it offers a valuable standpoint from which to view the modern historical novel.

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