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Edited
by Anna Michońska-Stadnik

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W. Shakespeare's *The Tempest* as an Intertext in *The Sea and the Mirror* by W. H. Auden

Poststructuralist text analysis has willingly accepted 'intertextuality' as a productive and indispensable currency for approaching any text as confronted by a crisis of subjectivity and the displacement of the notion of autonomy. In fact, the term itself establishes an ontological basis of any text that has ever been written, projecting it onto an ideal model – a grand *pre*-text. In the light of *inter*-textual analysis no text is ever autonomous as it always relies on ever-enlarging plurality of meanings inherent in previous texts.

According to Roland Barthes, any text redistributing language exists as a new texture of past citations, old formulae, bits and scraps of social languages, symbols, codes, and rhythmic models that are redistributed in it, as "there is always language before and around the text" (quoted in Young 1981: 39). For Barthes, an intertext in this respect constitutes some general field of unconscious or automatic formulae that can scarcely ever be located. However, these formulae cannot be treated as entirely automatic since they also own their existence to a conscious selection of the author.

The idea of 'intertextuality' and its formulations have been initiated largely by Julia Kristeva and it is her understanding of 'texts existing within other texts' that will be taken into account here as well as considerations of other authors acknowledging Kristeva as a point of theoretical reference. It should be noted that the concept has evolved as a dynamic category and the first propositions of its status will differ considerably from the most recent *re*-formulations.

In the late 1960s Kristeva defines intertextuality as a textual interaction occurring within a single text and sees it as a concept that demonstrates how any text interprets history and participates in it. In her *Revolution in Poetic Language*, Kristeva shuns the term 'intertextuality' and prefers 'transposition':

> The term inter-textuality denotes this transposition of one (or several) sign system(s) into another; but since this term has often been understood in the banal sense of "study of sources," we prefer the term transposition because it specifies that the passage from one signifying system to another demands a new articulation of the thetic – of enunciative and denotative personality. If one grants that every signifying practice is a field of transpositions of various signifying systems (an inter-textuality), one then understands that its 'place' of enunciation and its denoted 'object' are never single, complete, and identical to themselves, but always plural, shattered, capable of being tabulated. In this way [polysemy] can also be seen as the result of a semiotic polyvalence – an adherence to different sign systems (p. 59-60).

Thus, transposition (*inter*-textuality) is understood as a play of different signifying systems or languages, as a field of a linguistic and non-linguistic exchange that produces multiple meanings resulting in polysemy and the impossibility of 'totalization' or 'wholeness.' In fact, all *inter*-textual dependencies and exchanges undermine the hegemony of the *same* and, potentially, open up an infinite number of interpretative paths generating ever fresh perspectives and meanings. Of course, this is not to say that an *inter*-textual approach confines one to fragmented literary landscapes. It rather refuses to be ultimate in the sense of conclusions and absolute truths – its nature in fact consists in things unconcluded.

In order to talk about an *inter*-textual or transpositional status of Auden's *The Sea and the Mirror*, it will be useful to specify his reading position that must have imposed some angle of interpretation choosing certain issues implied by *The Tempest* and leaving out others.

To my way of thinking, Auden read Shakespeare's play as both a mystery play and a play about language and its potentialities. There exists a book about *The Tempest* under the title *Shakespeare's Mystery Play* where the word 'mystery' is used with reference to a religious rite and to a mysterious play in terms of sources and potentially semibiographical elements (Frye 1986: 47). That the play dramatises the theme of language and its use, becomes evident when one takes a closer look at Prospero and Ariel.

Prospero's rule over Ariel or – to put it in a linguistic sense – his command of Ariel is primarily authority over speech. Prospero's magical power is identified with books representing some order of language and thinking, which power parallels political rule. He says about his past: "... my library / Was dukedom large enough" (AT: 108-109). When called by his master, Ariel thus declares his fulfilment:

Pro. Hast thou, spirit,
Perform'd to point the tempest that I bade thee?
Ari. To every article.

(AT: 195-198)

It seems that Ariel is a linguistic being, very similar in character to Fool in *King Lear* that exists as an utterance rather than a fully blossomed dramatic figure. Now Ariel appears as a medium able to impose and to cancel the chaos of speech and the chaos and multiple senses – he is responsible for polysemy.

Auden in *The Sea and the Mirror* is extremely language and genre conscious. The poem does not only perform a linguistic mastery but operates on a level of different poetic forms that complete one another but may function as well as separate entities.

The name of each character in *The Sea and the Mirror* comes from Shakespeare's play and in this case the intertextuality is considerably dense when measured in terms of linguistic reference as the names become quotations and exist on the basis of 'use' (Lyons 1977: 5-10). In other words, they exist on a level of one-to-one correspondence and become telling intertextual marks identified through both a poetic form they use and content. For instance, Ferdinand confessions of love are conveyed in a sonnet; Miranda reciprocates affection in a villanelle; Sebastian pronounces his ambitions in a sestina; Antonio expresses his dedication to villainy in terza rima that brings to mind associations with Dante's *Divine Comedy*, which may suggest a religious significance of Antonio's statement (Blair: 110).

On a structural level Auden poeticizes or rather semi-dramatizes (since *The Sea and the Mirror* is in fact a semi-drama) what Shakespeare indirectly implies in his play, namely that Ariel is a subtle being representing a series of coordinated signifying practices; a spirit whose existence is purely linguistic and able to create and control reality.

The theme of language is in my view essentially related to the following scene that seems central for Auden's reading of *The Tempest*:

Seb. Look, he's winding up the watch of his wit; by and by it will strike.
Gon. Sir –
Seb. One-Tell.
Gon. When every grief is entertain'd
That's offer'd,
Comes to th' entertainer –
Seb. A dollar.
Gon. Dolour comes to him, indeed; you have spoken truer than you purpos'd.
Seb. You have taken it wiselier than I meant you should.

(AT: 12-22)

Saved from the physical danger of a storm, Sebastian and Gonzalo experience freedom of deliverance in a pastoral landscape that paradoxically is a magical trap set up by Prospero. What is more, Sebastian and Gonzalo appear as personalities that have participated, in a symbolical sense, in a Babel-like event. Their language now is marked by polysemy, in which suffering may be equalled with material happiness in the context of a crosstalk that is imposed by the language itself. "Dollar" and "dolour" on a phonetic level become ambiguous and their undecidable status guarantees the words' strength. This situation reminds one of what Zygmunt Bauman proposes to consider in *Modernity and Am-*

bivalence. Namely that all undecidable phenomena or words like those discussed by Jacques Derrida – "pharmakon" (meaning both 'medicine' and 'poison'), "hymen," denoting a 'membrane in woman's body' and 'marriage'), "suplement" (in French meaning both 'supplement' and 'replacement') – meet on the plane of "neither/nor," which implies they can never be interpreted in a context of "either/or." The undecidable phenomena or ambivalent words in fact shatter all oppositions enabling one to take up effective action and to organise knowledge. In fact, they undermine anything that has been bracketed off and treated in terms of 'exteriority,' or 'separateness,' which is found to be 'the Sin of Strangers' (Bauman 1991: 81).

Alonso, Sebastian, and Gonzalo are strangers on the island and their blurred identities are reflected in distorted communication. Also the linguistic estrangement causes one's political alienation since citizens-to-be are not able to establish a rapport and are ironic about any vision of a political order. They will not be able to control and organise what Michel Foucault calls 'the production of discourse,' an instrument of power and authority. What is even more essential, their estranged identities cancel out potential discursive practices characterised by "the delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories" (quoted in Young 1981: 74). Polysemy or in other words some mysterious functioning of language is 'intertextualised' in the opening lines of *The Sea and the Mirror*. In his address to the Critics, the Stage Manager describes an archetypal artistic event:

> The aged catch their breath,
> For the nonchalant couple go
> Waltzing across the tightrope
> As if there were no death
> Or hope of falling down;
> The wounded cry as the clown
> Doubles his meaning, and O
> How the dear little children laugh
> When the drums roll and the lovely
> Lady is sawn in half.
>
> (CP: 403)

Ambivalence produced by the clown corresponds to a dubious position of an audience placed between the Sea of Life and the Mirror of Art. The coexistence of 'dolour' and 'dollar' from Shakespeare's play on the one hand, and 'the wounded' coupled with 'the clown [that] doubles his meaning' in Auden's poem on the other, they both ask for a reconciliation that is only possible in Art obliterating a contrast between the Real and the Unreal.

Contrary to Prospero in *The Tempest*, Prospero in *The Sea and the Mirror* finds language as extreme impossibility when confronted with a metaphysical quest:

> Yet if I speak, I shall sink without a sound
> Into unmeaning abysses. Can I learn to suffer
> Without saying something ironic or funny
> On suffering? I never suspected the way of truth
> Was a way of silence where affectionate chat
> Is but a robbers' ambush and even good music
> In shocking taste;
>
> (CP: 409)

Characters in *The Tempest* have learnt that Truth as absolute meaning is impossible in language tainted with polysemy. Auden makes his Prospero project this impossibility onto the Unnameable – the Sublime of meandering existence that may only be approached through silence or through denying language its nature of naming things and of establishing sense.

Ultimately, language succeeds in its failure to represent reality, and estrangement from Truth becomes the only possible mode of being. Caliban in Auden's poem thus diagnoses an ontological status of Art, which is primarily the Art of Word:

> ...we are blessed by that Wholly Other Life from which we are separated by an essential emphatic gulf of which our contrived fissures of mirror and proscenium arch – we understand them at last – are feebly figurative signs, so that all our meanings are reversed and it is precisely in its negative image of Judgement that we can positively envisage Mercy; it is just here, among the ruins and the bones, that we may rejoice in the perfected Work which is not ours (CP: 444).

Auden 'intertextualises' here the Renaissance understanding of mimesis that must be now validated by Negation. The Augustan metaphor of Art as 'Mirror held up to Nature' is partly reflected in Auden's concept of 'negative knowledge.' Man as separated from the Absolute by limits of human imperfection can approach only the tangible, physical and time-bound reality – the here and now of Caliban's immediacy. Therefore no man can possibly dare to define the nature of absolute reality. It is gradually revealed by bits of negated reality and thus perceived as 'the absolute-is-not-what-we-know.' The imperfect knowledge of Art in Auden is voiced by Caliban, who begins to 'feel something in all its drabness and sham.' His religious consciousness clearly bears traces of spiritual education Caliban in *The Tempest* goes through:

> *Cal.* ....and I'll be wise
> hereafter,
> And seek for grace. What a thrice-double
> ass
> Was I to take this drunkard for a god,
> And worship this dull fool!
>
> (AT: 294-297)

As a deformed slave to Prospero who has taught him language ("I know how to curse. The red plague / rid you / For learning me your language!" says Caliban in Act 1), Caliban is brought to the point of a conscious religious choice.

In *The Sea and the Mirror* he throws discredit on the idolatry of Art, which is also a religious gesture. He touches upon the question of an ideal Work of Art 'that is not ours' and may be only negatively intuited in language, which reminds one of the medieval mystical dogma of 'the way up is the way down.' In Auden's poem, the closer one approaches the Work of Art, the thinner become linguistic means. When Caliban feels he is nearly speechless and in a way parts with the language which so far, it appears, has served only as a prop in the existential landscape, this is clearly a moment in which he seems to be embracing reality as it is. The agreement of substituting words for objects is now annulled as it were and a quasi-paradisal unity of words and reality is restored.

Whereas Shakespeare may have believed his play represented mimetically some portion of reality, Auden sees both dramatic and poetic Art as a consciousness-raising tool of estrangement, securing distance from immediate physicality. His Caliban is a counter-image of Shakespeare's horrible slave, which intensifies intertextuality as one sees it against background of Bakhtin's concept of 'dialogisation' playing a crucial part in the Kristevan model. In Bakhtin, any reference to the already existing texts or systems of discourses becomes intensified, the more an original text and a new one are contradistinguished ideologically and semantically.

Caliban as employed by Auden is a significant mark of the Kristevan 'semiotic polyvalence' that is 'tabulated' in Auden's poem and now represents, in the most ironic way, the ultimate aesthetic and religious consciousness. In Shakespeare's play he stands for a myth of savage origins and untamed instincts; in Auden he possesses the awareness of 'mimesis' that in the classical understanding refers to the construction of an object according to verisimilitude and not to truth. Auden's Caliban is posited as a subject of enunciation and represents poetic language as a possessor of meaning which is always grammatical and syntactic in its nature (Kristeva 1984: 57). Indeed, he may be seen as an emblem of simulation whose self-sufficiency undermines the power of an image and whose autonomy produces truth of its own design. To put it in Jean Baudrilliard's terms, he is "not unreal, but a simulacrum, never exchanging for what is real, but exchanging in itself, in an uninterrupted circuit without reference or circumference" (*The Precession of Simulacra* in Storey 1994: 364).

It is of considerable importance here that for Kristeva:

> Transposition plays an essential role [...] inasmuch as it implies the abandonment of a former sign system, the passage to a second via an *instinctual intermediary* [italics mine] common to the two systems, and the articulation of the two systems, and the articulation of the new system with its new representability (Kristeva 1984: 83).

'Representability' denotes the specific expression of the thetic and the semiotic as a sign system. Although Auden does not entirely replace the former sign system or the universe of Shakespeare's play with a world governed by Caliban's intelligence, the two texts intersect each other in a moment of a religious discovery and some epiphany of language pointing out towards the *un*-nameable preconditioned by the known and the verifiable. The act of speech then acquires a stance of a religious rite one goes through in order to transcend the hampering contours of Caliban's monstrosity.

Another significant intertextual link concerns political implications raised by Shakespeare's play and reversibly carried on by Auden's speakers. Gonzalo in *The Tempest* thus envisages his ideal state:

> *Gon.* I' th' commonwealth I would by
> contraries
> Execute all things; for no kind of traffic
> Would I admit; no name of magistrate;
> Letters should not be known; riches,
> poverty,
> And use of service, none; contract,
> succession,
> Bourn, bound of land, tilth, vineyard,
> none;
> No use of metal, corn, or wine, or oil;
> And women too, but innocent and pure;
> No sovereignty –
> (AT: 140-149)

A weird prerequisite seems to control the vision of the commonwealth. "No name of magistrate; / Letters should not be known" says Gonzalo, which is equal to a primordial absence of language and to a state of paradisal happiness – the world of semiotic essence of things. It is the vision that essentially excludes any authority automatically calling for verbal representation and political control endangered by ambivalence immanent in a language.

Prospero in *The Sea and the Mirror*, when setting Ariel free, spreads out an image of anti-commonwealth:

> Wind up, though, on a moral note: –
> That Glory will go bang,
> Schoolchildren shall co-operate,
> And honest rogues must hang;
> Because our sound committee man
> Has murder in his heart:
> But should you catch a living eye,
> Just wink as you depart.
> (AT: 152)

The politics (the pluralistic strategy generating multiple meanings) of a larger social plane in Gonzalo's speech is shifted here to a province of disintegrating morality, and becomes a politics of heart. Thus a pastoral society in Gonzalo's vision and 'honest rogues' in Prospero's farewell to Ariel in *The Sea and the Mirror* exemplify this change of the thetic position and of denoted objects, which change conditions any transposition or '*inter*-textuality.'

In view of the above considerations, Kristeva's 'instinctual intermediary' in the case of Auden's poem 'inter-textualising' *The Tempest* is significantly related to a *meta*-consciousness of a work of Art primarily and ultimately exercised in language that becomes a device of religious estrangement or transcendence of a speaking subject.

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Sublime Modes of Presentation

The purpose of this paper is to present an aspect of Lyotard's perspective of the sublime in the light of recent analyses of Jean-Luc Nancy, Philippe Lacoute-Labarthe and Jacob Rogozinsky which is the relation between the sublime and *mimésis* (or the notion of presentation as such). I will try to extract the gist of the analyses mentioned above, but without drawing any specific conclusions. My intention is just to indicate the direction in which these recent philosophical and analytic 'thinkings of the sublime' evolve, what areas they cover and what kind of discourse they employ.

I. The sublime – Lyotard's perspective

At the outset let us briefly recall the basic tenets of Lyotard which led him to the concept of the sublime.

In the course of the 20th century two major narrative types: (1) that of human liberation associated with the Enlightenment and the revolutionary tradition and (2) that of the prospective unity of all knowledge associated with Hegelianism, both lost their credibility. The Enlightenment project produced a range of social and political disasters: from modern warfare, Auschwitz and the Gulag to nuclear threat and severe ecological crisis. The results of modernisation have been bureaucracy, oppression and misery as the Enlightenment narrative of liberation and equality turned into its opposite. Thus, in Lyotard's view, we deprived ourselves of the source for any truth claims. This decline of transcendentality brought in its wake not only the fall of grand narratives, but also dilution of the criteria, which had so far safeguarded the existence of objective reality. In modern-day world reality is not what is *given*, but is rather a state of the *referent* which results from certain establishment procedures defined by a unanimously agreed upon protocol. This relativism of values deprived art of its core. Since there are no absolute rules of artistic practice and no objective reality to be mirrored, there is no source of legitimation for art as such. All attempts to breach the chasm

between cognitive, ethical and political discourses, are seen by Lyotard as Hegel's 'transcendental illusion.' In present conditions, totality and unity of experience are impossible.

It is so, because in Lyotard's view the criteria regulating the 'truth claims' of knowledge derive from discrete, context-dependent 'language games' and not from absolute rules or standards. A new source of legitimation emerges thus from modest *petits récits* – emancipated from any claims for universality and indebted to the radical *avant-garde* imperative to constantly experiment. In Lyotard's perspective modern art takes place according to the sublime relation between presentable and conceivable – it no longer attempts to reconcile this eternal conflict but its only aesthetic purpose is to accentuate it. Therefore the sublime became the fundamental aesthetic category for modernists and postmodernists – their aim was to present the fact that there is unpresentable. Within this relation (i.e. between presentable and conceivable) it is possible to distinguish two modes. The nuance that distinguishes those two may be infinitesimal, but nevertheless exists, and is the one of emphasis. Lyotard claims that it can be placed either on the powerlessness of the faculty of presentation or on the power of the faculty to conceive. That is for him the difference between modernist and postmodernist artist. The modernist one would rather tend towards nostalgia for presence and concentrate on expressing art's helplessness in respect of (re)presentation of the unpresentable, whereas postmodernist would choose even infinitesimal satisfaction which stems from the possibility of inventing new rules of the game, with the full awareness that art: (1) gives up universality, (2) accepts the fact that all artistic solutions are temporary (3) accepts that there is no transcendental reality and (4) submits itself, as it always has, to the compulsion of constant experimenting.

The postmodern aesthetic then can be thought of as an investigative aesthetic of the sublime, two main features of which include de-realisation of the objects of aesthetic feelings and the absence of the real aesthetic faculty of knowing.

II. The sublime – presentation and *mimésis*

Lyotard claims that there are concepts, usually connected with infinity or totality, to which no presentation is possible. Any object or symbol strikes us then as painfully inadequate. In these moments we experience the feeling of the sublime which is pleasure (of conceiving) and pain (caused by our inability to present an object corresponding to the concept). Since the real sublime sentiment, which is an intrinsic combination of pleasure and pain, is not anything outside us, it must be a purely aesthetic judgement. This judgement is indispensably linked with, and takes place within the problematics of representation or *mimésis*. But if the sublime is the expression of our helplessness in the face of the unpresentable, how can we present it? Following Kant, Lyotard recourses to the idea of negative presentation – presentation of the inexpressible as the missing

content or absence of form. From this perspective modern art is seen as making allusions to the unpresentable, leading to the unpresentable indirectly, almost without any figural representation. This notion of 'negative presentation' caused much criticism and commotion among literary critics. Can we really do away with all figurality, as Lyotard suggests? Is there anything like a 'negative presentation'? After all, any presentation – be it negative or indirect – is still always a presentation and in this way it is always, in the last analysis, direct and positive. If that is so, how can we then reconcile Lyotard's claims about the death of *mimésis* and his almost axonomic postulates that there is no more objective reality and concepts related to representation lost their grounding?

Philippe Lacoute-Labarthe approached this controversial issue in his article *La Vérité Sublimé*. Labarthe meticulously analysed the notion of presentation, drawing upon thoughts of Hegel, Heidegger and Kant and averred that *there is no other determination of being other than eidetical.* This, he added, can be supported by all classical interpretations of the sublime, Burkean included. Then Labarthe commenced a very intricate analysis of the statement of Isis (included in Kant's *Critique*) and divine law concerning prohibition of representation given to Moses – which are canonical examples of Lyotard's sublime as the presentation of the unpresentable. Both are God's announcements, both represent the theme of epistemological transcendence, both are conveyed by some means or other, and both are closed by certain form of prohibition or, to put it otherwise, by a specific *announcement of impossibility*. Since the announcement on the temple of Isis is constative and not prescriptive (i.e. pronounces the mystery in an esoteric style, creating metaphors, which in turn would sustain it) and heralds the truth presenting the essence of the divinity, which could never be unveiled, it is considered as absolutely sublime. Not only does it confirm the impossibility of metaphysics understood as truth, but also presents or testifies to the fact that unpresentable exists. These are known implications of the announcement of Isis.

Nevertheless, if we interpret it as a metaphor, added Labarthe, then the unpresentable would be thought of as 'the unveilable' and that would make a great difference. It would do so because this prosopopoeia of Nature as totality, or of the being as totality (since it is precisely the totality in itself, that is: the unity of all being, which is 'unveilable') would be at the same time the prosopopoeia of truth. Therefore Labarthe claims that 'the statement of Isis is not merely the announcement of the truth, but the announcement of the truth inside truth' (Labarthe: 124). Such notion means that either such presentation of the unveilable would simply be a contradictory idea, an oxymoron (which was the conclusion of Hegel's, because to say the truth is to unveil it[1]) or it would entail a claim that *the essence of truth*

[1] Hegel quoted the inscription of Isis, but at the same time claimed that it was incomplete, since originally it also contained the following sentence: 'The fruit I have born is Helios (the sun god).' Hegel, therefore, commented that this brightness of the sun is the Spirit. In such a manner he was able to solve his dilemma – the truth of the Truth was simple unveiling, just as the pure light of the sun was the simplest escape from the night. In this light, the Spirit is seen as the

is untruth or, to put it in other words, that the essence of unveiling is veiling. Much as it seems paradoxical, noticed Labarthe, it deserves our attention, because similar notion also functions in Heidegger's second work on origins of art and also resurges in his analysis of *a-letheia*. In it, Heidegger aimed to prove that the essence of *aletheia* was the *lethe* (the essence of unveiling is veiling). At the same time he stipulated that such statement did not mean that truth at its core was falsehood, but it meant that it is never itself but always *also* its contradiction. Shortly, it accommodates in itself both possibilities.

In this light the opening from which the being could present itself as such, the opening itself would be 'more being' (*plus étante*) than the being itself. Labarthe also pointed out that the veiling as presented by Heidegger is of double nature: on the one hand it is concealment of instability (*instabilité dissimulante*; *Verstellen*), that is the being which 'shines before being,' the veil, a gift for that which is not; but on the other, it is the refusal (*Versagen*) which affects being at its core. So 'the being refuses itself for us from that point of simplification, when we do not recognize neither part as better, because, while being, we are unable to say what is' (p. 127). This, stressed Labarthe, is exactly what we are faced with in the example of Isis, because the refusal is precisely that which is being announced by the statement: 'No mortal has ever lifted my veil.' It is the limit (*la finitude*), but on the condition of understanding it as 'something more than just the limit of knowing.' Heidegger defined it as 'the beginning of enlightening of the illuminated,' in other words, the very possibility of the unveiling.

By the above argumentation Labarthe attempted to confirm such an understanding of the sublime, where 'the presentation of the infinite would annihilate the presentation itself.' He supported his notion by theses of Heidegger, who thought of the manifestation (i.e. any 'figural' representation of the spirit) as eidetical presentation of being. Of course, being presented in this category would not always be feasible to be thought of and would never be like *eidos* but rather it would figure or install itself in a statue, in *Gestalt* (p. 131). For Heidegger, work of art was not simply a being, but rather the opening of what the being is. Consequently, because it is *Dassheit* of being that is at stakes, the presentation as figuration descends into a second plan.

At this stage of analysis and with the aid of arguments presented above, Labarthe attempted to annihilate the presumable negativity of the sublime, claiming that in the motive of reserve, escape or suspension there is no negative value. He reached the definition of the sublime – slightly different from Lyotard's – instead of *the presentation of the fact that the unpresentable is* (which would still imply certain 'negative being' and postulate 'negative presentation'), Labarthe discovered the sublime as *the presentation of the fact that there is presentation*

consciousness of the self and of the subject, whereas in Kant this statement was left in its paradoxal contradiction, which did not involve jubilation – as in the case of Hegel – but a 'sacred thrill' (Labarthe: 126).

(p. 131). Thus, he concluded, some kind of 'positive comprehension' of the sublime can take place, and only then the sublime would resolve in high art.

According to Labarthe this 'positive comprehension' allows us to rethink the essence of art in the philosophical aspect of the sublime and inaugurates a new search for the conditions under which the high (sublime) art is possible. If we go back to the source – to Longinus' treatise – we can find there a postulate that the sublime *calls for certain measures and techniques* (i.e. is connected with *techné* or literary 'know how'). This is why Labarthe impeached opinions that the sublime is an innate idea, and thus eludes and escapes all didactics. Longinus based his elaborations on the inherited after platonism division between the innate and the acquired. Because the given, the innate, is a gift of nature, it is also that which resurges in art through a prism of *phusis* itself. This understanding, averred Labarthe, has dominated the problematic of the sublime since Kant, who defined sublime artist (a spiritualized genius) while saying:

> Genius is a natural gift, which imposes the rules of art. Because talent, similarly to inborn productive faculty of the artist, belongs to the nature, one could put it in the following terms: talent is the innate power of the spirit, through which the nature transmits the rules of art (Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, p. 86, as quoted in Labarthe).

Longinus' claims were similar and his reciprocal relation between *techné* and *phusis* was the same. But if the epistemological transcendence of the sublime rests upon the fact that it presents its object, i.e. itself, as epistemologically inaccessible, in what sense can one say that the sublime finds its impetus in *phusis* (genius or spirit) and in the *techné* at the same time? Labarthe noticed that the *phusis* assigned to the sublime is autonomous, that is it is a law unto itself and it is this (according to both Kant and Longinus) that gives the rules of art which, at the same time, are not devoid of 'some method.' So, the natural gift still remains within certain rules, methodics, and the spirit of genius in itself gets its rules from nature (Labarthe: 134). That is why Longinus could assert that the *phusis* is to be found in all things as a principle and archetypal element of all the creation. The method of the *techné* resolves itself simply in *a joyous accomplishment of the natural gift*. At the same time, we can see that the *techné* is not thought of as a kind of regulation of the natural possibility or as a possibility to control it. It is expressive of sublime experience, but eludes theories. And it is in this limited sense, Labarthe concluded, that sublime art takes over from the *techné*.

Labarthe defined the structure which determines the relation between *techné* and *phusis* as a kind of 'necessary supplementation': only art (*techné*) is able to reveal spirit (the *phusis*). To put it in other words, without *techné* the *phusis* derobes itself, because in its essence it aims at dissimulating itself. This claim is exactly the same as the one in Aristotle who, in the 4th chapter of his *Poetics*, asserted that the poetic art is the *techné*, that is *mimésis* – the representation. Labarthe thus concluded that the *techné* in art is the production of knowing – it is most probably for those reasons that Heidegger would translate with all consequence *techné* as *Wissen*. This knowing could arrive solely by means of the

mimésis, where *mimésis* is understood as *a faculty of rendering present* in general, of representing, but not in a sense of copying once again, reproducing in a common meaning of this word. It is rather in a sense: *to render present that which has a need to be rendered present*, that is this without which present in itself would not exist. *Mimésis* understood in such a sense would be a representation, a precondition for any knowing that there is such a thing as being, even if this being will be known as veiled and ultimately unpresentable. In either case, we would get some picture of it. With those considerations in view and because *mimésis* defines the rapport of knowing it by means of *phusis*, *mimésis* is similar to, as if discovers the *phusis* as such.

In this way Labarthe proved that *mimésis* is still present in modern art, although its definition had changed into that of 'faculty of rendering present that without which the present would not be itself.' This interpretation seems to offer a novel solution. Re-definition of the *mimésis* as a particular mode of artistic reaction on the world finds its strength in the simple fact that it is precisely this act of presentation – no matter whether the presented is recognized as unpresentable, unnameable or not – that constitutes our possibility of knowing that the world is.

What are the consequences of the survival of the *mimésis*? How could it affect Lyotard's thesis? Assuming that redefined *mimésis* is thought of as apophantic (whose nature is denial or concealment) and if the sublime (high) art stems in some sense from *techné* as it was proved by Labarthe, then *techné* should help it in a *phusis*. At the same time we realize that what is being aimed at in high art, is *the superhuman*, which is nothing that by its definition could be reproduced, because high art is not an affair of *eidos* – it is not essentially a matter of 'already seen, or already present.' Consequently, we can infer that in the sublime as such, high art should obliterate itself. That is to say, *techné* accomplishes its end when it seems to be *phusis*, and the *phusis* prevails because it encircles the *techné* dissimulating it in appearance. In conformity with its apophantic function *mimésis* should make the *phusis*, the natural *pathos*, surge up. But in this kind of presentation, under the apparition of the *phusis*, the *techné* effaces itself. It becomes the same thing as the *phusis* which it reveals. The climax of the *mimésis* would then lie in its veiling and its dissimulation.

Longinus suggested that the sublime in truth should be thought of as indicating, revealing factor of that which is (*phusis*). Then *techné*, (*mimésis*) would be the illumination of the *phusis*, which is, literally and in all sense, the truth of all high art. That is why high art cannot perceive itself; the brightness it emits shadows its source. Such art does not come into a presence of any form, figure or *schemé*. It just presents, 'unpresenting' itself, that there is the present being. The sublime reveals itself through the brilliance and brightness. In the last analysis, suggested Labarthe, if we accept that redefined *mimésis* is apophantic and dissimulates itself since such veiling lies in its very nature then the borderline between the sublime (unbearable brightness or the unpresentable) and so understood *mimésis* gets blurred. In short, one could say that the sublime is mimetic and *mimésis* is sublimity.

Jean-Luc Nancy approached the matter from slightly different perspective. For him, the sublime forms until our time the mode of thinking uninterrupted since the beginning of modern times. Although it does not always bear its name, it is always present, mainly because of the fact that under the motive of the sublime announces itself a necessity of art's modern destiny. Nancy says:

> ...the thinking of the end of art which suppresses art as art and consecrates it as a philosophy, which suppresses the philosophy as a discourse and conserves it as art – as a pure art of a pure thinking – this thinking has the sublime as its exact reverse. This doesn't connote that there are two thinkings of art thus standing against each other or facing each other. It signifies above all that there is one thinking which absorbs art and another which thinks it in the direction of its destination. And the second one is thinking of the sublime (Nancy: 41).

As long as for Hegel the ultimate end of art was the presentation, Kant understood that the stake of art was not any representation of truth but the presentation of freedom. And this is precisely that mode of thinking which, according to Nancy, is engaged in the thinking of the sublime. If the aesthetic judgement is a free play of imagination (as defined in Kant's *Third Critique*) then, basically, art should not represent anything, neither in beauty nor in the sublime. The imagination thus construed would not signify a subject which moulds something in image. It would simply signify:

> .....the image which is being imagined, not as a figure of something else, but as a form which is being formed (at the time of its forming), a unity arriving at multiplicity, occurring in multiplicity, in the sensible multiplicity, simply as a unity, without an object or a subject – and so without an end. It is precisely from here, from this general situation of the free aesthetic presentation, that the respective games of the sublime and the beautiful can be appreciated (Nancy: 43).

Imagination which schematises without concepts would schematise itself into an aesthetic judgement. And this is precisely what it, in some sense, does; it presents itself as a unity and it presents that unity to itself, presenting nothing else than itself, presenting – so to say – the faculty of the presentation in its free play, that is presenting the presented or *representing*. Here that which presents – the subject – is the presented. Therefore, according to Nancy, in the sublime the unity of spirit, spirit as a unity, and the agreement of the faculties operates in imagination or more precisely as imagination which presents itself to itself.

That autopresentation would then be the presentation of the technique of the reason in itself, a technique thought of as an original or ultimate nature of the reason, according to which the reason evokes itself, operates, figurates itself and presents itself. Nancy eluded the controversies that Lyotard had evoked with the notion of negative presentation, elucidating that in the case of the sublime *we do not deal with the presentation nor with impresentation* (i.e. the infinite posited by the side of the presentation of the finite and constructed upon an analogue model). The sublime rather initiates and indicates a movement to the infinite or,

more exactly, in the direction of illimitability, 'which takes place by the side, on the edge of the limited and so on the edge of the presentation' (p. 51). But since we're allowed to speak about 'the unlimited' as of 'something' which takes place 'somewhere' it is because with the sentiment of the sublime we are being offered an apprehension of this illimitability. The unlimited commences at the external edge of the limited, but it not only commences but also never ends. Thus the sublime, understood as infinity, and taking place in such space is *the infinity of commencements*.

Nancy claims that the sublime does not make a figure nor an infinite image, but it is an infinite *movement*. The sublime is always 'engaged'; whether it is 'anything' or it 'makes' an aesthetics it will invariably be an aesthetics of movement always confronted with the aesthetics of being.[2] Nancy added also that probably this movement would not be a movement in any of the senses connoted by this word. It would be the unlimited commencement of the delimitation of the form and in consequence a 'being of a form' and the 'form of being.'

Because this illimitability is not a number but a gesture, or if one prefers, a motion of the infinite, there cannot be any presentation of the infinite in the infinite. Having confronted such dilemma, Kant turned to the negative (indirect) presentation as if – noticed Nancy – he were embarrassed when faced with a contradiction of *presentation without presentation*. However, any presentation – be it negative or indirect – is still always a presentation. Having acknowledged this fact, Nancy reached the conclusion that the sublime permeating the Kantian text did not confront itself with the logic of the representation (i.e. when something takes a place of something else) *nor* with the logic of absence (i.e. when a thing is missing from its place). The sublime is neither a matter of pure presentation, nor of the adequacy or inadequacy.

> It is all a matter of something else, which takes place, which arrives or happens in the presentation itself and in sum by it, but which is not a presentation. This is that motion by which incessantly the unlimited denudes itself, delimits itself just on the edge of the limited which delimits itself in presentation (p. 54).

Nancy called that movement the offering (*l'offrandre*). For him the secret of the sublime apart from that of a schematism is that the presentation *really* takes place, but it does not present anything. He claimed that the pure presentation, presentation of the presentation itself, or presentation of the totality does not present anything. One could say without doubts in a certain logic that it presents nothing but *the nothing*. In other words that it presents the unpresentable. Nevertheless, this offering does not take place in the present. That which is being

[2] This of course, refers to the aesthetics of beautiful. According to Nancy the sublime takes place in the same spot as the beautiful and although they are not identical they *are* both presentation, but of that kind that the beautiful is *the presented in the presentation* and the sublime is *a presentation in its motion* – which is an absolute removal (*l'enlèvement*) of the unlimited along the edge of limited. In Nancy's view what removes itself, is all form; all forms as such, all figures are small in regard to the unlimited in the face of which they denude themselves.

offered remains in certain distance, suspended on the edge of reception, on the edge of acceptation.

Should we then understand the sublime as devoid of any form? As we know from Kant to be judged sublime the phenomenon cannot be absolutely deprived of a form and the illimitation which defigures it should add through thinking the notion of its totality. Besides, it has to be (as postulated by Kant) *the plurality considered as unity*. If this totality would not be perceptible, then the phenomena would be judged as monstrous. We know that the sublime indeed elevates itself to the edge of the monstrous but under the menace of falling into it, or into deformation, it is never absolutely in-formal. It preserves some traits of a form, even under the pressure of the chaos. Moreover, from the text of the *Third Critique* it is clear that the sublime does not resolve into monstrous or hideous, but only preserves the guise of the form tossed in chaos. This peculiar form deprived of figure offers itself only for deformation, and is probably the most pure of all forms.

The relation of the sublime to form was meticulously analysed by Jacob Rogozinsky in his work *Le Don Du Monde*. Can there be a presentation, or, in Rogozinsky's words: schematization, of the sublime? On the one hand it is only an aesthetic judgement which reaches us from within, but on the other it does come about through some medium. Rogozinsky noticed that Kant himself defined this medium in one word: violence. The schematism of the sublime presupposes extreme tension of the imagination, which evokes in us contradictory emotion. This double effect reveals violence of the reason which forces 'aggrandizement' of the imagination and sensibility to the infinite, opening it for an abyss of ideas. The individual arrives then simultaneously at fear and attraction (Rogozinsky: 186). Against the effort of the imagination to schematise the ideas, the reason 'exercises the violence' upon sensibility. Once again defeated and submitted to reason, the imagination puts its violence in the service of the ideas. If this is so, noticed Rogozinsky, to be able to exercise 'by itself' the violence of the reason, imagination should already be violent by itself (p. 190).

Kant described the sublime as 'the impossibility of the imagination to present the idea in its totality; in the effort to do that the imagination reaches its summit and in an attempt to surpass its maximum, indeed itself, crumbles into the abyss of itself' (Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 91, as quoted in Rogozinsky). However, from the perspective of the *Transcendental Analytics* such failure of the imagination was inconceivable! According to Kant, imagination is the faculty of synthesis, which gathers the fragments, differences, and brings them to unity. This is its 'indispensable function, without which we would never have any knowing' (p. 93). If imagination would cease to work then the unity of experience would disappear and the world of phenomena would become, as Kant put it, 'a blind game of representations, that is even less than a dream' (p. 126). Elaborating on this contradiction, Rogozinsky recognised that unity of

experience can be reached by violence of reason on imagination and by violence of imagination on time.[3]

This violent synthesis of the imagination reduces time to a continuous and uniform series of 'nows,' it entrusts the temporality to the reigns of the present, to 'now-ness' of time. And it is precisely this 'now-ness,' this present, which is the violence.

Rogozinsky explained it in the following manner: the form of all the forms is time, but since time does not let itself to be presented and its form is infigurable, we search to supplement this want by the analogics representing the sequence of the continuity of time by the line which prolongs to infinity. Because we have to exercise violence upon time to force it to stay in present, to represent the unpresentable of the original temporality by means of external intuition, it is only at the price of this violence that the synthesis of the imagination could constitute the 'fundamental representation' of time. The violence of the presence is the precondition for all re-presentation (Rogozinsky: 194). Rogozinsky asserted that only as a result of this violence upon time imagination can schematise it in order to arrive at the objective knowing. Then the scheme of reality, as perceived by the imagination, is precisely that continual and uniform production of realities in time. However, Rogozinsky noticed that the categorial schematisation operates with a restriction, a contraction which tightens up the horizon of the possible:

> While schematising, the imagination exercises violence on the possible. It engenders, creates and generates this monotonous time, mutilated of its possibilities, where the past and the future are the recidivists of the eternal present. Where the past is never gone, never delivered or pardoned, but untiringly reproduced by the synthesis of reproduction which summons it back to present as its obsessive fear. Where the future is deprived of adventure, already recognized by the synthesis of recognition, which identifies it in advance and awaits it there since always (p. 195).

This is ultimately what Rogozinsky thinks of the world created by imagination, which at the first glance appears as unity but remains so only under reason's and imagination's violences upon time. This suspension between already gone and not yet (*déjà-plus et pas-encore*) is of the greatest importance. It is there, that the sublime can take place – and this truth has been recognized not only by Rogozinsky, but also by Nancy, Lyotard, Sircello and many other critics and theoreticians of culture. The sublime is always 'still taking place' in its instability which is just another word for the transcendental defiguration and de-schematisation of the world. These two constitute the price by which the sublime succeeds, manages to schematise the infigurable time in the face of phenomena. It

[3] According to Kant the possibility of experience depends solely upon the synthetical liaison of the different. If all synthesis is violent, this elementary violence is the precondition for the possibility of any objective knowing, of all the experience and perception. That is why Rogozinsky concluded that the experience of the sublime reveals the violence inherent in the synthesis of the imagination, and the aesthetic of the sublime would be impossible if the pure imagination was not, in its essence, violent.

is because within the schemes that we ordinarily operate, the number of possible moves is limited. What is inconceivable within them is a rupture of temporality. The sublime breaks temporality and this is the transcendental liberty which it carries with itself. This transcendental liberty is understood by Rogozinsky as a power to commence a series of phenomena, which could never be admitted in a universe schematised by the synthesis of imagination, because its very possibility would threaten to destroy the necessary unity of experience (p. 196). And this is precisely what the sublime does. The freedom it connotes would be compatible only with the mutilated representation of time. What the sublime revelation discovers then, at the limits of the informal and at the risk of chaos, is the event of birth (*l'événement de la naissance*). This being-in-birth (*l'être-en-naissance*) is a possibility of the impossible. Rogozinsky claims that the sentiment of the sublime invades us in an instant where the chain sequence of the phenomena is broken, where time gives itself a new chance, delivering in one moment a horizon of new possibilities (p. 197). Therefore, the sublime sentiment discovers for us a pure form of space, irreducible to any agreed or abstract spatiality. The sublime schematises the freedom of the world, the possibility of commencements and so allows us to think of an aesthetics of novation, an aesthetics of the conversion and a politics of revolution.

Lyotard has been often accused of neglecting to demarcate a clear-cut distinction between the beautiful and the sublime. In a sense these reproaches seem to be right, but whether including this issue in his aesthetics would add any clarity to it is still another question. Taking into account multiplicity of approaches to the subject, its intricacy and vastness, one can be certain that the last words in the discussion on the place and role of the sublime in present day aesthetics, have not been said yet. One thing, however, is unimpeached: Lyotard's project – despite a few, unclear points – has been the most concise and relevant one to describe contemporary situation in art. Its major drawbacks were (1) Lyotard's insistence on the death of *mimésis* and necessity of the negative presentation and (2) his avoidance of the issue of the relationship between the sublime and the beautiful. Nevertheless, since 1980's, when the sublime became again topical, these two weak aspects of Lyotard's proposal have been thoroughly analysed by many authors, such as Jean-Luc Nancy, Jacob Rogozinsky, Philippe Lacoute-Labarthe, Guy Sircello and many others. In the light of these recent works, Lyotard's thesis about the sublime character of postmodern aesthetics appears even fuller and more tenable.

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Ideological Vulnerability of Imagery. T. S. Eliot's Jewish Representations

The very titles of Eliot's significant essays and lectures – *After Strange Gods: A Primer of Modern Heresy* (34), "The Idea of a Christian Society" (39), "Notes Towards the Definition of Culture" (48) and "The Aims of Education" (50) – are informative as to his major social and cultural concerns. Still, in his critical writing, Eliot claims the posture of absolute impartiality and elitist detachment within the realm of poetry. However, it is his poems that communicate Eliot's political and social stance, albeit in a veiled way, while his prose writings remain on the fringe of public interest now. Aggressive and spiteful as they were, the anti-Semitic pronouncements from Virginia lectures did not do much credit to the author, and years later Eliot tried to excuse savagery of his contemptuous tone by saying that he was "a very sick man" – thus putting his views down to his private worries (Ackroyd: 201). For his anti-Semitism Eliot received bashful criticism from America, however British notorious tolerance of eccentricity silenced his voice as a lecturer and an essayist. At most, the vehemence of his conclusions was thought to match equally ineffective anti-Semitic attacks of other writers of the 20s and the 30s, who jumped on the bandwagon of literary anti-Semitism. In this they followed Fascist mob dictators, whom they saw as a remedy against Bolshevism. Being fascinated by Mussolini, a mob hero, T. S. Eliot at the same time shared T. E. Hulme's elitism (the idea being that some people are better equipped for perception of absolute values), which was an initial contradiction in itself. His anti-Semitism might be also shaped under the influence of Ch. Maurras, whose royalist ideology replaced "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity" with "Work, Family and Country." Such was the general aura among the literati, while socially anti-Semitism in England took only a form of upper-class hooliganism.[1] Anti-Semitism of such people as Mosley and lady Unity Mitford was thought to be ill-judged rather than threatening. On general

[1] Cf C. Cox, pp. 116–117, 155-156.

scale anti-Semitism would break the code of English tolerance towards sects and odd beliefs (though there actually were cases of quotas or ban that limited admission of Jewry to schools).[2] So literary expression of anti-Semitism did not wreck any serious influence and Eliot's anti-Semitic pronouncements dispersed without much echo in England. As put by I. Calvino literature is politically most effective when it challenges authority and is submitted to persecution,[3] which was not the case with Eliot's writing.

There remains, however, the question of individual responsibility for the spreading of verbal images. So the aim of this essay is to examine Eliot's anti-Semitic imagery as revealing his personal political myth and not as politically harmful. It is not to neglect the impact of literature, but rather not to exaggerate its effectiveness, as the English or American writer – if contrasted with the Polish one – is not elevated to the status of a national moral authority. They are allowed to speak for themselves and do not necessarily function as a speaking mouth of their country. Consequently literature can be treated as an exploration of individual awareness rather than a "depository of a given truth".[4]

Following I. Calvino's stance with respect to literature's involvement in politics, the assumed attitude should not be that of appraisal or condemnation, but of mistrust, which allows to trace the implications of particular depiction's of the Jew figure. The vein of mistrust "[...] does not influence literature alone: it can also be useful in politics, enabling that science to discover how much of it is no more than verbal construction, myth, literary topos" (Walder: 101). The depiction of Jewry is stereotype creating but at the same time it is reflective of already existent patterns of imagination and mythological thinking. The shape of Eliot's personal myth of culture and politics emerges as the interplay of his private concerns and of the public patterns of thought which slip into the text beyond writer's conscious control. P. Macherey will view the writer as a secondary cause of the text, having located the first and primary cause of the text in the ideology that underwrites it[5] (which seems partly reminiscent of I. Calvino's view of an author as voicing social unconscious and, even furthur, of the assumptions of apparently dated archetypal criticism). In P. Marcherey's opinion this hidden ideology can be arrived at only by refusing to follow explicitly stated intentions and instead asking questions about implied prejudices and beliefs. This way the text becomes a trick diverting attention from its ideological foregrounding, or an evocative shortcut to implant ideology in the reader's mind. Yet neither an image nor its silenced implications have any priority over each other. The meaning is generated from the tension which arises between them (*ibid.*: 217-220). With regard to T. S. Eliot, this is the tension between the verbal depiction of the Jew and Eliot's idea of society and culture which underwrites it.

[2] Cf N. Annan, pp. 174-275, 281.
[3] Cf D. Walder, pp. 90-91.
[4] As rendered by I. Calvino in D. Walder, p. 101.
[5] Cf D. Walder, pp. 217-220.

Similarly, W. Benjamin views pictures or images as saturated with and productive of political meaning. He points out the fact that the distinguishing factor of modernity is transformation of the world into an image: "The world picture (*Bild*) now means structured image (*Gebild*) that is the product of the subject's representational capacity (*des vorstellenden Herstellens*). The modern subject creates reality in representation. He produces (*herstellen*) the world by reproducing it in representation (*vorstellen*)" (Bazargan: 232). Consequently, the world of politics and history is engendered by and confined within the reservoir of imagery. So if one rivets attention to images, one can dismantle the whole ideological continuum they evoke. At this point it would be pertinent to refer again to W. Benjamin for his critical and metaphorical term, the "monads." Benjamin treats the ideology invested stretch of history as an allegory which features images he calls "monads." By scrutinising the status of images-monads one can be subversive of the imposed vision of history (Bazargan: 231-246). Following this line of reasoning one can focus on analogical poetic "monads" in Eliot's myth of culture and politics. It may be also noted that the concept of "monads" (i.e. images invested with ideology) may be viewed in perspective of E. Pound's idea of poetic "nodes." In Pound's formulation an image is "[...] a radiant node or cluster [...] a vortex from which and through which, and into which ideas are constantly rushing " (Levenson: 128). In both views the stress is on discontinuity and almost independent status of images as loaded with meaning engendering potential.

The critical vulnerability of imagery was recognised by T. S. Eliot himself. By pointing out the incoherences and weaknesses of Romantic imagery, for instance, Eliot dismantled the old literary canon thus performing the task of a liberator of literary works, and freeing them from the confines of authoritative Victorian taste. Yet, soon, he built up a flagrantly comprehensive and compelling historical and literary structure of his own. In turn, Eliot's own poetic output betrays a framework of ideological continuum he himself was entangled within.

The image of the Jew, random as this choice may seem, is a crystallisation of beliefs and prejudices that are housed in Eliot's work. The most egregious and explicit evidence is included in "Burbank with a Baedeker..." and "Gerontion," yet "Sweeney Among the Nightingales" and "Portrait of a Lady" include some oblique anti-Jewish allusions in their epigraphs which are taken from Ch. Marlow's *Jew of Malta*. Scanty as these references may seem, they are backed up by remarks which were included in Eliot's unpublished correspondence and, first of all, in offensive lectures Eliot delivered in the USA in the 30's. Here, T. S. Eliot regards "the undesirable number of free-thinking Jews" (Eliot, *After...*: 20) as a threat to the homogeneity of American society. The leading question of the following quarry will concern non-schismatic or orthodox Jews. Were the equally undesirable?

As Eliot's biographer, P. Ackroyd, remarks Eliot was never to live down his anti-Semitic pronouncements (Ackroyd: 201). In the same lectures he attacked

E. Pound and D. H. Lawrence, for which he tried to apologise 25 years later. In the early 70's Eliot insisted that his anti-Semitic sentiments should be removed from the preface to W. Lewis *Selected Letters* (Ackroyd: 331). And most probably they did not do him much justice as his anti-Semitism was not an isolated phenomenon. Leonard Woolf, himself a Jew, remarked: "I think T. S. Eliot was slightly anti-Semitic in the sort of a vague way which is not uncommon. He would have denied it quite genuinely" (Ackroyd: 303-304). Yet the charge was levelled against him in letters that were sent by Jewish people after the Second World War. His anti-Semitic and fascist sympathies were thought particularly outrageous in post-war America, where he was singled out for abuse in 1948 as a member of the Jury of the Fellows of the Library of Congress (*ibid.*: 297). Before that George Boas, a philosopher and one of his friends, had sent him a letter, in which in response to anti-Jewish Virginia lectures, he promised to "rid (Eliot) of the company of one" (*ibid.*: 201).

Greatly offensive as Eliot's anti-Semitic remarks were they were not consistent enough to be treated as a well-balanced part of a coherent ideology. They were just a tip of the iceberg of his social anxieties. Also, they could be seen as undermining the much cherished modernist conviction of aesthetic self-absorption and non-involvement within the world of policy. In other words anti-Semitic overtones deny modernist pretensions at "abstractiondrang",[6] or predilection for pure form beyond the limits of history. By performing a subterfuge of ostensibly abstracting himself from the lived world (Lebenswelt) in his poetry, Eliot lapsed into deliberate creation of prescriptive social and cultural myth in his essays and lectures, though he insisted that his poetry was free from the interference of economic and political discourse.[7]

Yet, for the purpose of this essay it is assumed that imagery will disclose the power game behind its façade of appearances. And any view that ignores the fact of pertinence of imagery to politics is suspicious in itself, because, as implicated by B. Kruger, Baudrillard's feminist adversary: "it is a typical, even predictable ruse of power to say that it does not exist or that it has become an image which according to Baudrillard, 'bears no relation to reality whatever' " (Bazargan: 301). It is likewise suspicious that the poet so intensely aware of the difficulties posed by language and "the intolerable wrestle / With words and meanings" (*East Coker*, II) should be ignorant of the mind shaping and stereotype-creating potential of imagery.

[6] The term *"abstractiondrang"* is used to designate the modernist shunning out of the political and social reality, as advocated by T. E. Hulme under the impact of German aesthetics; in particular the theory of W. Worringer which is expounded in his *Abstraktion und Einfühlung*. Cf M. H. Levenson, pp. 94-102.

[7] This apparent claim of innocence of poetic imagery would find a potent support in J. Baudrillard's hypothesis, which is dismissive of ideology (with the reservation that an image was for Baudrillard levelled with the spectacular rather than with the verbal). With reference to the significance of imagery, J. Baudrillard writes: "The divinity was no fool: he sided with the iconolators, who never really believed in him, venerating only the simulacrum" (Bazargan: 299).

Imagery's efficacy in creating national stereotypes might seem especially alluring to the poet who was himself an expatriate, eager to assume British national identity. To accomplish this goal for a novice, there must be the other to identify oneself against, or to delineate borders. Hence practical usefulness of an image of a stranger who can function as an external wedge posing threat to national purity, or more specifically "free-thinking" Jewry that was supposed to jeopardize Eliot's ideal of a parochial community.

Eliot's parochial ideal was very ill-grounded itself. A perceptive critic of Eliot's Anglican stance, D. Davie points out that Eliot neglected actual disappearance of rural England at the end of the 19thc and its replacement with the working class and bourgeois, which had already been hailed by Th. Hardy. So the idea of return to the concept of rural Christian community would be a futile trial to turn the clock back. Further, he doubts whether Eliot actually "knew the country and the people he meant to speak for" (Litz: 181). And calls Eliot's application of Maurrasian categories an "initial miscalculation," as rural society could be prescribed for France or Ireland but not for England (*ibid.*: 183). Parochialism itself dominates attachment to the state and society as a whole. Eliot's grasp of a nation state seems feeble if compared with emphasis he puts on small local communities. His attitude to England and America was very ambiguous. As noted by P. Ackroyd he referred to Americans as "us" and at the same time spoke of the English as "we." Even after having adopted British citizenship he referred to himself as "metoikos" which is a Greek term for "resident alien" (Ackroyd: 88). Small community could offer something less elusive to identify oneself with than shifting citizenship. In the context of Eliot's devotion to the concept of a parish community, the figure of the Jew looms as a serious threat. The Jew is an alien element that disturbs perfect harmony between the landscape and the people (which is a queer Eliotic version of spiritus loci). In *After Strange Gods* Eliot voices his sentiment for regions "in which the landscape has been moulded by numerous generations of one race, and in which landscape in turn has modified the race to its own character"(Eliot, *After...*: 17). The above statement remains much in accordance with the views of ultra-conservative Southern Agrarians, and among them: R. P. Warren, A. Tate, C. Brooks and J. C. Ransom. R. H. Robbins, in a debunking treatise ("The Eliot Problem") demystifies the tricky New Criticism methodology, which, by riveting attention to the very aspect of formalistic congruity of a literary text, rendered its ideological communication unimportant. By performing this ruse – R. H. Robbins claims – they promoted extremely conservative and aggressive views and reacted "with resolute blindness" to Eliot's anti-Semitic imagery (Robbis: 169-205).

The sentiment for homogeneity of landscape and its inhabitants betrays a strongly anti-cosmopolitan note in Eliot's writing. Significantly enough the figure of the Jew is usually positioned within a multi-national millieu or has a share in the history of a random choice of European places. Thus in "Gerontion," "the Jew squats on the window sill, the owner / Spawned in some estaminet of

Antwerp, / Blistered in Brussels, patched and peeled in London." The history of his past wanderings lingers on as something foul, as advancing illness. Further, defilement spreads over the property he owns and onto the inhabitants of the rented house. The speaking persona of "Gerontion" uses the fact of apparent impurity to make up an excuse for his emotional and spiritual atrophia: "I have lost my passion: Why should I need to keep it / Since what is kept must be adulterated?" The prosaic echo of the quoted phrase one can find in *After Strange Gods...* There Eliot claims that "the population should be homogenous: where two or more cultures exist in the same place they are likely either to be fiercely self-conscious or both to become adulterate" (Eliot, *After...*: 19). The linking idea is that of "adulteration" rather than the possibility to enrich, permeat or exist as interlaced. The implications of infection, contamination and physical distortion are carried over to another poem of the same volume. In "Burbank" poem the abuse goes as far as the juxtaposition of the phrases: "The rats are underneath the piles. The Jew is underneath the lot. Money in furs [...]." Here, the cosmopolitan environment (Princess Volupine, Sir Ferdinand Klein, Burbank and the very site, Venice from a tourist's perspective) coincides with wealth. The quoted image opens onto what was called elsewhere "the underlying power game." Already in the era of colonial expansion Jews lost their political and social function but they kept their wealth, which seemed to serve blatant consumerism. H. Arendt stresses that "only wealth without power or aloofness without policy are felt to be parasitical, useless, revolting, because such conditions cut all the threads which tie men together" (Arendt: 5). Eliot could perceive rich Jews as a diffusion causing group and yet another challenge to the fulfilment of his yearning for order and hierarchy. The view of wealth as order imposing might be derived from Eliot's St. Louis childhood, which was saturated with the memories of his grandfather William Greenleaf Eliot who had helped "to establish three schools, a university, a poor fund and a sanitary commission" (Ackroyd: 16). Also his mother and the oldest sister were engaged in social work.[8] The tradition of social responsibilities of the rich, Eliot learnt at home, proved to be congenial to the views of Southern Agrarians, to whom T. S. Eliot's poetry was particularly dear. The following statement R. H. Robbins will quote as one of the Tateisms that could be taken for Eliot's opinion: "The traditional society is based upon property, and property means not only ownership but control [...]. A society based upon property will pass on its heritage in a concrete form, and this concrete form, property, which means moral control of the means of life is the medium in which the tradition is passed on" (Robbins: 186-187). So the reasons that triggered Eliot's anti-Semitism could be in part traced down as a felt disturbance of social and economic structure by socially unrelated wealth.

The already mentioned cosmopolitan aspect of his Jew-representations is of no less importance. Bleistein – a parody of the wandering Jew – stares without

[8] Cf T. S. Pearce, p. 11.

comprehension at an artefact which is a stamp of tradition and the past. Unlike him the picture of Canaletto he is looking at belongs to the city as its organic part. The Jew, however, knows no belonging or state loyalty. They are "a people without a government, without a country and without a language. Jewish history offers the extraordinary spectacle unique in this respect which began its history with a well defined concept of history and an almost conscious resolution to achieve a well circumscribed plan on earth, and then, without giving up this concept, avoided all political action for two thousand years" (Arendt: 8). This was precisely the lack of socio-political history, their migratory character, adaptation to existing circumstances and the language of the host country that Eliot disdained and thought outprising and challenging. Jews epitomized to him the relativity of tradition and effacement of social links whose need he felt with utmost urgency. Lack of attachment to any particular state in case of rich cosmopolitan bankers is best exemplified by the situation of the Rothschilds. Old Meyer Amschel Rothschild established his banks in five financial capitals of Europe by entrusting them to his five sons. Family bonds were stronger than national loyalty. As they kept aloof from the host states they were perceived as the challenge to the social structure they served with their money. Rich bankers remained in direct relation to the governments or any authority as such, but socially and nationally they lived in a void. H. Arendt claims that the image of a misdealing, unscrupulous Jew had no reality behind it, simply because they were "politically spineless" and their intention was never to wield power but self-preservation as an ethnic group (*ibid.*: 11-28). Yet abuse directed against Jews had practical motivation behind it, which was to establish national identity or, in other words, to answer the question: "What are we not?" For instance as ironically noted by Sartre "the true Frenchman rooted in his province, in his country, carried along by a tradition of twenty centuries, having the advantage of ancestral wisdom, guided by proved customs does not need intelligence. Sacred tradition is something that relieves an individual of responsibility for an individual judgement and allows them to revel in mediocrity. That's why without much harm to oneself an anti-Semite can stoop and admitt such features as intelligence and hard-working character in a Jew" (Kaufmann: 276-277). Similar stereotypes were created for instance in pre-war Poland, crediting the Jew with a cunning character of a small bargainer as opposed to the noble Pole – a helpful trick to establish Polish identity that was threatened under partition.

In T. S. Eliot, the Jew is charged with cupidity – which was an internationally recognized prejudice ("Money in furs [...]"). To add there is also an aura of lewdness and physical monstrosity. Thus in "Burbank..." the Jew appears in the company of Princess Volupine (the name being suggestive of voluptuousness). He haunts the lines of the poem "with a saggy banding of the knees and elbows with the palms turned out." In one of the Sweeney poems the figure of Rachel *née* Rabinovitch is credited with deadly instincts: she "tears at the grapes with murderous paws." In "Gerontion," the senile persona of the poem excites sens-

es "with pungent sauces in the wilderness of mirrors," the lines being suggestive of lavisciousness in Jonson's *Alchemist*.[9]

The quoted examples account for caricature rather than stereotype creating effect of Eliot's imagery. The shrill tone of abuse makes one aware that there is more at stake than just a failed theory which charges vicariously the Jews with the blame for social crisis. W. Kaufmann notices that the underlying assumption goes as far as to identify the Jews with the Evil (thus, in extreme they will taint the water in a swimming pool and sully the air they breathe). To Sartre anti-Semitism carries the conviction that the Jew's only will is the proclivity to wrong-doing which verges on Manicheanism and reduces old religion's Jew-hatred to sheer absurdity. Precisely this sort of Manicheanism allows Maurras to view anti-Semitism as a sacred struggle "with the final triumph of the good (that is Ormuzd against Ahriman)." The aim of such struggle can not be rendered in terms of the balance of interests, but in terms of total, sacred "destruction" (*ibid.*: 280).The implications of such views are no longer a theory or an idea but "first and foremost a passion";[10] mythological rather than rational thinking.

The next question to be raised shall concern the shape of Eliot's political myth as featured by the distorted Jewish representations. Significantly the Jew figure usually appears within the cluster of images of dissolution and fall – sort of cultural or cosmic entropy. In "Gerontion" the Jew "Squats on the window sill" while the central consciousness of the poem is depicted as "a dull head among windy spaces," placed within the chaotic debris of "rocks, moss, stonecrop, iron, merds," listening to "(vacant) shuttles (that) (weave) the wind" and finally arriving at the image of catastrophe. Final verses introduce mind-boggling perspective to position human speck within the cosmic vortex and out of the ordinary social milieu: "De Bailache, Fresca, Mrs Cammel, whirled / Beyond the circuit of the shuddering Bear / In fractured atoms. Gull against the wind, in the windy straits of Belle Isle, or running on the Horn." In "Burbank," as indicated by B. C. Southam, the very epigraph alludes to the recurrent theme of dissolution and fall: either directly "nil nisi divinum stabile est: caetera fumus" (only divine endures the rest is smoke) or indirectly by incorporating the lines from Browning's poem "A Toccata of Galuppi's," in which the speaker contemplates the death and decay of those who were rich and beautiful "with such hair too" (Southam: 52). The invective against the Jew sets the evolutionary clock back and attributes to "Chicago Semite Viennese" "a lustreless protrusive eye" which "stares from the protozoic slime (at) a perspective of Canaletto".[11] Being absurd to the extreme, the offensive image

[9] The analogy is suggested by B. C. Southam, who points to the pleasure enhancing function of mirrors in *Alchemist*: "my glasses / Cut into more subtle angles to disperse / And multiply the figures, as I walk / Naked among my succubae."

[10] J. P. Sartre ironically comments that "one might have an *opinion* on wine-growing policy" but not on anti-Semitism (Kaufmann: 272). Emphasis mine.

[11] The blatant character of this grotesque expletive encourages quoting of a joke R. Collingwood concocted against the evolutionists: "The archaeopteryx might in fact have been an ancestor of the bird, but what entitles us to call the bird an improvement on the archaeopteryx?" (Collingwood: 332). Crude as the application of this joke may seem its ironic treatment of evaluative evolutionism in historiography and sociology seems pertinent to mock monstrosity of the Jew image. Paradoxically enough, T. S. Eliot, an anti-evolutionist himself – which is evident in his treatment of J. Frazer's *Golden Bough* (as "a rich and satisfying apple-cart to overturn") – used distorted evolutionist mode of thinking to amplify invectives.

reveals omnipresent fear of the fall of cultural standards. Bleistein (Jewish-German name, literally leadstone) defiles beauty of Venice by the very act of riveting his attention to the picture. Furthur the poem unfolds through the images of the end: "(the) smoky candle end of time / Declines," and Burbank meditates "on Time's ruins and the seven laws," which, as pointed out by B. C. Southam, evokes Byron's deploring of Venice's decay in moral, financial and political terms (Southam: 52). Images evocative of decline create the sense of bathetic collapse by the very arrangement of verses. For example the line: "Lights, lights / She entertains Sir Ferdinand / Klein" is split between two stanzas. Having promised – so full of splendour – appearance of Sir Ferdinand in the first stanza it collapses to the mediocrity of prosaic Klein in the latter one.

Finally, in the third poem to be considered, "Sweeney Among the Nightingales" the person designated with a Jewish name – Rachel *née* Rabinovitch – is placed in a motley cosmopolitan environment including: "Apeneck Sweeney," "the person in the Spanish cape" and "the silent man in mocha brown." The mongrel cosmopolitan character of the scene conveys a vague notion of the disruption of social ties. The scene is, besides, saturated with a sense of insecurity and conspiracy: "She (Rachel) and the lady in the cape, / Are suspect, thought to be in league." Similarly, as in "Gerontion," human group with its vicious but petty affairs is superceded by portentous natural signs of catalysmic order: "The circles of the stormy moon / Slide westward toward the River Plate / Death and Raven drift above" and "Gloomy Orion and the Dog are veiled." The natural occurrences may be viewed as an allusion to fertility cults, yet their ominous overtones foreshadow the closing image of Agamemnon's death "in the bloody wood" where the nightingales sang. The voice of nightingales is a functional link between the place of murder and the "Convent of the Sacred Heart," which has been introduced in the preceding stanza. By the interplay of erudite allusions Eliot introduces the Jew – "hero-as-a-devil" – into texture of his poem. In a way, the poem evokes the memory of the convent from Marlow's *Jew of Malta*. In the fragments of the play Eliot used for epigraphs, the Jew comes afresh from the grotesque dimension murder – poisoning of a convent of nuns. Albeit indirectly, the Jew looms over the cafeteria scene.

The afore mentioned images of collapse and dissolution proliferate especially in "The Waste Land" and earlier poems. London is pictured as "an unreal city" buildings in "Prufrock" dissolve into mist and streets are wrapped up in the "yellow fog." Centres of civilisation fall apart with their "Falling towers / Jerusalem, Athens, Alexandria, Vienna, London." The picture of collapsing towers is pre-

ceded by the catalysmic image of "hooded hordes / swarming over endless plains," suggestive of Russian revolution. Together with earlier examples they contribute to an overall sense of crisis. Material fall of Europe is for Eliot only a metaphor for a spiritual dissolution. In *After Strange Gods...* he states: "(if) the latter dies (i.e. the spiritual organism) what you organize will not be Europe but merely a mass of human beings speaking several different languages" (Verma: 12). He felt the inefficacy of the League of Nations and would rather revive the spirit of the 13thc Europe, as he thought that its spiritual substance and material organisation overlapped. Megalopolis with "falling towers" stood for mechanical production and standardisation, itself being enfeebled and erratic, devoid of any sense of direction (with recurrent images of circular movement).

Like F. R. Leavis, Eliot apprehended suburban falsities and like T. Hardy he would shrink from machine civilisation. He shared Leavis' belief in the essential importance of "organic relationship," with which he would toy to offset the vision of dilapidation. P. Ackroyd stresses search for order as typically Eliotic trait, saying that "there were twin poles of Eliot's creative and critical work – the vision of chaos and the attempt to [...] defend himself against it" (Ackroyd: 70). Similarly as F. R. Leavis, he would believe that native vigour and originality were sapped by cosmopolitanism. While, as N. Annan remarks, this cosmopolitan gangrene was to Leavis epitomised by Bloomsbury (Annan: 433), to Eliot its epitome might be the migrant Jew.

Thus, the Jew figure and images of crisis and chaos are inseparable. An attempt to see how they overlay the pattern of apocalyptic thinking might yield another clue concerning Eliot's literary anti-Semitism. Beside frequent images of collapse one can spot three other apocalyptic stamps: (1) allusions to decadence, (2) Terrors ("bats with baby faces" (TWL), "breastless creatures under ground" ("Whispers of..."), "white bodies naked on the low damp ground" (TWL), "Christ the tiger / In depraved May" ("Gerontion"), (3) proclivity to revive the mythology of the Empire. The third point needs some explanation as to the way it is deployed for the purpose of this essay. The very notion of empire and kingdom (as it is metaphorically deployed in Christianity) features order and strict hierarchy, preservance of differences and taboos and certainty that there is a divinely prescribed niche for everybody. In short, it may be a foil concept to the idea of democratic egalitarianism and mobility which Eliot thought threatening. P. Ackroyd, indicates parallelism between Eliot's trial to reactivate Europe of Dante and Saint Thomas Acquinas (T. S. Eliot studied neo-thomism of J. Maritain) and Maurrasian political attempt to revive the unifying kingdom of *le roi soleil* (Ackroyd: 155). The three above mentioned characteristics (i.e. decadence, terrors and myth of empire) can be translated into the aspects of the myth of Transition and Crisis as delineated by F. Kermode.[12] Each apocalypse includes its period of Transition and opens with Crisis. However, one should not forget

[12] Cf F. Kermode, *The Sense of an Ending...* Ch. IV.

the thoroughly fictional character of each crisis, which refers not to the lived reality, but rather to the mode of thinking about reality. Each generation has its own crisis. Its uniqueness, however, is highly debatable. Still, each generation regards its crisis as more worrying than other's; "[...] anxiety reflected by fin de siècle is perpetual and people don't wait for centuries to end before they express it. Any date can be justified on some calculation or other" (Kermode: 98). And, in F. Kermode's opinion, Yeats' obsession with dates and gyres is only exemplary (*ibid.*: 98-99).

In case of T. S. Eliot it is not the obsession with horoscopes and closing dates but, so to say, a *dispossession* of a sense of history which has to be regained via memory and Christian orthodoxy. With regard to modernist sense of time, Kermode goes as far as to claim that Darwinian evolution lengthened in a way history of mankind; the ends and beginnings became obliterated. Time paradigms became less attainable, and "a relation between the time of a life and the time of a world" was blurred (*ibid.*: 166). In this context the irony of Eliot's "Sweeney Erect" is there for all to see: "The lengthened shadow of a man / Is history, said Emerson / Who had not seen the silhouette / Of Sweeney straddled in the sun." Sweeney casts a shadow of a shape which is erect as contrasted with the stooping stance of primates. Yet, his individual history is trivial and insignificant in the context of Emersonian metaphor of history. History is vast and incomprehensible – no longer "a shadow of man." Modernist desire to re-order reality by means of art is by Kermode conceived as "a historical transition related to this protraction of time, from a literature which assumed that it (was) imitating an order to a literature which assumes that it has to create an order unique and self-dependent and possibly attainable only after a critical process that might be called 'decreation' " (*ibid.*: 167).

The above lengthy interpolation of historiographic nature within the passage referring to the notion of crisis would be out of place if it did not lead back to the image of the Jew in "Gerontion" as communicative of Eliot's preferences within realm of historiographic fiction. The speaking persona of "Gerontion" never participated directly in the events that make history: "I was neither at the hot gates / Nor fought in the warm rain / Nor knee deep in the salt marsh, heaving a cutlass, / Bitten by flies fought." In contrast, the Jewish owner of the house got "spawned in some estaminet of Antwerp, / Blistered in Brussels, patched and peeled in London." Yet, this vast scope of actual experience does not contribute to the understanding of history and leaves no vision behind it. The subsequent verses resound with the cry of Pharisees: "We would see a sign," which certifies to the ignorance as to the significance of events. The Jew is entangled in fictive history which is mere facts connected by forced links: "History has many cunning passages, contrived corridors / And issues, deceives with whispering ambitions, / Guides us by vanities [...]." The Jew, although experienced, is inferior to Gerontion who, though inactive (he says: "I stiffen in a rented house"), seeks significance of events as an inner motivation, not as an external manifestation. It is

the inherent significance of facts which comes to light with the coming of the punishing force, "the tiger (which) springs in the new year" (reminiscent of the earlier "Christ, the tiger"). The coming of "the tiger" renders memory free of external appearance – flesh and bone or: "Us he devours."

The above attempted interpretation is carried along the lines of Christian historiography, in which only the coming of Christ could re-write history with the New Testament to reciprocate Old Testament prophecies. Hebrew history, however, remains an open chronicle with no end to validate or fill in the events with significance and as such offers no way out of the "contrived corridors" of history in "Gerontion." The above image-dependent intuition as to history is reminiscent of medieval historiography, which views things *sub specie aeternitatis* as a part of divine "pattern" or "design" (both terms being used interchangeably in Eliot's earlier poetry, the latter being limited to divine plane in his later poems). However, this is not pure historiography but the fictive figure of the Jew that foregrounds the image. The need for fictive contrivances relating us to time paradigms becomes particularly urgent in the times of crisis. They can be seen as innocuous inside the realm of fiction, yet the moment their fictive character is broken they reveal essentially harmful qualities, or to use Kermode's formulation: "If we forget that fictions are fictive we regress to myth" (Kermode: 51). In *After Strange Gods...* the border line between fiction and political myth got however transgressed in support of conservative Southern Agrarians.

Resorting to medieval historiography is not the only instance of Eliot's active participation in history making. For example, the concept of literary tradition and famous "dissociation of sensibility" provide him with just another useful fiction to justify his own poetic method. And it can be noted that re-writing the literary canon means again "smuggling in notions of cause and connection from social and political history" (*ibid.*: 112). While fiction limited to aesthetics and disarmed by disbelief makes no harm, fiction combined with myth creating images and believed in is politics. F. Kermode stresses that both Marxism and Third Reich used mythical patterns of decadence and renovation, with (in case of Marxism) its Transitional stage in the form of class struggle and tyranny of the working class and (in case of The Third Reich) its anti-Semitic hypothesis experimented on in gas chambers for credibility (*ibid.*: 41).

At this point, it is worthwhile to reiterate the initial assertion that the concern of this article is with poetic imagery and not with racial hypothesis. Images – in turn – are considered for the disclosure of particularised anxieties productive of anti-Semitic prejudice. These anxieties have been already specified as: the concern over socially unrelated financial power, cosmopolitan challenge to local originality, fear of cultural entropy, sense of crisis and suspended belief in the validity of history. Of all the above ennumerated issues the lack of cultural differentiation (with the related blurring of the notions of order and hierarchy) seems to be the foregrounding one. It is the fear of dissolution or loosing the laces which prompts various racist tendencies. T. S. Eliot is no exception to the paradigm of

social behaviour. He overlooked the fact that his Jewish references betrayed the game of scapegoating behind them. Eliot used numerous mythological motifs from J. Frazer's *Golden Bough* and, like J. Frazer, Eliot was unaware of the scapegoating mechanism and thus rendered himself open to its influence. His attitude to the myth of pharmakos lacks in suspiciousness, the effect being that motifs from Hindu, Egyptian or Greek mythologies in "The Waste Land" are deployed on the same basis as the motifs from the New Testament. The exceptionality of the Bible as dismantling the scapegoat chase mechanism is neglected.[13]

Frazer's attitude to his mythological material is that of an ironic evolutionist and structuralist. He organises myths and presents them as an example of barbarism and obscurity, yet he fails to grasp their significance as the worship of persecution. Eliot's "The Waste Land" can be seen as a negative reflection of *Golden Bough*, however the mechanism of scapegoating is equally overlooked. The same scapegoating mechanism, now on the part of the poet, can be seen as re-activated with relation to Jewish representations in his poetry. As it has already been noted, images that are clustered around the Jewish figures are indicative of a sense of chaos and disruption of traditional cultural ties. According to R. Girard traditional culture will shun immediate or direct exchange (the very culture being defined as a system of exchange). The immediacy of exchange is prevented by the system of taboos, complex inner structure and strict hierarchy – all of them reliant on the existing differences. Thus the blurring of differences is the end of traditional culture. R. Girard emphasises the point that it is not the difference but the lack of difference which triggers the scapegoat chase. When translated into modernist context, the crisis of traditional culture reads as cultural standardisation and uniformity which elitist, modernist artist tried to evade. The fictitious Jewish figure, the guilty one, is charged with the crimes against cultural diversity and social differentiation: cosmopolitanism, economic liberalism and religions indifference – in short, with the crime of assimilation. To exemplify the issue R. Girard notes that the related crime in Russia was to be cosmopolitan and the analogous offence is to be half-breed (metis). To be half-breed means to be an amalgamation of several racial norms, which is to be expressive of none in particular. All abusive language focuses on the lack of a norm or nomos, i.e. on anomaly and presents it as hideousity or unsightliness (Girard: 36-37). This fact may throw some light on the grotesque physical monstrosity of Eliot's Jewish representations.

Finally, the above speculation allows to answer the question which I raised at the beginning of this article with concern to Eliot's repudiation of "free thinking Jews." To reiterate this question will be to inquire why he omitted orthodox traditionalist Jews in his anti-Jewish exhortations. The omission of traditionalist

[13] According to R. Girard, the Bible lays open the mechanism of persecution. Scapegoating is no longer a regenerative ritual, but a malignant and sinful act which is on the heads of people of different denominations (Peter, who denies acquaintance with Christ, his pupils and Pilate, the Roman). Persecution is a rejuvenating worship no more.

Jews tells a lot about the personal foregrounding of Eliot's anti-Semitic myth. Namely, this is not the Jew in general but the rich, cosmopolitan or un-orthodox Jew that haunts Eliot's imagination; the ones who adapt themselves to the host culture. It may not be a coincidence that such a symbolic figure from a warehouse of racial prejudice plagues the poet, who was a Missouri expatriate, and who himself sought the assimilation within English society.

To conclude I wish to hint at two issues. First, Eliot's anti-Semitism as betrayed by his imagery is not related to conservative party anti-Semitism which functions as an "explanatory model for objective problems",[14] but a quasi-mythical answer to his personal anxieties. Secondly, neither is it an instance of omnihuman Jew hatred or "eternal anti-Semitism," as T. S. Eliot's attacks are exclusive of Sephardim (or orthodox Jews) and target at a fictional figure which I tried to delineate.

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[Abbreviation: TWL – The Waste Land]

[14] This belief is strongly repudiated by H. Arendt as adapted by professional anti-Semites and "giving the best possible alibi for all horrors" (Arendt: 7).

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Language

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Going, Going, Gone? The Future History of the Definite Article in English Names of Countries

I

Time and again various authors voice their concern over the future of the use of the definite article with some English names of countries. Their wistful comments typically go back to the old times of their school days when the definite article could be found not only in the classics of linguistic geography, e.g. the USA and the Netherlands, but also in a handful of other names, e.g. the Congo, the Argentine or the Sudan, and based on that they decry the decay creeping into the grammar of the English article. More often than not, however, these are columnists and teacher trainers and not linguists who comment on (and generally resent) the change in usage they have come to witness in their lives, as if academic scholars had to wait for the complete demise or resurgence of the article in front of such names of countries before they could comment on the development.

Contrary to that complaint tradition, this article will examine the situation in that area of English usage in linguistic terms and focus on uncovering the causes driving the developments. In doing so this investigation will survey the body of country names preceded with any frequency by the definite article and try to account both for the cases of rapid loss of the article e.g. Ukraine and its steadfast use e.g. the USA, including the newly developed article patterns e.g. the CIS or the Czech Republic. And exposing the motivation behind such tendencies will be used to predict the outcome of the developments under way. The backbone of these investigations will be the ostensive theory of proper names as developed by Kripke (1980), the latest developments in article studies (cf Hawkins 1991) and the iconic approach to definite article usages with proper names put forward in Berezowski (1997).

II

In statistical terms, the definite article before English names of countries is not necessarily doomed to extinction as the quick demise of the article usage with some names (e.g. Sudan) is accompanied by equally abrupt emergence of country names requiring the obligatory use of the article (e.g. the CIS or the Czech Republic, referred to above). There is then traffic both into and out of the definite article camp and no account brushing the whole issue aside in a few brief comments as mere evidence of the general simplification of the article pattern will obviously do. All such accounts are based on generalizing the more and more infrequent use of the definite article with some names [e.g. (the) Lebanon] over the whole group and ignoring the names which do not seem to give in at all or even develop new article usages. Any more viable explanation will then have to account for both trends, but a necessary prerequisite for developing such an account is that some other point of departure for linguistic inquiry be identified besides statistics.

It is the contention of this article that a much more adequate foundation for such explorations would be ascertaining the function the definite article has been continuing or discontinuing to serve in such names. The first step of the analysis to be developed below will then be examining the reasons for using the definite article with any proper names in general and names of countries in particular.

As has been convincingly shown elsewhere (e.g. Kripke 1980), proper names are not abbreviated definite descriptions but rigid designators, i.e. items which preserve the uniqueness of reference in any possible world. At first sight it might look like a distinction without a difference since definite descriptions by definition serve to ensure that reference is unique i.e. do what rigid designators have just been claimed to be doing. The crucial difference between the two, however, is that the uniqueness ensured by definite descriptions is ultimately tied to a specific context, i.e. one of the possible worlds, while the uniqueness warranted by a rigid designator does not depend on any contextual considerations. For example:

(1) The Queen vs (2) Elizabeth II

It is obviously unquestionable that the definite description in (1) does pick out only one individual and ensures the establishment of perfectly unique reference. The point, however, is that the identity of such unique individual critically depends on where and when the reference has been made. Referring to the Queen in the UK and the Netherlands clearly can make the speaker pick out a different individual in each case, just like the intended referent of a historian who had used (1) may well be Victoria, Elizabeth I or the wife of any English king if we choose to restrict the context to the history of England alone.

In most cases the context of the utterance naturally provides enough cues to guarantee that only the intended referent is identified and other potential ones do not surface at all. The place of the utterance or the nationality of the speaker will

readily clarify which of the ruling queens has been referred to by saying (1), just like the period referred to by the historian will point out which of the previous queens of England the description given in (1) has been intended to pick out. Occasionally the situation may, however, be less clear, e.g. if a British subject talks to a Dane in the Netherlands, where at least three (if not more) different monarchs might be naturally referred to by saying (1). An effective hedge against such confusion may be expanding the definite description and turning (1) into:

(3) The Queen of England,

(4) The Queen of Denmark, or

(5) The Queen of the Netherlands,

respectively.

And still more bewildering cases can possibly be coped with by using even more beefed up descriptions. Confusion can thus always be averted; the point, however, is that the more elaborate description is needed to streamline the crowd of potential referents down to the one intended by the speaker, the more information normally taken for granted is incorporated into the description itself. In other words, the elaboration of the definite description is equal to explicating the otherwise implicit features of the situation, i.e. laying the context dependence of definite descriptions bare and beyond any doubt.

Whether one takes such complex cases seriously or dismisses them as too far fetched, there is no doubt that definite descriptions ensure uniqueness only in a particular space and time, i.e. one possible world in the language of logic, while rigid designators are free from any such contextual dependencies. If (1) is replaced with (2) in any of the situations discussed above all the potential ambiguities outlined in the preceding paragraph are immediately done away with. No matter what time and space reference is established in, the identity of the referent is always the same, i.e. identical in any possible world. If context is available, actual reference of a particular utterance will then typically be equally unique whether the speaker uses a definite description or a rigid designator only the latter can, however guarantee that such reference will stay unconditionally unique in any context. Rigid designators ensure then absolute uniqueness of reference, while definite descriptions may potentially refer to a number of distinct unique individuals rooted in different situations and limited down to one only by contextual considerations.

Country names are natural examples of rigid designators they are carefully kept distinct from one another by adding appropriate modifiers whenever necessary (e.g. People's Republic of China vs Republic of China) and each of them refers to one and only one territory. The uniqueness of their reference is protected by international treaties and troops garrisoned on the borders and technically there should be no room for the definite article, which, according to the latest scholarship, conventionally implicates the uniqueness of any referring expressions to be found in its scope (Hawkins 1991: 414). Why should the uniqueness of some

of such referents be conventionally implicated if they are already unique by virtue of their rigid designator status? Why should any of them stand out and have their uniqueness expressed twice?

The answer is, that they do not. In the case of English proper names the impeccable uniqueness of rigid designators has been shown (Berezowski 1997) to be sensitive to some perceptible features of their referents. If present, such features can easily override the uniqueness implicit in any rigid designator and leave its expression to some alternative means. And it is quite natural that the best choice of such a back up linguistic device to mark uniqueness is the definite article, especially in the light of its function proposed by Hawkins (1991) above. If the definite article precedes names of countries it does not then double their natural uniqueness but provides an alternative way to express it wherever the original one has been overridden.

The use of the definite article with proper names is thus claimed to parallel several other points of English grammar in that it is not arbitrary but dependent on the presence of some perceptible features of the referents of such names. Perhaps the most widely known example of this type of conditioning is the distribution of English prepositions referring to space (e.g. *at, on, in, away from, off* and *out of*) which are now widely recognized to mirror the number of dimensions in which speakers conceptualize the objects of such prepositions (Quirk *et al.* 1972: 307). It is now generally accepted that *at* and *away from* tend to go with zero dimensional, i.e. punctual objects, *on* and *off* co-occur with one and two dimensional, i.e. linear and flat ones, and *in* and *out of* are generally used with three dimensional objects.

The nature of a relationship in which linguistic form reflects in one way or another the reality it refers to is thus essentially iconic (Haiman 1981) and any items linked by such relationships with the reality external to the system of language are said to be iconically motivated (Croft 1989).

III

The most straightforward example of a perceptible feature of the referent capable of overriding the uniqueness inherent to a name is the lack of a clear and fixed border, e.g.:

(6) Everglades National Park vs (6′) The Everglades

(7) Smoky Mountains National Park vs (7′) The Smoky Mountains

(8) North Carolina vs (8′) The Piedmont

(9) Utah vs (9′) The Great Basin

or, if countries are concerned:

(10) Turkey vs (10′) The Levant

(11) Syria vs (11′) The Middle East

(12) Nepal vs (12′) The Orient

(13) Greenland vs (13′) The Arctic

(14) Israel vs (14′) The Holy Land

(15) Mali vs (15′) The Sahel

The definite article is indispensable in the names of areas whose borders are indeterminate and vague (6′)-(15′) and not needed at all wherever clearly outlined and easy to perceive territories are staked out in such general areas (6)-(15). In terms of the explanation based on iconic motivation the contrast is not arbitrary but is a natural consequence of the fact that it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceptualize an area as unique if its borders are vague and a clear cut outline is missing (Berezowski 1997).

It is only natural to think, however, that country names should be immune from such processes as their borders as fixed as they can be, defined in treaties, guarded by troops and fought over if challenged. It is equally natural, however, to see the definite article fall into disuse with such names if it has accompanied them for various historical reasons but against the iconic rule. And these are precisely the uses which are marked off by grammarians as passing away and mourned by various non linguist commentators:

(16) (the) Sudan

(17) (the) Lebanon

(18) (the) Congo

(19) (the) Gambia

(20) (the) Yemen

(21) (the) Ukraine

The origins of these declining uses may be quite different. (The) Congo and (the) Gambia seem to have originally referred to the indeterminate and largely shapeless territories explored and conquered along the Congo and Gambia rivers, while (the) Sudan appears to have borrowed its name from a wide but borderless strip of land stretching across Africa just south of the Sahara and called the Sudan by geographers. (The) Yemen seems to have originated as a term referring to a largely undefined area in the south of the Arabian Peninsula, while (the) Lebanon and (the) Ukraine appear to have initially referred to the indefinite territories claimed by various powers north of the Holy Land and east of Poland, respectively.

The referents of these names lacked then definite outlines and provided iconic motivation for the use of the definite article with their designations. Once such territories gained statehood and international recognition of their borders the

iconic motivation ceased, however, to operate and the definite article lost any formal grounds to precede the names of such territories. No wonder then that grammarians report the attrition of such uses.

It is only natural that formal developments in language take time to translate into usage habits of the speakers. Occasionally it is possible, however, to observe the operation of such changes almost live. When the Congo gained independence from Belgium in mid 1960s one of the policies introduced by the new regime was renaming the country Zaire. The political ramifications of such moves apart, the linguistic consequence was the rapid demise of the definite article usage. Geographically, the referent of the new name was exactly the same as of the old one, but statehood and lack of any similarity of the new name to the old designation of the formerly vague territory made it an ideal example of a rigid designator which has never needed any article. Once the regime was ousted in late 1990s and its successors decided to change the name of the country again, the Congo came, however, back, this time around as a part of the name of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Embedding in such a descriptive designation of the referent gave the old name a new lease of life to be discussed in the final section devoted to the future of the article usage.

Another recent instance of such overnight developments in article usage is the case of (the) Ukraine. This stable and long standing use of the definite article confirmed by various surveys and authorities [e.g. Jespersen (1949: 549), Quirk *et al.* (1972: 162) or Berry (1993: 56)] collapsed on declaring the independence of the Republic of Ukraine in early 1990s. Nothing changed in the geography of the country or its English name, but statehood and international recognition were enough to affect the article usage. And given the modern ability to search electronic corpora of published texts, it is even possible to pinpoint the date the article was first dropped by the press. In the case of (the) Ukraine for American publishers it was only two weeks after the country declared independence (Piotrowski 1998: 148).

Whether the developments are as quick paced as the two described above or proceed at much slower rates, they seem to be inevitable and independent of the historical origins of the usage. Whether it is the loss or outright lack of iconic motivation that is the case, it has set in motion the process of bringing (16)-(21) in line with the normal pattern found in rigid designators and there seems to be no turning back whether the article uses originated as borrowings or were iconically motivated.

IV

As has been already indicated above, only some definite article usages with country names are on their way to extinction. There is a group of names which do not seem to be giving up their definite articles at all and the explanation put forward

above clearly can not cover such long standing and steadfast uses, let alone the newly developed ones. All it means in iconic terms is, however, that, contrary to the situation in the group discussed in II, some names cling to their articles because the referents of such names continue to provide iconic motivation for the usage. In order to account for the unwavering stability of such uses it is necessary, however, to base their motivation on features which are both perceptible and permanent.

One such factor is, beyond any doubt, the collective status of the referent (Berezowski 1997). For example:

(22) The Great Lakes = Lake Michigan + Lake Superior + Lake Erie + Lake Huron + Lake Ontario

(23) The Baltics = Lithuania + Latvia + Estonia

(24) The Sierra Nevada = Mt. Whitney, Yosemite Valley, Lake Tahoe, etc.

(25) The Caribbean = Barbados, the Cayman Islands, Jamaica, etc.

If used on their own, individual members of such collections either take the definite article or not, as the case may be. When they are bundled together into a collective name the article becomes, however, mandatory whether the names are marked for the plural (22)-(23) or not (24)-(25) and whether the collections are finite (22)-(23) or infinite (24)-(25). In iconic terms it simply means that the collective status of such referents overrides the inherent uniqueness of their names and provides iconic motivation for the use of the definite article in the manner described in section I. This time, however, the iconic relationship seems to reflect the common intuition that only discrete and singular entities can be truly unique. Linguistically, the idea that uniqueness abhors plurality has been shown to be fundamentally mistaken by recent students of definiteness (cf Hawkins 1991, and the references therein) who successfully demonstrated that the plural equivalent of a unique individual is a unique maximal set of referents. It seems, however, that a sufficient number of linguists and philosophers working on language for a living have been fooled to reserve uniqueness for singular count nouns only to fully justify the claim that it is one of the assumptions underlying the perception of an average language user.

In the case of country names the perception of their collective status is additionally aided by the fact that it has been carefully enshrined in the plural ending:

(26′) Luzon

(26″) Mindanao

(26‴) Cebu

+ etc.

(26) The Philippines

Archipelagoes are collective by definition, which is invariably indicated by the plural ending, and primarily responsible for the use of the definite article brought in to dispel any doubts as to their uniqueness.

Typical items in need of having their uniqueness explicitly marked by taking the definite article are then plural names of insular countries. For example:

(27) the Cayman Islands/the Caymans

(28) the British Virgin Islands

(29) the US Virgin Islands

(30) the Faroe Islands/the Faroes

(31) the Bahama Islands/the Bahamas

(32) the Channel Islands

(33) the Marshall Islands

Politically, (27)-(33) enjoy various degrees of independence, from merely fiscal autonomy to fully fledged sovereignty. Linguistically, however, they all belong with the Philippines in that their definite articles are motivated by permanent features of their referents (i.e. collective status of archipelagoes) and are thus unlikely to follow in the wake of the names discussed in section II and fall into disuse any time soon.

Given the stability of their iconic motivation, the only way (26)-(33) may quickly lose their definite articles seems to be renaming. If the referent of the new name of the country is clearly distinct from the referent of the geographical designation of the chain of islands, the iconic motivation for the definite article will not be available for the new name and it will carry on as a genuine rigid designator. Three examples of such transformation have recently accompanied political developments in the Pacific:

(34) the New Hebrides → (34') Vanuatu

(35) the Ellice Islands → (35') Tuvalu

(36) the Gilbert Islands → (36') Kiribati

The renaming has differentiated the names of the countries from the names of the archipelagoes. The old names were left to continue as the geographical designations of the chains of islands and, consequently, kept their iconically motivated definite articles. The new names, however, were coined to refer to the territories of independent states, i.e. both land and ocean within internationally recognized borders. The referents of the former naturally remained thus collective, while the referents of the latter came to be clearly delimited solid swaths of space on the map providing no iconic motivation for the use of the definite article on the grounds of vague outline or collective status.

The new names joined thus:

(37) French Polynesia or (38) Indonesia

in keeping the collective names of the archipelagoes they are made up of distinct from the unique names of entire territories, which guarantees that the referents of both designations are easily perceived to be different entities (the chain of islands and the country, respectively), relieving thus the former from the obligation to take the definite article. Wherever both designations are the same, the name of the country is, however, bound to be confused with the name of the archipelago and the article usage based on the collective status of the chain of islands may inadvertently spread to the designation of the country, e.g. (26)-(33).

The collective status of the referent provides thus fairly firm iconic motivation for the use of the definite article, yielding only to tinkering with the names of such territories. Wherever the linguistic clues hinting at the existence of such motivation prove, however, to be spurious, the definite article is bound to disappear. For example the now defunct article uses with the names of countries which do not show any traces of collective status reported from earlier stages of the history of English (Jespersen 1949: 549-550). For example:

(39) the Bermudas

(40) the Brasils, or

(41) the Cameroons

quoted in Berry (1993: 56) to be now yielding to

(42) Cameroun/Cameroon

There is obviously no knowing whether the plural ending attached to (39)-(41) specifically marked their collective status or some other feature (e.g. unknown expanse, etc.). It is, however, generally perceived to do the former, so once it became common knowledge that the referents of these names do not show any perceivable traits of collectivity, the articles were dropped along with the plural markers.

V

Perceived collectivity of the referent provides thus sufficient rationale for some of the stable definite article usages with country names. Still, there remains a host of article usages this iconic factor is not able to account for, e.g.:

(43) the Netherlands (44) the Central African Republic

Even though (43) is formally plural it does not seem to reflect any obvious internal plurality of its referent which would make it perceivable as a collective entity and (44) does not even show such would be vestiges of collectivity.

Both of these names seem, however, to reflect some features of their referents in a manner far more explicit than any of the country names discussed in the two preceding sections. (44) states openly where the country is located (Central Africa) and how it is governed (a republic), while (43) provides information on the elevation of the country relative to the sea level (low). The clarity of the information contained in the latter may be dimmed by the fact that *nether* is on its way out of use as a meaningful lexical item but the message is easily driven home by the less official and more readily comprehensible version of (43):

(45) the Low Counties

Here there is no doubt as to the meaning of the message carried by the name and it is crystal clear that the information is iconic; the country really is located in a low lying area just like (43) really is a republic in central Africa. The significance of such iconic relationships for article usage with proper names is, however, brought out best by the contrast between (43) and (45) on the one hand and yet one more name of the same referent:

(46) the Netherlands (47) Holland

Once the referent is finally assigned a name which does not reflect any of its features (i.e. low elevation above the sea level or alleged plurality) the definite article is not and never has been necessary to be used. The difference between the names of countries which reveal some features of their referents and the names discussed in the two preceding sections is then only a difference in degree. In the latter the iconic relationship is quite implicit but the groups of names are organized around one iconic factor governing article usage, while in the former the features of the referent are explicitly quoted in their names but they are not organized around just one type of factor affecting article usage.

In the examples discussed above the features of the referents encoded in their names were the type of land in (45)-(46) and the relative location and kind of government in (44). There is, however, a motley of other features to be found in country names. For example:

– designation of the political system prevailing in a country, e.g.:

(48) the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/the USSR

which was both soviet and socialist in every aspect of its life;

– name of the nation which has formed and developed a country, e.g.:

(49) the Czech Republic (50) the Argentine Republic

where *Czech* and *Argentine* denote the nationality, language and tradition dominating on the territories circumscribed by the borders of the Czech Republic and the Argentine/Argentina, respectively. In the latter case, however, the adjectival name is in direct competition with the name of the same referent borrowed from Spanish [(la) Argentina], which is not in any sense iconic, does not require the article, and, consequently, is quickly gaining ground over the older designation;

– identification of the main resource of a country, e.g.:

(51) (the) Ivory Coast

which for a long time was explored and exploited by European ivory traders, or even

– historical detail, e.g.:

(52) the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

which is perhaps an extreme case both in terms of origin and specificity of information.

The referent features most frequently quoted in country names are, however, their political characteristics, which is only natural given the fact that statehood, independence, etc. are primarily political concepts and institutions. For example:

(53) the United States of America/the United States/the USA/the US

(54) the United Kingdom/the UK

(55) the United Arab Emirates

(56) the Commonwealth of Independent States/the CIS, or the short lived

(57) the Confederate States of America/the CSA

revealing their internal organization (union, kingdom, commonwealth, confederacy) and status of individual members (states, independent states, emirates).

The stability of such definite article usages critically depends, however, on how permanent the referent features quoted in the name are. Should a feature lose prominence in the perception of a country or vanish altogether in a renaming operation, it will no longer be a perceivable feature of the referent and will stop providing iconic motivation for the use of the definite article. A case in point is

(58) (the) Ivory Coast

which is both subjectively and objectively seen less and less as an ivory supplier and the best evidence of such perception besides statistics is the fact that any documentary, book, etc. on elephants and ivory invariably focuses on Kenya, Tanzania or other countries in East Africa and hardly ever on (58). A case of renaming which removes a referent feature from the name is the transformation underwent by its neighbor:

(59) the Gold Coast → (59') Ghana

Whether the feature simply disappeared from the name (59) or only lost salience in its perception (58), the linguistic consequence invariably was the loss of the article. Majority of the referent features quoted in the names discussed above seem, however, to be more stable (e.g. elevation of land above the sea level, system of government, etc.) and are, consequently, much more likely to keep the definite article in use.

The classic explanation of the definite article usages in (48)-(57) makes a sweeping claim that they follow from incorporating common nouns into the structure of the affected proper names [e.g. Berry (1993: 56), or Kałuża (1976: 47)]. And there is no doubt that indeed it is an astute observation of linguistic facts and a useful heuristic since (48)-(57) really do contain lexical items which can function as common nouns. It is not, however, satisfactory as a linguistic explanation of such usages. It ignores the fact that there are numerous proper names made up entirely of common nouns, which have never taken the definite article, e.g.:

(60) Cape Fear
(61) Pearl Harbor
(62) Great Bear Lake
(63) Botany Bay

The common noun explanation is then merely an *ad hoc* proposal limited to a handful of names of countries and it fails to appreciate that they naturally belong with other geographical proper names. No wonder then that it is not able to account coherently for the whole range of country names taking the definite article, let alone any other group of geographical proper names. Most importantly, however, this explanation does not provide any rationale for the observation it captures. All there is on offer is a vague and implicit supposition that the presence of common nouns is in some way incompatible with the proper name status of the names in question.

In view of all these flaws the common noun conspiracy may be safely demoted to the status of a clever observation while the iconic explanation, which does not seem to suffer from any of those shortcomings, may be claimed to account for definite article usages with country names far more correctly than any theory put forward so far. The ultimate test of the explanatory power of the approach besides its applicability to a variety of other proper names, which has been presented in Berezowski (1997) is, however, its ability to predict further developments in the area it is claimed to apply to. The final section of the article will then risk plotting the future of the definite article usages discussed so far and base the predictions on the claims of the iconic approach.

Still another motivation for such a risky step is the challenge of the gloom and doom preached for the article in country names by various amateur writers. A linguistic answer to such concerns has to go beyond explaining the present state of affairs and do what these writers have been doing, i.e. predict further developments.

VI

The claims of the iconic approach are based on the relationships holding between perceptible features of referents and the definite article needs of their names. The stability of the article usage is thus made directly dependent on the continuing presence of a given feature of the referent. Should for any reason such a feature

disappear the article is bound to follow in its wake with some time lag allowed for language inertia.

The names which definitely stand to lose their definite articles are then the names whose referents have ceased to provide them with iconic motivation for such use. The largest group here is made up of country names which acquired the definite article due to the vague or nonexistent outline of their referents (64)-(69). In the era of international treaties, conventions and organizations there is no room for such indeterminacy and the article should follow suit. In the three other cases the referents of the names in question either proved not to be collective (70), have been superseded by designations free of any iconic elements or stopped to be perceived in terms of the feature encoded in its name (71). Provided that no political events interfere with the workings of the English language, the following names should then shed their articles:

(64) (the) Sudan
(65) (the) Lebanon
(66) (the) Gambia
(67) (the) Yemen
(68) (the) Ukraine
(69) (the) Cameroons
(70) (the) Argentine
(71) (the) Ivory Coast

while (the) Congo, which seemed to be doomed along with (64)-(71) until the latest political developments in that country, seems to have evaded extinction by becoming a part of a country name revealing some features of its referent:

(72) the Democratic Republic of the Congo

proclaimed by the new regime to be a democracy based on a republican model.

The whole designation along with (the) Congo has then joined names whose article uses are founded on much more permanent referent country features than in (64)-(71) and are thus sure to stay. In the same manner any articles motivated by stable features of referent countries are not likely to become history any time soon. Whether it is the collective status of archipelagoes or other geographical and/or political features brought up in the preceding section and not listed in (64)-(71), they are judged to be permanent enough to guarantee providing iconic motivation for the use of the definite article. The following names are then not expected to lose their articles in the foreseeable future:

(73) the Philippines
(74) the Cayman Islands/the Caymans

(75) the British Virgin Islands

(76) the US Virgin Islands

(77) the Faroe Islands/the Faroes

(78) the Bahama Islands/the Bahamas

(79) the Channel Islands

(80) the Marshall Islands

(81) the Netherlands/the Low Counties

(82) the United States/the USA/the US

(83) the United Kingdom/the UK

(84) the United Arab Emirates

(85) the Central African Republic

(86) the Commonwealth of Independent States/the CIS

(87) the Czech Republic

(88) the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

unless the names are changed so that they do not reflect any features of their referents or the referents become history themselves. The former was illustrated in (34)-(36) above and the latter may be exemplified by the sudden and unexpected demise of (48).

The only country name which seems to elude the explanations and predictions put forward above is the designation of the smallest one:

(89) the Vatican

The name has clearly been borrowed wholesale along with the article from the name of the ancient district of Rome, where the state is located, but that does not explain much. There is no knowing why the names of the districts of Rome should need the article in the first place, e.g.:

(90) the Aventine (91) the Palatine

and the only comfort comes from the fact that the same situation can be found in New York where one borough does take the definite article:

(92) the Bronx

In spite of this deficiency it is, nevertheless, believed that the account of definite article usages with names of countries put forward above is far more coherent and comprehensive than any other one advanced so far and its greatest asset is the fact that it does away with any *ad hoc* theories and makes the definite article used with country names do exactly the same it does anywhere else in English, i.e. implicate the uniqueness of the referring expressions in its scope (Hawkins 1991: 414).

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The Meaning of Jeremiad and Its Particular Use in the Political Speeches of President Reagan

The purpose of the paper is to present, on the example of one of the best known contemporary American presidents, how the meaning of jeremiad was changed mainly because of its adjustment to the political speeches of Ronald Reagan.

The notion of politics is here understood as: "The interaction between government and the people who are governed. In democratic societies, that interaction occurs principally during elections, as in the United States and Great Britain [...]" (Woll and Zimmer 1989: 291, G-13).

With regard to the aforementioned it is the American president who is on the top of the hierarchy of governing, often incarnating projected national beliefs and acting as the highest priest of this supposedly blessed land. No wonder then that it is no one else but the American president, who very often uses symbolic language of political discourse charged with the principles of the so specific American election version of reality simply to gain more votes and the public approval.

It should also be pointed out that the jeremiad of Reagan is a way of addressing Americans within a political context. Therefore, it may be considered to be included into the American political discourse notion. The above mentioned discourse may be regarded as a dynamic phenomenon of interaction between language and its contextual embeddings (see, for example van Dijk 1997).

Many political scientists view the institution of the presidency as limiting and controlling what an individual president can do (Ericson 1985: 4). It is the American Constitution that restricts the legal authority of the office as well as numerous bureaucratic establishments that obfuscate president's action. Nevertheless, at the same time the president's words seem to generate enormous power.

Let us now consider the way Ronald Reagan employed his oratory in the presidential campaign of 1980. Throughout the campaign, Reagan's speeches functioned as secular sermons, and it is to be noticed that their texts derived from a Puritan address delivered approximately 350 years earlier. President Reagan was supposedly well aware of the parallel as regards his campaign rhetoric as

well as religious sermons. When accused of delivering virtually the same speech for years, answered calmly, according to Bakshian (1980: 157):

> Isn't it a bit like a minister? You could say he's saying the same old line – he's got a different sermon every Sunday but his theme is one and the same. My theme, as far back as I can remember, was a warning... The theme is that we continue to centralize authority, we continue with the government growing bigger – and every time we do we're losing freedom.

It is apparent that the Great Communicator used America's oldest sermon structure to arrive at the soul of America. The soul would translate into the American Puritan Dream so well rooted in every American citizen since his early childhood. The form that is used most often by Reagan is the form of the jeremiad. It may be defined either as a tale of woe, a prophetic warning foretelling disaster, or denouncing the evils of a civilization (Baldick 1990: 115). The model of this kind is to be found in the Old Testament, where the Hebrew prophet Jeremiah states (Jeremiah 2: 19):

> Thine own wickedness shall correct thee, and thy backslidings shall reprove thee, know therefore and see that it is an evil thing and bitter, that thou hast forsaken the Lord thy God.

It was the prophet Jeremiah, who lived during the downfall of the kingdom of Judah, who called Jews to forsake their "wicked" ways and to obey the laws. It was also the very prophet who had presented potent apocalyptic visions, being at the same time a lone voice of conservative values striving for their maintenance in the society. Scavan Bercovitch (1975: 7) in his work *The American Jeremiad* admits to its moral relevance, and explains that the "proper" jeremiad is rather redemptive in nature. Moreover, the very form of jeremiad is regarded to imply in its structure, and obviously in its content, a penetrating moral significance and commitment. Regardless of the fact of the Old Testament jeremiad having a rather merciless character, Bercovitch (1975: 9) perceives its particular realization as the one that aims at the eventual Paradise on earth, rather than taking under consideration the current hardships:

> In explicit opposition to the traditional mode, it inverts the doctrine of vengeance into a promise of an ultimate success, affirming to the world, and despite the world, the inviolability of the colonial cause... In Europe, let me emphasize, the jeremiad pertained exclusively to mundane, social matters, to the city of man rather than the city of God. It required not conversion but moral obedience and civic virtue. At best, it held out the prospect of temporal, worldly success. At worst, it threatened not hellfire, but secular calamity (disease, destruction, death). The Puritans' concept of their jeremiads was to direct an imperiled people of God toward the fulfilment of their destiny, to guide them individually toward salvation, and collectively toward the American city of God.

There was to be seen the harsh contrast between the Carterian darkness and the bright future of the self-appointed Founding Father – Reagan, who appeared to have known for sure how to bring America back to its glory. The Republican President has started his career as a Democrat, and in the course of time he, however, learnt to shift the emphasis of his oratory. As a final version Americans received a very optimistic description of an age of prosperity and almost

omnipresent well-being. It would be interesting to remember that Reagan began his politics as a politician that had a somewhat pessimistic assessment of how far America had detached itself from the original convenant of limited bureaucratic establishment. In the view of many a politician there are to be noted more general characteristics distinguishing the American political discourse, for the country has a definite purpose for existing which translates into the American dream; understood as a set of communal ideals and values, as well as goals that bring together the majority of the American nation (Colbert 1995). Ronald Reagan (1989: 44) has apparently applied the American Dream values to his own version of the jeremiad appealing for restoration and progress at the same time:

> We who are privileged to be Americans have had a rendezvous with destiny since the moment in 1600s when John Winthrop, standing on the deck of the tiny Arabella off the coast of Massachusetts, told the little band of Pilgrims: 'We shall be as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us so that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have undertaken and so cause Him to withdraw His present help from us, we shall be made a by-word throughout the world.'

According to Puritan beliefs the colonists who came to New England in the early 1600s were the chosen people. They were to build the New Jerusalem from "sea to shining sea" in America. Being certain that the time described in the Bible was approached, the colonists came to the New to prepare for the New Era. Needless to say that they were strongly inspired by a sense of mission. It should be kept in mind that the very same address, wherefrom President Reagan adapted his "city upon a hill" line, is to be found in John Winthrop's *Arabella* sermon. John Winthrop, the apparent leader of the community, must have been aware that the expectations of "his" Puritans could make them rapacious and also too much concerned with worldly rewards, so that they would relinquish their duty of charity and mortification. Therefore, Winthrop warned the newcomers (Ericson 1985: 88) what could happen:

> The eyes of all people are on us, so that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have undertaken, and so cause him to withdraw his present help from us, we shall be made a story and a by-word through the world. We shall open the mouths of enemies to speak evil of the ways of God, and all professors for God's sake. We shall shame the faces of many of God's worthy servants, and cause their prayers to be turned into curses upon us until we be consumed out of the good land whither we are going.

The Puritans profoundly believed that Christ would come very soon to rule them. No wonder then that they may have found themselves in a quandary when he did not arrive to rule them. Nonetheless, increasing prosperity and political freedom have changed the "city upon a hill" into what many may think is close to an economic and civil Eden. Many civil religions appeared in America after three and a half centuries since the Massachusetts Bay Colony had been established. In this regard President Reagan has not done anything special, he has solely created his own mythology with the American jeremiad being its primary means of influencing the American audience. In order to strengthen the effect it

was combined with Reagan's media created image, carefully prepared phrases, catchy slogans, as well as sweet TV advertisements of *Pax Americana*. In spite of Reagan's advisors reminding him of the dreadful possibilities of a failure, he never failed to see a glorious tomorrow, which brought him victory two times in a row (Colbert 1995).

One of the American Studies scholars, namely David Howard-Pitney (1990: 8), has worked out an outline of three distinct parts of the secular American jeremiad, so often used in politics and particularly often embarked on by Ronald Reagan in his political campaign oratories. Its inherent parts are as follows:

1. **The promise** that stresses America's special destiny as the promised land and its covenant with God;

2. **The declension** that cities America's failure to live up to its obligations as chosen people, its neglect of its mission, its failure to progress sufficiently, its national sin of retrogression from the promise;

3. **The prophecy** that predicts that if Americans shall repent and reform, the promise can still be fulfilled.

It may be believed that the U.S. had very much developed, ultimately becoming one of the most favored and powerful countries on the face of earth, which could have been due to the constitutional concepts of individual freedom and limited governmental powers that constituted the America's covenant (Colbert 1995). In other words, America had been blessed by God as the home of liberty, and it was precisely what President Reagan was doing. He redefined the old form of Puritan sermons and made them fit into his late 1970's and early 1980's campaigning tactics. Ronald Reagan seemed always hopeful and strongly advocated voting for the glorious future, that is himself.

Few Americans have noticed in due time that Ronald Reagan argued from his own definitions of terms, using high-level abstractions. According to Hayakawa (1990: 93), the high-level abstractions gain an unfavourable reputation because they are so often used, consciously or unconsciously, to confuse and befuddle people. I feel that the aforementioned is worth considering, as we can not be certain whether it has been the case as far as President Reagan is concerned. Reagan mentioned several times that something had gone wrong in America and that the people had been misguided by leaders who violated the covenant. The solution was to restore the original covenant and recover its blessings before it was too late. Therefore, Reagan's message was a secular version of the religious jeremiads from the Old Testament prophets who used to remind that in every generation sins were the cause of national disasters, and that repentance led to new life and salvation (Barton 1990: 51).

Reagan's jeremiad was particularly appealing because unlike the Old Testament prophets and the American Puritans, he blamed America's problems not on the people but upon their leaders, who had "let the soul of a nation rot" (Cannon 1969: 276). In the light of the above we could consider jeremiad to be a special form of politically formed language. If to the just mentioned, keeping in mind the

way Americans have been communicated to by Reagan, we add the view of language being the result of cognitive processes and considered at the same time to be both a psychological and physical carrier of social and cultural thoughts (Anusiewicz 1995: 113), then we should conclude that the American society is still a profoundly Puritan society. Therefore, we can say that it has been very appropriate of President Reagan to use the form of the jeremiad while addressing Americans.

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Process Orientation – an Integrative Concept of Foreign Language Learning[1]

1. Explanation of the term and introduction to the concept

Process orientation is not an absolutely new concept. Originally the matter was taken up by Bredella who in 1987 presented his considerations on a draft for the process-oriented teaching and learning of literature. At the end of the 80s, the terms "process" and "product" were introduced into foreign language didactics as differentiating concepts. Above all, Breen (1987) and Nunan (1988) as well as Rost (1990) understood process orientation "als Orientierung an den sprachlichen Verarbeitungsfähigkeiten des Lerners" (as an orientation towards the learner's language processing abilities[2]) which according to foreign language didactics meant "Orientierung an den Lernfähigkeiten des Fremdsprachenlerners" (orientation towards the learning abilities of the foreign language learner) (Wolff 1993: 27 ff.).

Besides that, Schwerdtfeger's (1975: 6) considerations on the mutual influence of working with media *and* learning are of important relevance in foreign language teaching. Schwerdtfeger defined media as "konstruktiv-dynamische Mittel..., durch deren Einsatz Prozesse verschiedener Art im Individuum hervorgerufen, erleichtert, befördert oder aufrechterhalten werden" (constructive-dynamic means..., through whose application processes of various kinds can be stimulated, eased, promoted or kept up). She characterised media as "prozeß-konstitutiv" (process-constituting) and therefore demanded as early as 20 years ago media-application oriented towards the learning process in foreign language classes. Additionally, she recommended thinking over the **effects of the media content and possible learning stimuli** rather than the technical side before using media in class – in accordance with an integrative view of learning. Not the technical apparatus but effects on learners and their ways of learning are to be the

[1] Revised version of an article in *Der Fremdsprachliche Unterricht* 1/1996, translated by André Preißler.

[2] All German quotations were translated by André Preißler.

focus of consideration! These basic conceptual ideas have still to be practically realised in many areas of language teaching. That is why there is a further need to investigate and discuss the theory and practice of process-oriented media-didactics of modern languages (Cf Multhaup, Wolff 1992; Gienow, Hellwig 1993 and 1994).

Process orientation stands for complexity and integration. Some of the features of process-oriented learning correspond with characteristics of other concepts in foreign language theory including learner autonomy, orientation towards interactive learning (Handlungsorientierung), as well as creativity. This is an important indicator for the complexity and integration of process orientation.

Little describes **learner autonomy**, presumably the most consistent learner-oriented concept, as

> a capacity – for detachment, critical reflection, decision-making, and independent action. It presupposes, but also entails, that the learner will develop a particular kind of psychological relation to the process and content of his learning. The capacity for autonomy will be displayed both in the way the learner learns and in the way he or she transfers what has been learned to a wider context.

The features of learner autonomy listed by Little – as will be seen – are compatible with process orientation. They are in a way part of it. Here the processes that take place in learners are central issues of the concept, autonomy develops as a process and is therefore part of the process-oriented approach.

Orientation towards interactive and creative learning emphasise the learner's practical activities and creative powers. Teaching that is oriented towards interaction demands the capability of "sprachliche Kommunikations-und Erwerbsprozesse autonom handelnd zu gestalten" (creating processes of communication and acquisition by autonomous actions). Interactive oriented learning processes are "erfahrungsbasiert, (kommunikativ) motivierend, interaktiv, prozeß-und produktorientiert, entscheidungsbetont" (motivating communicatively, interpersonally communicative, process- and product-oriented, decision-forcing, and based on practical experience). They aim at establishing interactive language competence, the ability "mit anderen Menschen im Kontext der gemeinsamen Lebenswelt inhaltlich engagiert und partnerorientiert sprachlich zu interagieren, um eine bestimmte Absicht zu verfolgen" (to interact in a content-involved and partner-oriented way with other people in the context of their common environment by using language to follow specific intentions) (Bach, Timm 1989: 18, 10, 17 ff.)

Orientation towards creativity particularly focuses on stimulating "Lernende(n) zum Schaffen von etwas – wenigstens subjektiv – Sprachlich-Neuem" (learners to create – at least subjectively – something new in language). The "*sozial erzieherische* Komponente" (*social-education* component) of interactive oriented teaching is clearly visible. "Sie scheint dominant zu sein" (It seems to be dominant) (Hellwig 1993: 92).

Particularly the learner's activity is considered to be a basic feature of the 'processuality' of any language acquisition and language usage. The web of various processes of assimilating and developing language and information, as well as learning processes, finally constitute the subjective language product in connection with certain intentions. Orientation towards interaction and creativity are basically founded on processes.

Therefore: For institutionalised language learning it is very important to know through which contents and forms of the "syllabus," in which activities and with which results the ability and willingness for intercultural communication can be stimulated and developed adequately in a process-oriented way.

In Fig. 1 the concept of process orientation is illustrated in a generalised form.



Fig. 1. The concept of process-orientation in a simplified form

We understand process orientation as a complex-integrative concept, supported by findings in cognitive- and learning-psychology, psycholinguistics, and neohermeneutic text-theory – a concept that aims at intensifying and deepening foreign language acquisition by constantly stimulating subjective learning processes.

These are, first of all, processes of activating and modifying subjectively represented factual and activity-related knowledge about language, the world and the self, as well as mediating processes between represented and presented information. These various intermingling processes of activation, mediation and modification decisively initiate the development of concept and language.

It can be principally assumed that the learner's entire system of receptive and productive processing of language and information has to be addressed and activated. Presented by different forms of media topics/contents that are important and relevant for the learner are used to stimulate process-oriented working and learning. Stimuli can also be given at the interpersonal level both by learners and teachers. The process-oriented approach intends to strengthen the learning abilities as well as the learner's responsibility and the productive components of working- and learning-processes, so that individually new texts can be developed on the basis of evaluative concepts. These are most of all language texts, but also other meaning-carrying structures such as graphic sketches or pictures which can be developed to serve the productive use of the foreign language.

2. Media and text diversity to stimulate psychomental processes

In spite of general agreement on the fact that language-texts are of different effectiveness in different phases of the learning process, the use of the written text is often still given absolute or high priority.

2.1. Change of the form of media

It is obvious that the use of different media has to be adapted to the learning-group, the learning level and to the state of the learning process. For example in the beginning phases of learning, when there are deficits in factual and/or activity-related knowledge of language and the world, the adequate medium should guarantee the efficient receiving and processing of new knowledge. Static pictures, paralleled by a matching text which can be perceived successively by the learners would be more useful in this case than a lecture without pictures or written text or even a TV-film for that matter. However, texts and film could be used legitimately in a following process-phase: The oral and/or written text would build upon already developed ideas, upon processed knowledge of language and the world, which could be the preconditions for the successful use of the TV-film. The simultaneous activity of different levels of language and information processing, which the learner can apply for a dynamic picture-sound quality, can usually be reached by using different forms of media (Gienow 1993: 50).

Inter- or intramedial change is useful and does make sense. Texts – between which there are for the pupils frictions, breaks, absurdities, alienations, incompatibilities, oppositions and challenges while reading – are, according to Decke-Cornill (1994: 272 ff.), of pedagogic and textdidactic value because "sie öffnen die einzelnen Texte und schließlich das Thema selbst für eine weiterführende Auseinandersetzung" (they open the single texts and eventually the topic itself to further discussion).

A justified change oriented towards the attained learning level, opens up several possibilities of attracting attention or keeping one's distance, of perception and interpretation. Multilateralness and diversity in the offer of learning materials correspond with the complexity and differentiation of learning processes, lead to a "fusion" of language, the world and the self, alleviate this fusion of perspectives, of spoken and written language, of language with pictures in noise and sound or with pictorial and plastic expressions of states-of-affairs and actions.

2.2. Topics/contents of importance and relevance

Topics and contents in foreign language learning should not be chosen at random. Kramsch (1995: 52, 62) for example insists on "intellektuell vertretbare humanistisch orientierte Inhalte" und sich "mehr auf den neu entstehenden und sich verändernden... Sprachlerner/in selbst (zu) konzentrieren" (concentrating more and more on the newly emerging and altering... language learner by using intellectually acceptable, humanistically oriented subject matters) to supplement traditional communicative goals and a mere functional use of language.

Instead of beginning at the level of communication, deeper existential foundations of communicative language capacity are embraced so that language learning is combined with the development of personality. Therefore topics/contents of importance and relevance are needed, as for example Postman's (1992: 185 ff.) "most important and time tested stories of mankind" as a reservoir of resistence against the almighty power of the *technopol*. However, important narrations of our times in language, picture and film can also include contents of relevance. What does this mean in essence?

Depth instead of superficiality: According to Holzkamp (1995: 222) we see in depth "primär ein Kennzeichen des (Lern) **gegenstandes**, wie er mir von meinem Standort und meiner Perspektive aus gegeben ist" (primarily as a feature of the (learning-) **matter** apprehended from my personal situation and my perspective). "Ein Lerngegenstand ist mir zunächst 'in meiner unmittelbaren Weltsicht stets nur in seinen... oberflächlichen Beschaffenheiten zugänglich: Ob ich darüber hinaus weiter in ihn eindringen kann, hängt vor allem davon ab, wieweit er vermittelte Bedeutungsstrukturen enthält, die... bei weiterem

Gegenstandsaufschluß... erfaßbar werden, also quasi selbst *Tiefe* besitzt' " (In my immediate view of the world a learning-matter is first apprehended in its mere superficial structures: whether I shall be able to become involved deeper in it depends on how far it contains mediated meaning-structures that become comprehensible during further preoccupation, on the *depth* it contains in itself). Learning-matters must therefore consist of layers of meaning; they have to be ambiguous and open to interpretation, involve problems, enigmatic and troubling aspects, also innovative and alternative perspectives to affect the pupil and aid an intensive processing in the depth of "Denk-Fühlen(s)" (thought-feeling) (Christa Wolf). Thus it brings about the analysis and development of sense.

Life-practice and experience as access: The version of the communicative-oriented *Threshold Level* (van Ek, Trim 1991), revised by the European Council, surprisingly contains "bestimmte '*universal experiences*' (S.103): existenzielle Daseinserfahrungen, die für alle Menschen prägend sind" (certain '*universal experiences*' (p. 301): existential experiences which are of permanent effect for all people). Following Zydatiß (1994: 367 f.) this shows "das Prinzip der Anbindung der auszuwählenden inhaltlichen Aspekte des jeweiligen Zielsprachenlandes an die bisherigen Lebenserfahrungen der Schüler" (the principle of binding the chosen content-aspects of the target-language-country to existing learning-experiences of the pupils). For the sake of general life-practice and experience, the perspectives of the text should meet the learners' pre-perspectives/previous experiences. Only then can a "Verschmelzung der Horizonte" (fusion of the horizons) (Gadamer 1965: 359) occur. The "principle of binding" is essential for learning in so far as the individuals may decide for themselves whether they will, for example, attend to a topic and certain contents or not. "Lerngegenstände sind... etwas, das dem Individuum auf der Weltseite gegenübersteht, dessen Aufschließung sich das Lernsubjekt zum Ziel machen kann..." (Learning matters are... something that faces the individual from the world around him/her, whose discovery the learning individual might be aiming at...) (Holzkamp 1995: 208). As a rule the binding succeeds when a relation can be established between learning matter and processes of finding the inner-self, so that the matter is considered of importance (cf Gienow 1994: 84 ff.).

In order to achieve a constantly deepening revelation of contexts in meaning and sense, which are particularly part of sociocultural topics concerning the target-language-country, its people or universal states-of-affairs and social experiences, contents of importance and significance are essential. This gives rise to the following criteria for choosing texts of different kinds of media:

– A text that is ambiguous, open to interpretation, and consists of layers of meaning will provoke and introduce individual as well as controversial variants of interpretations.

– It should include particularities, unusual aspects, improbabilities, or something enigmatic and problematic, in order to fascinate, make curious, initiate questions and predictions as well as stimulate imagination and thinking.

– It should concern as far as possible common life practice and experience, "Suchbewegungen" (searching-movements) (Ziehe) and processes of finding the self of the learner but it must also deliver understandable future-oriented perspectives so that "binding" and individual meaning making are possible in depth and intensity.

As a rule these requirements are fulfilled better by texts with art content than those without. Because of their layered ambiguity, symbolism and openness to interpretation they provoke the learner's own thinking concerning a certain topic, a fundamental basis of meaningful foreign language acquisition and usage.

3. Process-activating learning-techniques

3.1. A general illustration

We call all **those** techniques of learning and working in foreign language teaching "process-oriented" which stimulate and enhance psychomental processes within the learner, likely on the basis of theoretical references, presumable on the basis of considerations in didactics, proved by observations and experiences in the classroom as well as empirical investigations.

According to Little, they are intended to develop autonomy in the learner by inducing within him "*detachment, critical reflection, decision-making, and independent action*" (compare with part 1 of this article) and one could go on as follows: *enhance perception and comprehension; develop meaning and a critical view towards media – mainly their manipulative side; assimilate concepts; integrate content, language and intercultural learning; arouse communicative initiative and responsibility; stimulate productive and creative response.* Despite showing specific learning effects, many traditional learning procedures do not achieve these claims: multiple choice methods or immediate attaching of mother-tongue meanings to foreign language lexis, for example, shorten processes of thinking, make learning selective (limit intensive learning); mere *pattern drill* and many narrow fill-in exercises enhance superficial mechanical learning.

According to Rampillon (1985: 14) learning-techniques are "Verfahren, die vom Lernenden absichtsvoll und planvoll angewandt werden, um sein fremdsprachliches Lernen vorzubereiten, zu steuern und zu kontrollieren" (devices, which are applied intentionally and methodically by the learner to prepare, direct and control his foreign language learning). In contrast to working-techniques ("Arbeitstechniken") Wolff calls them process-oriented. Working-techniques most of all focus on the acquisition of mere linguistic skills/capabilities (1992: 173-187). Learning-techniques, however, are designed to achieve much more (see above).

On the base of theoretical findings and different publications on learning and working-techniques, Hellwig (1993: 87 ff.) compiled a catalogue of process-oriented techniques of learning and working (compare box 1). First, there are

less complex techniques such as basic forms of process-oriented learning, and second, rather complex techniques such as extended and comprehensive forms. Usually complex techniques include less complex techniques so that the pupil's permanent activation would be the result. The additional differentiation between techniques of language-reception and language-production stresses predominant aspects of language usage, for all given techniques include receptive as well as productive activities (compare box 1).

3.2. Specification in practice

The following example from teaching practice will illustrate the concept:

A BLAKE-poem interpreted pictorially. Although the stimulating effects of pictorial art on speech and writing have meanwhile been recommended and practised more often (Akinro 1993; Eichhorn-Eugen 1993; Mischkowski 1995; Hellwig, Siekmann 1989; Charpentier, Cros, Dupont, Marcou 1995), the transposition of literary texts into pictures has been uncommon in foreign language teaching. W. Blake (1757-1827), G. M. Hopkins (1988: 134 ff., 36 ff., 48; ^{2}1985: 27 ff., 30 ff.) were pictorial artists as well as poets and thus created many of their works through the eyes of an artist, as visualised art in linguistic form. Because of this, some of their texts are open to picture interpretation, may in fact suggest this to visual processing recipients.

An example for such a poem is Blake's passionate light-vision in form of a letter: *First Letter, to Thomas Butts* (Oct. 1800), written from Felpham to his friend and patron. This mystic-anthropocosmic vision is an important, extremely meaningful text even for today's young people, as the following reception will show. In a seminar on "English Poems about 1800," Hellwig proved different ways of interpretation in pair-work: (i) the traditional analysis following the systematic criteria of lyric evaluation (the speaker's point of view, their layers of meaning and linguistic means of expressing), (ii) the free translation into the German language and the explanation of the translation-process as well as, (iii) the interpretation with the help of a pictorial draft and its explanation in foreign language. The variants (ii) and (iii) can be called process-oriented ('*language and media transferring*'). In two (of nine) groups students preferred pictorial transposition.

M. Meynecke's result of the pictorial processing of language is preceded by her personal descriptive draft of understanding:

> The first three lines are a kind of introduction. The lyrical I... tells the reader that he had a vision when he was looking at the sea... The following 71 lines are a description of the vision, while the last two lines belong to the speaker's reality again. It is not difficult for the reader to distinguish the lyrical I's reality in the introduction and at the end of the poem from the vision which is described in between. The vision itself, however, consists of several images, which blend into one another. The first image (l.s. 4-22) is dominated by the light of the sun, which is personified in lines 21 and 22: 'For each was a man/Human-form'd.' The second image continues the idea of human forms in nature: 'Every stone on the Land/...Cloud Meteor & Star/Are Men Seen Afar.' (l.s. 26-32). In the third image the lyrical I becomes a part of this vision of light. He seems to float in the sunbeams and sees the town of Felpham beneath his 'bright feet' (l.s. 33-36); Then he describes Felpham's personification as a woman with 'soft Female charms' (l. 37). This woman holds the shadows of his friends and family in her arms. In contrast to the lines before the next passage of the poem (l.s. 45-59) is much more difficult to describe as a clear picture. Here the many men formed by light and sunbeams blend into one man who speaks to the lyrical I (l.s. 50,51). In the next image the 'sun-man' addresses a 'ram horned with gold' (l. 62). In the final image the lyrical I becomes a child again and sees his friend by 'the fountains of life' (l. 76).

The student offers a first result of her process-like experience with poetry. With the help of a descriptive-arranging strategy, factual and strategic-procedural knowledge of the world and language were activated by following the pictorial expressions of the letter-poem passage by passage, observing, understanding and, in the initial stage, interpreting to develop a picture-anticipating concept of understanding.



The draft shows the sun-man in his polar – cosmic and worldly – reference. It is interesting how the student, referring to the poem, manages to show human nature in its complex and nearly mystic-surrealistic overlapping or 'merging' of worldly-cosmic, female-male, individual and social aspects and relations. Here the process-like language processing becomes felt conceptualisation as though turning deep internal experiences outside by way of illustration. Her explanation ('*explaining*') comments on the sketch, transforming pictorial production again into language production, and so indicates the boundary limits of a pictorial interpretation of poetry.

> It is quite difficult to transform a mythical and visionary poem like Blake's... into a picture that is to contain every part of the text. The poem consists of several visions... which are not clearly separated from each other. In my sketch I try to combine the idea of the 'sun-man' with the other separate images. I had to do without a pictorial presentation of the lyrical I because it would have been too difficult for me to distinguish him from the other human shapes in the picture, for example his friend in the arms of the woman of Felpham or the human forms in nature. Therefore my picture contains the coastal landscape in the introduction, the sun as a human shape composed of many smaller shapes, a woman arising from the

houses and church of a town, some human figures in her arms, the human shapes in nature and the 'ram...' In the poem the whole vision seems to be ruled by the idea of everything merging into the sunbeams. That is the reason why the sun is the biggest figure in my picture and the other figures are subordinated to it.

Whereas the landscape, the sun and the woman of the town of F. can easily be connected, I had some difficulties with 'the ram...' To me it is not clear where he has to be placed in this order of figures. He is too important to be left out, however, and so I had to place him in the skirt of the woman. In this position he can be interpreted as being opposite to the sun as well as being part of the whole vision.

C. Rankin emphasises in the processing-result of her pictorial sketch the archetype of femaleness and maleness in the vision and interprets it as being part of the sun-like, life-giving energy-centre of *Mother Nature* as well as her ecological context.

- Mother Nature cradling the world in the palm of her hand.
- She is presented in antique clothing, a ring of flowers in her hair. (circle of life)
- The power emitted from this world shoots powerful rays of energy, but encircles it, keeping all of its life alive and taking power from the life itself to stay alive. (again the circle of life)
- This energy in the poem is presented by a male figure. Our ring of energy is just as large as Mother Nature and they stand opposite to one another. They take to and give to one another in equal parts.

  Mother Nature ⟷ Sun/Energy
  (female) ⟷ (male)

  Without men there would be no woman and vice versa.
- Our male figure is more abstract.
- The ram is in the center of all nature, atop the mountain, emitting his energy and wondering and marvelling at all of the nature around him. (Ram = Sun)
- All aspects of nature mentioned in the poem are present in our picture, i.e: Trees/Water/Moon/Falling Stars/Ram/Sun.
- They are all elements needed in the circle of life and needed in our little biosphere.

Both students were deeply stimulated and moved by the visionary-mystic as well as micro- and macroscopic perspectives of the poem's speaker. Whereas the first example shows processing oriented more towards the initial text, the second one seems to be rather recipient-determined, for distinctively individual personal and more topical perspectives are visible.

The double-task "pictorial interpretation and its explanation by language" lead, as the texts show themselves, to a permanent, activating and deepening,

intensive preoccupation with the poem in the form of pictorial and linguistic activity. As a result, new texts have been developed which are doubly subjective. In the first case the meaning of the poem was taken up into the student's personal meaning repertoire rather by understanding and clinging to the text; the student in the second example tried to relate the personal sense-concept to a possible, relatively central interpretation-variant of the Blake-text.

By using corresponding lyrical and narrative texts that are productive for learners, this method of proceeding might be applicable as well in advanced English language classes (further examples Wordsworth: *Written in March, Lucy Gray*).

Box 1: Process-oriented techniques of working and learning

Less complex techniques of language-*reception*:

– *note-taking*: taking down of keyword notes on the contents of texts;
– *note-making*: taking down of keyword notes and comments on a text;
– *scanning*: taking down specific information from a text;
– *reducing*: oral or written reduction of a text to important bits/parts that can be a sentence or even a single word;
– *headlining*: oral or written summary of a text by a headline;
– *outlining*: developing an oral or written structure of a text;
– *skimming*: oral and/or written collection of initial impressions after reading a text (spontaneous utterances).

Rather complex techniques of language-*reception*:

– *diagrammatic evaluating*: oral and/or written production of graphic-visual schemes of evaluation that contain elements from drawing (i.e. narration-diagram, plot-structure, configuration-diagram);
– *discourse evaluating*: text discussion aiming at deeper understanding through the comparison of individual interpretations;
– *matching and comparing*: oral and/or written matching and comparing of texts and text-elements (even from different forms of media).

Less complex techniques of language-*production*:

– *bi-sociating*: oral or written linking of contradictory expressions and utterances;
– *associating*: oral or written collection of associations on a stimulating word, sentence or text;
– *substituting*: oral and/or written substitution of elements of a text (word, line, sentence, passage, refrain, verse,...);
– *elaborating and inferring*: oral and/or written filling of text gaps (word,...) which were originally present or subsequently inserted.

Rather complex techniques of language-*production*:

– *reconstructing*: written restoration of a heavily reduced text (for instance up to a headline);

– *scheme transferring*: mostly written creation of a commonly known text-type-scheme by filling it with new meaning through language;

– *language transferring*: oral and/or written translation of a text (particularly 'process productive' with literary short-forms);

– *media transferring*: oral or written transposition of a text (for example picture → language text and vice versa, language text → pictorial language-text and vice versa, narrating text → radio-play or acting out and vice versa).

Although this catalogue is already rather large, its permanent extension will still be possible in reflective-imaginative teaching practice.

Box 2: Examples from teaching practice

Akinro (1993) describes a variety of process-oriented learning-techniques while dealing with the painting *Experiment with an Air-Pump* (J. Wright of Derby, 1786) in different English classes of a Realschule.

Blell (1994) develops new process-oriented ways of learning on the basis of threefold processing of language and information by using literary-, pictorial- and music-texts' in English language teaching.

Donnerstag (1994) deals with popular American TV-series as an opportunity for processes of intercultural reception. In a teaching-unit on changes in the concept of family he recommends newer, more learner-oriented forms of processing.

Ek, Legenhausen and Wolff (1994) present process-oriented language-researching learning with relevant topics for pupils in a project on telecommunication in English language teaching.

Hellwig demonstrated (1994) elsewhere, but in connection with the Potsdam–Hannover-project "Process orientation in dealing with poems by Stephen Crane."

Kupetz (1994) describes process-oriented working with lexis by the help of stimulating video-programmes.

Rattunde (1993: 94) describes process-oriented creative learning for beginners of French in connection with literary-dramatic short-texts and scenic language activity as an *expression dramatique*. Additionally he presents a teaching experiment on *Simulation globale* under the heading *...camping* where media with highly stimulative potential as well as basically creative activities supported process-oriented learning.

Rautenhaus (1993: 94) reports on communicative language productive learning by the exchange of realistic and authentic texts through computer-assisted English language teaching. This approach is supplemented by concrete process-oriented techniques such as text comparison, text-reconstruction with the help of

Puzzling and roleplay as well as text bound establishing of pictorial and board game media.

Thyrolf (1993) shows, how process-oriented techniques become effective while working with original Russian radio plays.

Material 1

First letter, to Thomas Butts

To my friend Butts I write
My first Vision of Light
On the yellow sands sitting:
The Sun was Emitting
His Glorious beams
From Heaven's high Streams
Over sea over Land
My Eyes did Expand
Into regions of air
Away from all Care,
Into regions of fire
Remote from Desire
The Light of the Morning
Heaven's Mountains adorning:
In particles bright
The jewels of Light
Distinct shone & clear, –
Amaz'd & in fear
I each particle gazed,
Astonish'd Amazed
For each was a Man
Human form'd: Swift I ran
For they beckon'd to me
Remote by the Sea
Saying: Each grain of Sand
Every Stone on the Land
Each rock & each hill
Each fountain & rill
Each herb & each tree
Mountain, hill, earth & sea
Cloud Meteor & Star
Are Men Seen Afar.
I stood in the Streams
Of Heaven's bright beams
And Saw Felpham sweet
Beneath my bright feet
In soft Female charms,
And in her fair arms
My shadow I knew
And my wife's shadow too
And my Sister & Friend
We like Infants descend
In our Shadows on Earth,
Like a weak mortal birth:
My eyes more & more
Like a Sea without shore
Continue Expanding
The Heaven's commanding,
Till the Jewels of Light
Heavenly Men beaming bright
Appear'd as one man,
Who Complacent began
My limbs to infold
In his beams of bright gold:
Like dross purg'd away
All my mire & my clay.
Soft consum'd in delight
In his Bosom sun bright
I remain'd: Soft he smil'd
And I heard his voice Mild
Saying: This is my Fold
O thou Ram horn'd with gold,
Who awakest from Sleep
On the Sides of the Deep.
On the mountains around
The roarings resound
Of the lion & wolf,
The loud sea & deep gulf:
These are the guards of My Fold
O thou Ram horn'd with gold!
And the voice faded mild:
I remain'd as a child
All I ever had known
Before me bright Shone:
I saw you and your Wife
By the fountains of life.
Such the Vision to me
Appear'd on the sea.

William Blake

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The Semantics of *gold(en)* in Contemporary English

This article aims to present a semantic portrait of *gold(en)*[1] as a colour term. In order to define colour terms in linguistic literature reference is often made to various domains of human experience, to different fields of science and knowledge.

As colour is a light wave of a particular length, it can be analysed as a physical or mathematical category. As we derive colour sensations from nerve reactions in the eye and the brain, colour can be viewed as a biological or neurological category. On the basis of the appearance of colour to human observers, colour can also be characterised as a psychological category that enables people, for example, to identify or classify, to measure reaction time or ability to memorise, etc. Finally, colour can be interpreted from a linguistic point of view, which is the perspective adopted in this paper.

To introduce the concept *gold(en)*, let us mention first the basic meanings of the word.

The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (Flexner 1987) gives, among others, the following definitions (which cover both the literal and metaphorical sense of the word):

(i) **gold**, *n.*
1. a precious yellow metallic element, highly malleable and ductile, and not subject to oxidation or corrosion.
2. a quantity of gold coins: *to pay in gold.*
3. money; wealth; riches.
4. something likened to this metal in brightness, preciousness, superiority, etc.: *a heart of gold.*
5. a bright, metallic yellow color, sometimes tending toward brown.

(ii) **gold**, *adj.*
1. consisting of gold.

[1] This form will be used throughout the paper to stand for both *gold* and *golden* (being interchangeable in many contexts).

2. pertaining to gold.
3. like gold.
4. of the color of gold.

(iii) **golden**, *adj.*

1. bright, metallic, or lustrous like gold; of the color of gold; yellow: *golden hair.*
2. made or consisting of gold: *golden earrings.*
3. exceptionally valuable, advantageous, or fine: *a golden opportunity.*
4. having glowing vitality; radiant: *golden youth.*
5. full of happiness, prosperity, or vigor: *golden hours; a golden era of exploration.*
6. highly talented and favored; destined for success: *television's golden boy.*
7. richly soft and smooth: *a golden voice.*
8. indicating the fiftieth event of a series.

As *gold(en)* does not meet the criteria set for a universal basic colour term (as proposed by Berlin and Kay[2]), and is generally believed to belong to the semantic field formed around *yellow*, it might be advisable to find first a prototypical reference for *yellow*, and then examine and, possibly, compare the semantics of both *yellow* and *gold(en)*. After that we could examine whether the sense of a non-basic term (i.e. *gold(en)*) develops parallelly to the connotation of the basic colour (i.e. *yellow*) – whether the senses are linked or whether they contradict each other. Our assumption is that a non-basic colour term can replicate, at least partially, the semantic picture of its basic colour counterpart.

Before starting the analysis it might be useful to discuss the origin of *gold(en)*, as it will give us a general picture of the place and meaning of the word among other colour terms.

According to *Bloomsbury Dictionary of Word Origins* (Ayto 1990):

> **gold** [OE] *Gold* gets its name from its colour. The perception of what this is has varied. In the ancient Germanic languages, *red* was often used as a poetic epithet for 'gold,' and in English this survives into the present day as an archaism. And Latin *aurum* 'gold,' source of French *or* and Italian and Spanish *oro*, is probably related to words for 'dawn' (such as Latin *aurora*), the inspiration in both cases being 'redness.' The word *gold*, however, depends on the metal's yellowness. It goes back to Indo-European **ghel-*, source of English *yellow*. From this was formed **ghltom* 'gold,' which was the ancestor of Russian *zoloto* 'gold,' Polish *złoto* (whence *złoty* 'golden,' used as the name of a Polish coin), Sanskrit *hiranya-* 'gold,' and the various Germanic words for 'gold': English and German *gold*, Dutch *goud*, and Swedish and Danish *guld*.
>
> *Golden* is a Middle English derivative of *gold*, replacing the earlier *gilden*, which came from Old English *gylden*. Of related forms in other Germanic languages, Dutch *gulden* is the source of the coin-name *guilder*. The verb *gild*, from Old English *gyldan*, retains its original vowel; *gilt* began life as its past participle.

[2] In their classic, *Basic Color Terms*, Berlin and Kay (1969) introduced the notion of basic colour term. Their criteria to determine whether a colour term in a particular language can be assigned the status of basic colour term are the following:

1) it must be monolexemic (morphemic),
2) its signification must not be included in another colour term's,
3) its usage must not be restricted to a narrow range of objects,
4) it must be psychologically salient.

Compare Klein's (1971) definition:

> **gold**, n. – (...) traceable to I.-E. base *ĝhel-, *ghel-, 'to shine; yellow,' and orig. meant 'the *yellow* metal'(...).

We can notice that *gold(en)* is formally and semantically linked to *gold* as metal (although there is some relation to *red* as well – but this should not contradict any further findings since *red* and *yellow* are semantically closely related as the so-called 'warm' colours).

Our understanding of the meaning of a word is based on Anna Wierzbicka's views on language (Wierzbicka 1972, 1980, 1985, 1990), and, in the case of colours, may be described more or less as: "It is what people mean when they use a given colour term." According to Wierzbicka, the 'focal stability' of colour concepts discovered by Berlin and Kay (1969) may be explained by the presence in people's experience of some standard and probably universal points of reference. These universals are mostly related to human experience, and involve concepts such as *day* and *night*, *fire*, *sun*, *blood*, *milk*, *charcoal*, *sky*, *ground*, *plants* or *grass*.

For the basic colour term *yellow* Wierzbicka (1980) proposes the prototypical reference to the sun:

yellow – colour thought of as the colour of sun

(although in an earlier study – see Wierzbicka (1978) – she proposes the egg yolk, which was later rejected on objection that in some parts of the world there are no eggs with yellow yolk, so the concept is not universal).

The lexical, semantic, and cultural relation of *yellow* with the sun is confirmed in colour symbolism, in texts, in painting, etc. Tokarski (1995) seems to be right pointing out that this relation may be reflected, for example, in the fact that in children's pictures the sun is regularly painted yellow. This is a simple example of a picture of an object that determines the choice of a given colour ("if it is the sun, it must be yellow"), while the colour is linked not only to this object, but can be linked with a variety of different objects. Similar analogies can be also found in language. The establishing of the range of possible prototypical references aims to separate accidental, nonconventional uses of a given colour term (e.g. *yellow curtain*, *yellow car*, etc.) from the collocations that reflect the prototypical reference as a significant component of the definition of the colour term.

To support the linguistic analysis it seems necessary to provide a systematic account of colour symbolism which is reflected in the broad sphere of semantic connotations, and examine if these connotations are linked with the prototypical value of a given colour. Therefore, before providing some collocations of *yellow* and *gold(en)*, let us briefly discuss the symbolic significance of the two colours. Colour symbolism, like any other symbolism, has often been inconsistent or even contradictory: one object can signify two different, and even opposite values. For example, as Cummings and Porter (1990) write, *yellow* is the symbolic colour of the sun. For the ancient Greeks it represented fire and the

sun, and for Hindus and Christians it symbolises life and truth. For the Chinese or Leonardo da Vinci it was the colour of the earth. It is the Hindu marriage colour, and was the colour of Athena the classical goddess of wisdom and the patroness of institutions of learning and the arts. In heraldry it designated honour and loyalty. *Yellow*, however, may also suggest negative characteristics. Dark yellow has been used to indicate treason and jealousy, and yellow has often been the symbol of cowardice, prejudice and persecution. Judas Iscariot is often portrayed in pictures wearing a yellow robe.

Gold(en), on the other hand, occupies a privileged position in the kingdom of colours. Its associations are not only wide and strong, but also almost always positive. *Gold(en)* has almost no negative connotations (at least in art, where it usually symbolises light), unlike its close relative, *yellow*, which, as has been mentioned, may evoke negative associations.

The symbolism of *gold(en)* is based on two main attributes of gold as a metal: its value[3] (preciousness, uniqueness, superiority); and its colour, which symbolises light and brilliance, thus evoking positive associations. This symbolism reoccurred throughout the history, with greater or smaller strength, and was the most influential during the Middle Ages. As Rzepińska (1989) notices, despite all the ambiguity of colour interpretation, people of the Middle Ages were aware how strongly colour affected the human psyche, and made use of this strength as extremely powerful and valuable. The brilliancy of gold and light was used to reflect the metaphysical philosophy of the period. *Vera lux* – God – has always been identified in the Christian philosophy with light: "God is light; in him there is no darkness at all" (St. John 1:5). And St. Augustine, one of the greatest authorities of the early Middle Ages, making a reference to this statement, says: "Deus veritas est; hic enim scriptum est: quoniam Dei lux est." In this "light metaphysics" or "light ontology" characteristic of the medieval Christian philosophy, we may notice two main aspects of the Christian attitude towards art: the importance of the brilliancy of gold as beauty reflecting God's light, the highest beauty; and the importance of the transcendent preciousness of the material, a substance through the value, beauty and durability of which people worship God.

Let us, then, repeat: *gold(en)* in painting means *light*, and that means the *sun* – the most perfect source of light.

To express the above-mentioned notions, gold (as a paint or metal) has been employed in the visual arts: painting, sculpture, stained glass, etc. Language has also made use of the highly symbolic value of *gold(en)*: the word, apart from being used in its strictly literal meaning, has been employed in poetic and rhetorical language, in various metaphorical expressions, idioms, sayings, proverbs, etc.

[3] Possibly the first metal used by humans, gold was valued for ornaments, and magical powers were attributed to it. Alchemists of the Middle Ages tried to transmute baser metals into gold.

But the analogy between the artistic view of colours and the linguistic one is only a hypothesis. In order to prove this analogy, we are going to analyse typical collocations of *yellow* and *gold(en)*, and examine the metaphorical meanings of these terms by analysing synonyms of the two words.

It is not our aim to provide an exhaustive list of collocations of *yellow*, as this term is treated only as a basis of the analysis of *gold(en)*. A good selection of expressions with *yellow* can be found in a large dictionary (see, for example, Gove (1966). We can easily notice that *yellow*, unlike *gold(en)*, does not have much expressive value. It forms fewer collocations and the majority of them refer mainly to the colour in its literal sense, and not, as we shall see in the case of *gold(en)*, in a metaphorical sense.

This lack of expressive, metaphorical collocations may be explained by the fact that the prototypical reference to the sun with all its connotations of brightness, warmth, joy, perfection, or beauty, is taken over from *yellow* by a 'more suitable' colour term, that is *gold(en)*. Why does this happen? (In other words: Why do we say: *golden hair* rather than *yellow hair*?)

In the case of *gold(en)*, the prototypical reference to the sun seems to be additionally enriched by more or less distinct references to the basic meaning of the adjective, that is 'made of gold,' also 'containing gold' or 'coated with gold.' The two references, though, do not contradict each other – on the contrary – they appear to reinforce each other, creating a double motivation for the meaning of the term. Gold, as a precious metal, is regarded as a symbol of wealth, dignity, perfection. It is from this original meaning of *gold* as metal that the connotations of the adjective *gold(en)* have arisen. Sometimes it appears impossible to separate the use of the word in its basic meaning from its metaphorical or expressive use.

Now we shall make an attempt to classify *gold(en)*-related expressions into several groups on the basis of the degree of their metaphoricalness or abstraction. We start from literal expressions containing the word, that is expressions referring directly to *gold* as metal. Here *gold* is used with defining words in the names of various kinds of gold, alloys, counterfeit imitations of gold, etc. (for example: *angel gold*, *ducat gold*, *German gold*, *dentist gold*, *jeweller's gold*, *coloured gold*), with reference to the use of gold for coinage and as a standard of value, as *gold currency*, *gold standard*, *gold value*. Some of those expressions denote objects made of gold, e.g. *gold medal*, *gold plate*, *gold spring*, some are used for objects which contain gold, e.g. *gold stone*, *goldwasser*, *cloth of gold*. All these expressions, as we have said, refer to *gold* as an element, to its literal sense, therefore they are neutral, not charged emotionally or given any symbolic meaning or value.

Here are more examples:
afflux/influx of gold, *argental gold*, *bar gold*, *coined gold*, *common gold*, *crown gold*, *dead gold*, *duke gold*, *Dutch gold*, *earmarked gold*, *essayed gold*, *Etruscan gold*, *fairy gold*, *fine gold*, *fool's gold*, *free gold*, *fulminating gold*, *gipsy gold*, *graphic gold*, *green gold*, *leaf gold*, *leprous gold*, *Mannheim gold*, *mock gold*,

monetary gold, mosaic gold, pure gold, rate of gold, red gold, refined gold, roman gold, shell gold, solid gold, sovereign gold, spangle gold, standard gold, strike gold, unwrought gold, virgin gold, white gold, gold-amalgam, gold backing, gold-bank, gold basis, gold-bearing, gold-beating/beater, gold bloc, gold blocking, gold-bob, gold bond, gold-book, gold bullion (standard), gold certificate, gold clause, gold-cloth/web, gold digging/digger, gold doping, gold-drawer, gold-dredger/dredging, gold-driver, gold-drop/per, gold dust, gold-end-man, gold-exchange standard, gold fever, gold field, gold-filled, gold-film (glass), gold-finer, gold-finger, gold fixing, gold flat, gold-flint, gold foil, gold-ground, gold-hammer, gold-hewn, gold hoarding, gold holdings, gold-house, gold-hunger, gold loan, gold market, gold-mill, gold-mine/r, gold-mint, gold-note, gold number, gold-ore, gold-pan, gold-paper, gold parity, gold pin, gold plate, gold-plating, gold point, gold pool, gold-powder, gold premium, gold-proof, gold-purple, gold-quarrel, gold-quartz, gold reserve, gold-rush, gold-rimmed, gold salt, gold-sand, gold-shell, gold-size, gold-skin, goldsmith/ing, gold-solder, gold-stroke, gold teeth, gold therapy, gold-thirst/y, gold-thread, gold tooling, gold-wash/er, gold-work, golden calf, golden earrings, Golden Fleece, golden goose, golden rose.

Another group of *gold* expressions consists of expressions denoting objects resembling gold in colour, made of similar material, or pretending to be gold. They are mostly animal (*goldfish, golden eagle, golden oriole*) and plant (*golden aster, golden currant, goldcup*) names, derived from the colour (a light olive-brown to dark yellow, or a moderate, strong to vivid yellow), but may also denote other things, e.g. *golden syrup, golden shower, gold bronze*. The difference between them and those from the first group is that "there is no real gold in them" (there is also a shift in the form of the word: while in the first group the dominating modifier is *gold*, in the other *golden* predominates). These expressions could, therefore, be also considered neutral, as they, again, refer mainly to the physical characteristics of gold (i.e. the colour) and not to its connotations and symbolism. On the other hand, however, they may be considered 'less' neutral than those from the first group, as most of the objects they denote are actually yellow, and *gold* is used instead to add some positive connotations.

And, again, let us provide more examples:
gold-balls, gold basket, gold beetle, gold beryl, gold-bloom, gold-breasted trumpeter, goldbrick, gold-bug, gold-capped weaver bird, gold-carp, gold-crap/cups, goldcrest, goldeye, goldfields, goldfinch, goldfinny/goldsinny, gold-flower, gold-flux, gold-fringe, gold-hammer, gold-head, gold-knap/knop, gold-lily, gold-lip, gold medal, gold-mestling, gold-moh(u)r, gold of pleasure, gold-rain, gold-rimmed, gold-seed, gold-shrub, goldsmith beetle, gold-solder, gold-spangle, gold-spot, gold stick, gold-stone, gold swift, gold-tail (moth), gold-thread, gold-tipped, gold-web, gold-worm, golden agouti, golden alexanders, golden apple, gold(en)back, golden ball, golden bamboo, golden bantam, golden barb, golden bell, golden berry, golden-breasted vulture, golden-brown algae, golden buck, goldenbush, golden calla, golden cat, gold(en)-chain, golden-cheeked warbler,

golden chinquapin, golden clematis, golden-club, golden-comb, golden-crested kinglet/regulus/wren, golden-crown, golden-crowned kinglet/sparrow/thrush/wren, golden cuckoo, golden cudweed, golden-cup (oak), Golden Delicious, golden-doucet, golden-drop, golden dust, golden ear, golden eardrops, golden earth, golden-eye, golden fizz, golden-(eyed) fly, golden feather, golden fir, golden fizz, golden flax, golden flower, golden flower of Peru, golden glow, golden gram, golden-hair/ed, golden hamster, golden-head, golden herb, golden-knob, golden-knop, golden labrador, golden lion tamarin, golden-locks, golden-lungwort, golden maid/enhair, golden manakin, golden marguerite, golden Mary, golden millet, golden mole, golden moss, golden mothwort, golden munday, golden needles, golden nematode, golden net, golden nugget, golden oak (mushroom), golden oat, golden osier, golden perch, golden pert, golden pheasant, golden-pippin, golden plover, golden polypody, golden ragwort, golden rain (tree), golden-rayed lily, golden-rennet, golden retriever, golden-ring, gold(en) robin, goldenrod, golden russet, golden samphire, golden saxifrage, golden-seal, golden sherry, golden shiner, golden slipper, golden-spoon, golden spur, gold(en) star, golden thistle, golden-top, golden trefoil, golden tuft, golden(-winged) warbler, golden-wasp, golden wattle, golden willow, gold(en)-wing/ed, golden-winged woodpecker, golden-withy, golden wrasse, golden warbler, Goldie's fern, goldilocks, fool's gold, marigold, old gold.

The last group comprises the most complex set of expressions, related to gold in a more abstract sense: suggestive of gold as in richness or splendour (*golden voice*), precious (*golden memories*), marked by prosperity (*golden era*), excellent (*golden opportunity*), etc. Some of the literal expressions listed in the first group have acquired, by metaphorical extension, figurative meanings, e.g. *gold mill, gold mine, golden calf, gold digger.*

Here are some other examples of the metaphorical use of *gold(en)*:
gold braid, goldbrick/er, gold-bug, gold coast, gold dust, goldfinch, gold-plate, gold record/disk, gold rush, gold-sand, gold star, golden age, golden ager, golden arrow, golden book, Golden Bull, golden doughnut, golden dream, golden duck, golden generation, golden girl/boy, golden goose, golden handcuffs, golden handshake, golden hello, golden hoof, golden jubilee, golden mean, gold(en)-mouthed, golden number, golden oldie, golden opinion, golden parachute/ umbrella, golden remedy, golden rule, golden saying, golden section, golden share, golden spur, golden times, golden-toned, golden touch, golden wedding, golden words, golden years, black gold, fool's gold, pure gold, refined gold, ringing/clinking gold, gilded youth, gilt-edged securities/stocks, a voice of gold, a heart of gold (golden-hearted), a crock of gold, as good as gold, gild refined gold, strike gold, the crock of gold at the end of the rainbow, worth one's weight in gold,
and some sayings and proverbs:
All is not gold that glitters; Gold is but muck; Gold is tried in the fire; Golden dreams make men awake hungry; He that has gold may buy land; He who flings gold away with his hands seeks it with his feet; The golden age was never the

present age; Though stone were changed to gold, the heart of man would not be satisfied; We must not look for a golden life in an iron age; When we have gold, we are in fear; When we have none we are in danger.

Clear-cut boundaries between the groups are often difficult to establish; for example *gold medal* can mean: 'medal made of gold,' 'gold-coloured medal,' or may even mean any token of recognition. As it has been mentioned, some of the expressions are metaphorical versions of the literal expressions from the first group (e.g. *gold dust*). That is why they appear in different groups. There is also a set of expressions the origin of which is not very obvious, and difficult to determine: they may refer either to the colour of gold (then they would be placed in the second group), or to its uniqueness, preciousness etc. (and then they would be listed in the third group, as metaphorical expressions referring to the value of the metal). This group consists mainly of geographical names, but a few other proper names can also be found.

Some examples:

Gold Coast, Golden Arches, Golden Bough, Golden Bridge, Golden Chersonese, Golden Cloud, Golden Flake, Golden Gate, Golden Globe Awards, Golden Gloves, Golden Hind, Golden Horde, Golden Horn, Golden Horseshoe, Golden Kiwi, Golden State, Golden Triangle, Golden Valley.

Interestingly, there are some expressions containing *gold(en)* which are negatively coloured, e.g. *goldbrick/er, gold-plate* (in metaphorical sense), *fool's gold.* These illustrate the (marginal) set of connotations of *gold* as a noun: symbolising wealth, *gold* may be used in expressions indicating the danger connected with it, expressions which say that wealth, money can have a negative influence, that it can corrupt, that it has great power (power that can be used also for wrong purposes). This is well reflected in many popular sayings, e.g.:

A golden key opens every door; An ass loaded with gold climbs to the top of a castle; Gold does not belong to the miser, but the miser to gold; Gold dust blinds all eyes; Gold goes in at any gate except heaven's; Gold is an orator; What cannot gold do?, etc.

The above expressions, however, do not interfere with our description of the (mostly positive) semantic picture of *gold(en)* – actually, being exceptional, they support it.

So far, therefore, the connotations connected with *gold(en)* have proved to be positive.

Another reason why *gold(en)* is rich in positive associations may be provided by an analysis of synonyms of the word, both literal and metaphorical. To make the analysis even more telling, we shall contrast these synonyms with the synonyms of its closest relative – *yellow.*

Apart from neutral synonyms of *yellow* as a colour, a medical term, or an adjective denoting the Mongoloid race (here the meaning of *yellow*, if not derogative, is not particularly positive, either), terms which may be not relevant for our discussion, *Longman Synonym Dictionary* (Urdang 1992) lists:

yellow, *adj.* **4.** *Informal.* cowardly, craven, pusillanimous, *Inf.* mousy, *Sl.* chicken; timid, timorous, fearful, afraid, frightened; faint-hearted, weak-kneed, lily-livered, *Inf.* chicken-hearted, pigeon-hearted; unmanly, cringing, grovelling, slinking, snivelling, sneaking; panicky, daunted, intimidated, afraid of one's shadow.
5. (*of journalism*) sensational, lurid, sordid, blood-and-thunder; scandal-mongering, muck-raking; melodramatic, Barnumesque.

In the case of *golden* we have:

golden, *adj.* **1.** gold-coloured, gold, gilt, gilded, auriferous; yellow, yellowish, xantous; bright, metallic, glittering, glittery, shining, shiny, lustrous; gleaming, brilliant, dazzling, splendrous, splendid, resplendent.
2. priceless, invaluable, very valuable, precious, highly prized, of great worth; costly, high-priced, dear, expensive.
3. fine, rich, superb, excellent, perfect; favourable, propitious, good, timely, opportune, advantageous, profitable; fortunate, lucky, providential, auspicious; optimistic, promising, rosy, roseate, sunny, smiling.
4. radiant, glowing, shining, sparkling; exuberant, alive, vigorous, vital, healthy.
5. prosperous, halycon, flourishing, thriving, palmy, successful, glorious, good; happy, peaceful, blessed, blest, beatific, blissful, joyous, delightful, pleasant.
6. talented, gifted, exceptional, special; favoured, favourite, pet, cherished, beloved, loved; acclaimed, applauded, lauded, praised, *Inf.* much-touted.
7. rich, deep, soft, low, smooth, mellow, velvety.
8. *Slang.* wealthy, rich, opulent, affluent, well-to-do, well-off, *Inf.* well-heeled; moneyed, fat, flush, *Inf.* in the money, *Sl.* in the bucks, *Sl.* in the dough.

It does not require a deep analysis to notice that the synonyms of *yellow* concentrate mainly around cowardice or sensationalism, both of which have negative meanings, while the synonyms of *golden* evoke mostly positive associations.

In the 'competition' between the two terms, *gold(en)*, although not a basic colour, seems to place itself, beside *yellow*, in the centre of the semantic field of *yellow*-related colour terms. They are linked semantically (and etymologically), but at least some of their textual uses have different prototypical references and, accordingly, different connotations. Sometimes they may be used interchangeably but *gold(en)*, usually, carries additional expressive value, and so it is employed in various metaphorical expressions.

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